R|D

Articulation and Representational Divergence

Victor Peterson II

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This series of occasional papers is published by
The Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities
The University of Edinburgh
2 Hope Park Square
Edinburgh EH8 9NW

Published August 2022
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ISSN 2041-8817 (Print)
ISSN 2634-7342 (Online)
ISBN 978-0-9568610-4-7
Institute Occasional Papers, 24

The University of Edinburgh is a charitable body, registered in Scotland,
with registration number SC00533

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The Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities

The University of Edinburgh

2022





THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

ISBN 978 0 9568610 4 7

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication was completed while the author was a RACE.ED Archival Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh, in spring 2022.

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FOREWORD

Articulation theory is the study of how relations of subordination and dominance emerge. The function whose operation places the dominant over the subordinate expresses the concept of overdetermination. In the following chapters, we will model this concept's formation by way of a series of events whose inner relations compose a vector that models the activity of the subjects whose relations constitute the conditions in which that vector is considered significant. We formalize the encounter between the forms of life implied by these subjects' activity—the cross-product between the frames of reference they employ—to indicate how two or more levels of society and/or of individuals (events, persons, institutions) constitute the state of affairs under consideration. In so doing, we can analyze things that are by definition dynamic, moving, and paradigmatically constructed. Articulation theory being the study of how dominance and subordination emerge, we shall develop a method to apply this framework to our current state of affairs.

From what we've gathered from the formal development of Articulation theory, we will then be able to utilize a game-theoretic model to explore concepts of Race and processes of racialization by treating societal formations as incentivized structures. The study of Race, then, becomes a study of position within this framework. In developing this game-theoretical approach, we make one of the few attempts licensed by this formalization of Articulation theory that's applied to the study of these mechanisms organizing society. By doing so, we fulfil a call made at UNESCO in 1980 by one of this theory's major proponents, the sociologist and cultural theorist Stuart Hall.

(ART)ICULATION THEORY

Articulation theory analyzes the relations of subordination and dominance constituting our state of affairs. It is concerned with the formation of the conditions in which these relations emerge rather than documenting exemplary instances. By attending to the conditions themselves, Articulation (ART)-theory explains how the same relations can be maintained albeit under different names. Therefore, ART-theory considers the functional-content of assertions of subordination and dominance, whose application claims which entities obtain those positions. Calls for its formalization (Hall 1980a) have been made so as to develop a framework whose extension can be tested upon current formations so that when studying certain conditions a map of their formation can be analyzed without presupposing the objects that obtain those conditions within the study itself. In this way, one does not only search for evidence of previously held beliefs but presents an intersubjective framework in which the function of our terms of analysis can be shared. Therefore, the only objectivity that one can speak of is the object of the propositions constituting this framework. Objectivity *tout court* can be refuted, for it rests on an untenable identity theory (Evans 1978; Hempel 1952; Kripke 1980) which must be sufficiently generalizable but is unable to attend to the notion that an entity can have multiple names, a name label multiple entities. A one-to-one correlation in every imaginable context between name and thing is implausible as we are finite beings and only know where the objects of our thoughts do or do not apply insofar as the function of their application applies in the contexts, and contextual successors, to which they are indexed as appropriate. Thereby, we return to the formation of conditions in which assertions are licensed and whereby their claims can be said to satisfy those conditions; thus use implies one's participation in those conditions.

"Objectivity," i.e. facticity, is the result of a claim becoming a shared object at the intersection of collections of propositions. Satisfaction of this condition represents the ability to translate said claim within the intersubjective network constituted between those sets of propositions negotiated in such a way whereby the principles regarding the use of terms (and the conditions' specific reference frame those dependent concepts their use express) are open to those participating in that state of affairs. To be a "fact" is to satisfy the principles by which the context of a term's appropriate assertion is determined, i.e. a statement that is valid by way of the function of its use being valid within the system employed.

ART-theory reveals why it is important to map and model the formation of these intersubjective conditions in order for translation to occur. Rather than tallying the apparent or given constitution of events as immutable objects and inferring causes which our deductions seem to follow, one models how knowledge is constructed and valid, i.e. verifiable, insofar as it can be shared, therefore justified. The former assumes what one is looking for before a study is underway, leaving that study unable to account for its relationship with others. It also negates data that does not fit with one's assumptions. Extrapolating from current data to form a description of the conditions in which that data is the case, assumes the data as their own conditions, as their own cause, which is either recursive—for no real explanation is provided, only that the data *is* the context thus saying nothing of the context—or contradictory, for it negates what it searches for because different from what was expected. Anything that is not the data itself cannot fit into the description one wants. Abstracting cause from consequences following from the formation of a set of conditions affirms what one presupposes, providing no means of justifying itself save for looking for proof of what is already known. Our purpose is to model assumptions in which analysis can be determined valid or not. We then relate various models over the same state of affairs. If contradictions between models arise, we can determine that analysis as an alternative/creative approach or incorrect. Adapting the composite of individual but not mutually exclusive analyses to approximate this change in view represents an intersubjective understanding in which the object of our analyses obtains. If a model contradicts all others, only applicable to itself, then it has no means of justification provided by means of validation. It follows that instead of affirming consequents, if one can attend to conditions, even if a determinate (cause) is reenacted it either contradicts itself upon assertion or is rendered innocuous.[1]

Consider these examples. Criticism as a collection of object(ive) statements does not necessarily provide a theory of change. Liberalism as a policy of freedom is based on Enlightenment ideals and yet slavery was embedded in the U.S.'s Lockean conception of the constitution maintained on liberal grounds. Arguments were aligned with individual property rights and upheld by the Supreme Court's 1857 Dred Scott v. Sanford case. Take Afropessimism. Black identity is determined as cultural death, its value, absolute nothing. If one takes seriously the connection between universal quantification and necessity, to say that Black is identical to nothing reveals that there is no one Black individual that fits that description—all is not = not is all (Peterson II 2018). Frank Wilderson III's *Afropessimism* (2020) takes a singular experience as a framework to analyze the state of Black affairs overall. However, the theory implied by the conceptual framework and categorical machinery employed throughout his text is an assumption that all are clear on the terms justifying that frame's use. What is revealed is that without the intersubjective basis assumed in the critique, Wilderson assumes his audience is already in agreement with the state of blackness or reduces that current state to a singular experience (see Wekker 2020). There is no justification to be found for the ways in which the issues are identified and the program detailed to combat the identities generalized from singular experience describes a state occupied by Wilderson alone. This is why intersubjectivity is required before the object of the function of identity can be determined as significant within the contexts in which that identity can be said to have meaning. Otherwise, one evacuates the very thing employed to make sense of the world of everything that would animate its use in the first place, including themselves. This seems to be the point of Wilderson's critique *qua* theory of the world in which he states that the content of Black identity is "absolute nothing."[2]

A program of change does not arise from consequent affirmation, but only reiterates what has been said or done under a different name (see Brown 2015 and Táíwò 2020a, 2020b). As James Baldwin put it, "[t]o be a pessimist means that you've agreed that human life is an academic [i.e. a hobby, not of practical use or relevant] matter." The pessimist treats their critique as the theoretical basis for a program of change. Criticism as the sole instrument of analysis can only be deconstructive. A theory offers a particular model by which one constructs an explanation of phenomena which is valid insofar as we can test, experiment, or play so as to see where that frame does or does not apply. No doubt this testing can involve criticism. Criticism *as* theory does not explain the formation of states of affairs but analyzes (documents or tallies) its a/effects. A theory that asserts that its own academic goal is not of practical relevance, only disciplinary, marketable, interesting, making the pessimist a walking contradiction. If criticism=theory, one admits to criticism assuming the theory whose effects it analyzes. However, it does not explain where the theory comes from. We can have a theory of criticism and a criticism of theory, which when shared, allows individuals to understand the conditions in which that theory applies thereby coming up with a program to attend to those conditions. Yet conflation leads to undesirable results. Taking one in spite of the other forces an unnecessary choice. A theory of or criticism of express different outcomes.[3] Although criticism assumes that which it challenges, criticism itself is expressed by the function of its application, engendering different results dependent upon the conditions in which it is used. The function of its operation expresses its content to question, and to question is an act, that content itself being functional. Without an offer, criticism, upon completion, no longer obtains the object critiqued; the knowledge it produces, if that knowledge is some object, may not account for or be worth very much.

ART-theory can explain the use of the 1807 Insurrection Act, recently invoked by Donald Trump. By attending to the conditions themselves one can construct a state of affairs in which an act or assertion or claim, when enacted, is rendered innocuous because irrelevant (in game theory, indifferent) or contradictory upon its very assertion. Laws do not necessarily come off the books as if never there before, but conditions can be set up in which their use is void. The Insurrection Act was used by Lincoln to identify the revolt of southern slave states as a crime. It was used to give legal weight for actions against indigenous populations during western expansion; in 1992 during the uprising in Los Angeles after the assault of Rodney King; by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to enforce the desegregation of schools; etc. However, its recent evocation is uniquely interesting. Insurrection can only be enacted by those attempting to operate as noncitizens. In 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act (Rutherford B. Hayes) made it illegal for a government to militarize against its citizens. In 2020, Trump's evocation of the Insurrection Act is hollow because it contradicts the conditions in which it is being asserted. In these conditions, Trump's act, despite its superficial appearance, is shown for what it is by way of its functional-content, not some objective event or metaphysical fact that supposedly necessitates its application.[4] Trump's order is against citizens. The importance of analyzing enabling conditions in which application is appropriate comes to the fore in law, hence why we speak of use within the body of law and why Critical Race Theory issues from the study of law. A law's interpretation is indexed to the shape, the inner relation between constituting law(s). Therefore, different arrangements of laws, conditions constituted by the introduction or antiquation of others, change the output of the function of a law's enactment.

Affirming consequences without attending to conditions aside, the interpretation of these examples is generally accepted. Flaws lie in the contingency of their justification, their validity dependent upon a framework that is assumed, that framework made identical to the analysis itself. As such, the frame is unable to be justified on its own terms, for if utilized

outside the conditions to which it's indexed, counterexamples abound. Conversely, opponents feel justified in applying their own frameworks in constructed conditions based on the rearrangement of the facts of others within which their analyses become valid, albeit possibly contrary to a relation between frameworks over the same state of affairs that represent the multiple ways of describing that state. A theory of the formation of the conditions in which frameworks apply or do not apply is crucial so as to admit that there are multiple frames through which one constructs valid theories of those phenomena whose relations map the relations between the concepts employed by that frame. Some frameworks contradict all others when put in relation to them, or cannot justify their own use, thereby contradicting themselves on their own terms.

To avoid many of the metaphysical traps that come with naïve identity attributions, our theory of Articulation will be formalized with one assumption, null. The set of all things is equivalent to the set of no one thing in particular. In this way, there is no need to enumerate all objects within a particular domain, only to detail the composition of the conditions in which certain objects obtain and others do not. Attempts to enumerate a totality when one is only a finite being means one either is subsumed in the domain articulated, forcing the now subordinate to explain their position so as to validate or invalidate their telling of what is going on; or their analysis is assimilated within the lexicon of that framework, making their analysis an extension of that which they critique. The ontology of this system, then, determines the relations constituting the state of affairs in which what we study emerges (Peterson II 2018; Strawson 1959). We do this by formalizing the functional-content of assertions, detailing what may or may not satisfy those conditions so that when asked to discern between the objects obtaining the functions of our propositions regarding the world, we can detail the kind of entities this state of affairs as such allows to emerge. By attending to those conditions, certain functions will continue to apply, others not, and for those functions that continue to apply, as conditions are altered by way of different propositions becoming available, their output inevitably changes. Rather than detailing or consequentializing, the act of merely plugging in different looking input leading to different looking output whilst the relationship between what is produced maintains, we explain why the same type of relation is expressed, regardless of superficial appearances indicative of the same system at work, albeit under a different name.

ART-theory considers reference and modality. The relations that emerge within set parameters that express dominant and subordinate classes have to deal with the way in which individuals are in the world. In analyzing the formation of conditions, we speak of conditionalization. If/then statements are valid if and only if (iff) it is not the case that from them, we can infer a true antecedent and false consequent. As a result, either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true given that antecedent-condition. Therefore, the consequent is dependent, indexed, to its appropriate antecedent-conditions. From here, the relevance between antecedent and consequent comes to the fore due to the fact that a conditional is valid so long as the consequent is true; however, the antecedent can be true or false. If a consequent is true, we assume that the antecedent is as well, but our assumption does not always have to be the case because the consequent is apparent already. This leads us to discuss the probability of relevance within conditionalization, to formalize what the consequent given the antecedent entails.

We can model the (P)robable connection between conjoint antecedent-conditions (p) and disjoint consequents (q), i.e. if p then q given p, as: $P(q \mid p)$ is valid iff $P(q \mid p) \neq 0$. From here, we state that the probability of q given p is understood by the probability of both p and q

being the case with respect to the probability of *p*. As evidence arises, evidence being the probability of *p* given *q* experiences, we update our assumptions by the probability of the occurrence of *p* given *q* alongside the probability of *q*, with respect to the probability of *p*. Thus, we model the formation of the conditions in which *q* emerges insofar as *p* does not apply, i.e. *q* being the case given *p*-conditions.[5] Modeling conditionalization, if *p* then *q* given *p* yields a predicate of the conditions that must be the case for *q* to be the case.[6] As these conditions may or may not be the case, if they are, that consequent follows and we arrive at the connection between conditionalization and modality. Quantifying the objects which obtain certain conditions is connected to modality in the following way. We say that *q* is necessarily the case iff for all *p*, if *p* then *q*. Possibility is expressed by possibly *p* iff there is no *q* such that if *p* then both *q* and not-*q* follow. We find that not-necessarily-not is equivalent to possibly, and not-possibly-not is equivalent to necessarily. Possibility and necessity being co-definable, we come to the unique conclusion that necessity is derived from possibility, for conditions must be stated as possible in order for any one thing in them to be deemed necessarily the case.

Quantifying over predicates into the domains they label can turn up empty results[7] (Quine 1948; 1980), e.g. in order to disprove a category, one must produce an object that contradicts what that categorization states of the objects that ought to be its members. If there are no objects therein, there is no object to disprove that categorization. Consider our criticism=theory example. It remains valid, albeit vacuous. Take the assumption that (T)heory is (C)riticism. So, if T then C given T. Thus (C | T)=T(C)/T for if the identity is true, then it is necessarily the case that for all T, C because a theory of criticism, T of C, is a theory. If T is valid regardless of context, as well as C, then T cancels out and all we are left with is C without any one thing to criticize. Hence, our theory contends that the content of the predicate, whether it be a label or the category itself, is the function of its application, determining when and where the label determining that category is appropriate. Recall, if *p* then *q* is valid just so long as *given p*, *q*. Thus, *q* expressed by the function of an operation setting *p*-conditions.

In sum, you can have a theory of criticism but it is only valid insofar as one completes that critique and may be empty for criticism is nowhere applicable. If a criticism of a theory claims that the theory is false if consistent with the framework employed, that criticism's claims are true of that falsity, meaning that there is a possibility that it cannot be proven, even if valid. Both are expressed as functions of their completion. One can define truth for sentences that have at most n quantifiers. The reason there's no paradox is that when one builds the sentence that says "this sentence is false", it has one more quantifier; while you can define mathematical truth in stages, the process is never complete, e.g. "Nobody can give you all the money you might ask for, but for any n someone can give you up to n dollars."

ART-theory, then, is the analysis of modal frameworks. A frame is an ordered-pair such that we have a "world" or state (W) and a name (N), where W is a possible domain of *n* (names) determinate upon R(N)=N, that name's function, in W. We can represent this in total as $_{W}R_{N}$. A frame is determined, i.e. named, by N=W+R(N) where R represents the determinate of that name indexed to the conditions in which that name's use is appropriate. Those conditions, in and of themselves, are known under that name, as yet applied, if that name's determinate, function of application, is represented $f(n)=n$. Valid only when *n* is at its zero, represents the state before enumerating the first object it names. A claim about that world is made by way of an assertion implying a framework by which the domain that function

names is such that the use of that name implies $f(f(n))$=n-successor, i.e. a claim with respect to *w*. In this way, we treat the conditions in which a statement obtains modally. The formula $f(n)=n$ is modal because it is indexed to the conditions in which successive applications of *n* apply or not. So $f(n)=n$, the context of an R-identity, is valid then $f(f(n))=n$', i.e. a valid successor application of N, so N' is valid and so on. Therefore, we have a chain of conditions in which *n* can be determined valid or not, each *n*-assertion citing that line of successive appropriate use such that $N(0)=n$, $n'=N_1$, $N_1'=N_2$, ..., thus modelling the function of the operation R(N) (see Turing 1938). Thus, N(0)=N, N(N(0))=N-successor or N', and so on whereby satisfying the conditions of W populates the domain with what we consider W-members. With the functional-content described by R defined, we can now state that $r(n, r(n))=n$' where $n'=w$ in *w*'; thus an operation satisfied when $n'(n)$ holds for the function of that operation expresses the condition in which $w'(w)$ can be satisfied—$w_0=w$, $w'=w_1$, $w_1'=w_2$ etc. for a line of citation referencing its means of construction, $n=n$, $n_0'=n_1=r(n, r(n))=w$ for $n=w+r(n)$.[8]

An articulatory frame by which we model this process is the triple ‹W, N, R(N)› where R(N) enumerates the members of W by way of its use, whose functional-content implies a framework by which we understand the particular conditions denoted by N. As $n=f(n)$, the relation between the application of a frame and the worlds in which it is being tested can be modelled as such: ${}_wR_{\text{not-}n}$ iff ${}_w\not R_n$, i.e. $f(f(n))\neq 0$; ${}_wR_{\text{if } n \text{ then } n'}$ iff ${}_w\not R_n$ or ${}_wR_{n'}$; ${}_wR_{\text{necessarily-}n}$ iff ${}_{w'}R_n$ for all *w*' such that ${}_wR_n$.[9]

The frame implied by N-use is valid iff in ‹W, N, R(N)›, w implies n for all N in W; a frame N=W+R(N) is valid in ‹W, N, R(N)›. We know that structure holds if ‹W, N, R(N)›=‹W‹N, R(N)››=‹‹W, N› R(N)› from which we surmise that the domain of R(N) is W and its range is N insofar as it satisfies W-conditions. It is possible to model what this means for our theory if we consider individuals/entities/objects as vectors composed as a string of instances connecting the contexts in which the function of their operation, forms of life if you will, satisfy, were/are present. We model how the same individual appears differently as conditions change and the contexts of their assertion of membership relate or not. A vector is an entity that has magnitude and direction, a concept that works within our framework.

Modelled as a vector, an individual under consideration, in itself, is represented by its determinate which is the function by which it is expressed, defined at its zero, before its application. Considering the ordered triplet above, the zero of our vectors are W-N+R(N). We show '-N' because we assume that W≠N; otherwise a contradiction arises. If W=W and N=N, then N=not-W', otherwise exchange one for the other and we lose the relation we wished to show. Therefore, N=not-W, so if W=N, then there is an interpretation available such that W=not-W (Evans 1978). Unless, what we wish to say is that N is expressed by its function in W, so N(W)=N which is only true if W in itself. With, as yet, no one object named, W(0)=W. If $[f(n)=n]$=N then N(0)=N and W(0)=N(0), thus W=N only when both are null-members, as yet articulated. N is only determinable in the domain its use obtains, and null is W at its zero, thus W, as the domain of no one N as of yet, is always in excess of any one N stipulation. Removing the N, we get W itself, but W in itself is a category without objects. If N was greater or equal to W, there would be no discernable function for N's use, for it would represent its own domain and output without any one input appropriate to its articulation. Following a traditional use of individuals with regards to the ontology of the categories studied and limiting our assumptions as much as possible, we must be able to discern between individuals in order to enumerate the constituents of the world (state of affairs) under consideration. A world, name and the relation that name obtains in that world

suffices (Strawson 1959) for we would not need that name to point to a thing regardless of context, an implausible requirement for a finite being to inhabit all possible situations in which that thing may or may not exist; but only by discerning that name's relation in the world can its use can be determined valid or not. If not, use can be determined to be creative therefore indicative of another possible world.

Manipulations of the determinate of an individual's frame yields the following definitions from which we can model the coming-together of a particular state of affairs: N=W+R, R=N-W, and W=N-R. If a name, as the determinate of a subdomain by way of a frame of the world in which others may obtain, can be seen modally and therefore its function of application is determinate at zero, the zero of a list of members can start at "0" or any number, for the next in the series will count as the first enumerated[10]. We posit the assumption required to get ART-theory off the ground is the null assumption alluded to above. As R is determinate at $f(n)=n$, then N-0=W and as R(0)=R then N=0 such that W=0, presenting us with the null assumption. Null is to be considered as the set of no one thing in particular and therefore all possible articulations from which determinate collections are formed in which certain assertions are necessarily valid or not. We do not need to enumerate all constituents of null for even if it were finite, there are more subdomains that can be constructed from those means than there are individual constituents within it, e.g. the set of natural numbers is infinite, but the set of prime numbers is not itself a natural number, although composed of natural numbers. Thus, null is a member of every articulation and yet remains in excess of any one determination (set). Quantification and, therefore, the modal necessity required for names and reference does not pass over worlds, only the null assumption can. We conclude that the content of names in and of themselves is null; therefore, null is not a thing but filled with functional-content, the determinates of as yet applied functions *qua* objects of thought regarding the possible worlds they name, i.e. contexts denoting particular sets of conditions. We do not lose anything by onboarding this assumption, but gain explanatory power as functions' determinates are their zeros, the null filled with zeroes which do not contradict any one world in particular until applied.[11]

The semantics of our system follow: all tautologies representing the zeros of all functions, e.g. $f(n)=n$, $f(w)=w$, etc.; necessarily-N, then n, i.e. $f((f(n))=n$' implies a w in which n is valid, wRn; if necessarily-N then n yields either not-necessarily-N or n given necessarily-N; possibility (not-necessarily=possibly-not), then, precedes necessity; thus, it is the case that either not-necessarily-not-N or necessarily-N for all n; for all n, (if N then N'), then, (if N(n) then N'(n)), i.e. if n is valid in N then it is valid in the context-successor citing N; for all n', if for all n, N(n) then N(n'). These principles allow for each set of conditions (context) under consideration an underlying logic that takes care of itself. We will model the determinate of R as $r(n)=n$ at the zero of a particular w. That w then does not reference a particular object but its means of construction. As we have shown how names may be said to refer, if at all, by citing the conditions of their appropriate application, each w articulated cites its means of construction so that $w(0)=w$, $w'=w_1$, $w_1'=w_2$, etc. in the domain $W=W(0)=[f(w)=w]$ for all n whose possible relation to others express a particular w. The vector of a form of life can be modeled without having to render something which by definition is a process identical to, or interchangeable with, a thing that cannot be found in our current condition, that was never there or was only evoked to substantiate a previously held belief. To do so renders analysis relative and contingent to the analyst and no one else.

As articulation studies relations of subordination and dominance, this concept is expressed by the function of the operations modeled within the various states of affairs composed or

actualized from the set of all possible. N'(N) states that N' sets the function of the terms in N, but validity can only be determined insofar as N is considered, not N alone for N(0)=N=$f(n)$ which is valid only when n=0. This models the concept of overdetermination (Hall 1980a), key to ART-theory. How does one onboard the means of their own subordination? How can the function of a cultural product be extracted from one context and put to use in another, producing output that may be in contradiction to its determinate use? How can input and output change, but the relation between them stay the same, i.e. the same system operating under a different name? These will be answered using the machinery that we develop below.

The motive behind this method is to model the emergence of overdetermination. If $f(n)=n$, i.e. "n"=N for the function of the operation of a name expresses the concept it denotes, then with any N, the function of its application can be inferred in such a way that the contexts in which its use constructs can be modeled, and the conditions in which those contexts can be satisfied are explained.[12] So N is expressed by the formula: there is an n such that ("$r(n)=n$" and w) for $[r(n)=n]=[w]$ (Carnap 1934; Gödel 1931; Tarski 1933). Recalling that W-N+R is our model, N=W+R names that framework whose W-determinate is had when N=R, i.e. R=$[r(n)=n]$ and n at its zero determines W. From this, our analysis warrants the assertion that if N is possible, then N is necessarily possible[13] (Barcan Marcus 1946; 1947). Alternative models, state-interpretations, as yet to be experienced, can be formed in such a way that it can be discerned whether they are actualizable or not; not because they denote some apparent thing which would have to be both what it is and is not, but because it cites the means of its construction (Gödel 1931). This is our way out of the Pessimist's hole.

Ideologically, we can determine a modal formulation of belief in the frameworks expressed by way of their mode of application. Our model explains what ideology, thereby the overdetermination, of belief entails. An object of belief is not a thing but expressed by the function of its application (ascription), i.e. "I believe x", "disbelieve y". These represent one's credence. A belief (B) in p is possible such that given p, there is no consequence (q) such that for that individual, if p is the case, then that individual accepts both that consequence and its negation. That belief of p is necessary if and only if for all consequences/events, if that event/consequence arises, then one also believes p. Thus, if it is not the case that one believes not-p, B necessarily applies. In the domain of belief, if p then q given p displays that if possible then necessarily possible due to it being the case that if p then possibly-p. So if possible, then necessary given that domain of possibility.[14] Semantically: B entails not-p iff B does not entail p; B entails if p then q iff either B does not entail p or B entails q; and B entails necessarily p iff there is a subsequent context marked as a B-successor that entails p and for all B-successors, B satisfying the expectations of that B-successor.

A tentative explanation of ideology is implied by the application of a particular frame's use. If ideology sets the function of a belief within a system of belief, then that system of belief in itself is determinate at B'(B)=B, the belief in the belief of a particular frame. ART-theory models the function of ideology and the consequences of the function of one's operation in or using those frames entails. B'(B) implies an intersection of beliefs, i.e. frameworks implied by embodied individual theories about the world. A belief in a belief is a belief by name, hence the connection between ideology and identity theory. A system of belief is expressed by the function of an identified belief.[15] We wish to illustrate the intersubjective basis within which the function of these terms of analysis are shared, what is required for secondary determinates of the object of the propositions utilized to interpret that frame's significance,

implying a frame in which it is an object of study, i.e. modeling the formation of conditions rather than detailing individual instances which imply that they are unique or one-off.

So far, a determinate represents a function indexed to the conditions in which its application is appropriate and thus, defined prior to application (even if determined from relating objects of experience to be applied once that particular arrangement obtains once again), a determinate is expressed as the function of its (*id*)entity. The vector of the series of emergent events constituting what is currently apparent (v) is determinate at $v(0)=v$. If that vector is defined, $w\text{-}n\text{+}r(n)$, then $id(v)=v$ is the identity function of that vector which is only true at v's zero. Thus, $id(v)=w\text{-}n\text{+}r(n)$. Now determinate, we are able to discern between various individuals implied by the application of the frameworks they utilize and model the consequences of their interrelation. As frames' content are functional, for $id(v)=v$, a framework is known by way of its application, is valid within the citational line that references its means of construction.

The cross-product (intersection) of these vectors is formalized in matrix notation, modeling the conditions in which the terms of analysis represent, the vocabulary or lexicon of the state of affairs, at the intersection of multiple individuals and from which the determinate of a frame based on an intersubjective context of analysis can be had. It is from this that our ART-model will be built. The conditions are modeled and there is less of a need to predetermine the outcome or to parse the model for consequents fitting our preconceived notions. Our assumptions are placed in the model itself, the resulting connections being the case whether they are foreseen or not, useful in updating our assumptions.

Let's assume two frames representing the contexts of the subjects x,y putting those frames to work are: $\langle x \mid w, n, r(n)\rangle$ and $\langle y \mid w, n, r(n)\rangle$. We know that each individual is known by way of $n=w+r(n)$, so the cross-product is such that we are looking for a relation $r(n_x, n_y)=\mathrm{N}$ at the zero of the W-successor made articulate from those former conditions. Following our conceptualization of conditionals, if x,y are not assumed independent given the circumstance of this w-successor, the probability that their interaction articulates anything significant within x,y-conditions is $\mathrm{P}(x,y)$, without assuming, or even given, the information available. The probability of any one thing obtaining at their intersection is discerned from $[\mathrm{P}(x)+\mathrm{P}(y)]\text{-}\mathrm{P}(x \text{ and } y)$. We know the probability of $\mathrm{P}(x \text{ and } y)$ is equivalent to the N of the W-successor, linking the joint-probability formula to our vector analysis of articulation as the determinate of that successor is $\mathrm{W}\text{-}\mathrm{N}+\mathrm{R}(\mathrm{N})$ and so $\mathrm{N}=\mathrm{W}+\mathrm{R}(\mathrm{N})$. From the mutual constitution of this successor context given the relation between the two former contexts representing the conditions in which that successor is possible, a Venn-diagram can be drawn where the two circles separately are $\mathrm{P}(x)$, $\mathrm{P}(y)$ and their intersection $\mathrm{P}(x,y)$ is such that on the left we could have P of x given y, on the right P of y given x, and the intersection is $\mathrm{R}(\mathrm{N}_x, \mathrm{N}_y)=\mathrm{P}(x,y)$.

The encounter from which the cross-product is determined is represented as a matrix:

$$\begin{bmatrix} w & n_x & r(n_x) \\ w & n_y & r(n_y) \end{bmatrix}$$

Placement within the matrix can be explained by P of x given y such that top/bottom represents the dominant/subordinate relationship we wish to model. As each vector is defined on a series of n out of the set of all possible, the matrix in which the cross-product is

formalized follows for $(x \times y)$, logically, enumerates pairs of constituents from each subdomain. So if W=‹n_0, n_1, n_2, ...n_k› then a function determining a subset *w* is ‹n_0, ‹n_1, n_2, ..., n_i, ..., n_k›› where n_0 is W and maps one to one with each member of W from n_1 to n_k such that for any n_i, that zero is constant. If we have two subsets of *n* as *x,y*, the relation between the one-to-one pairings between those two sets is constant, so that a function, $f(x, y+1)$ is equal to $f(x,y)+x$.

The underlying logic of cross-multiplication is shown through the relationship for given series of *n* or *n*-tuples. The length of 3-tuples constituting a *w* is a set of *n*, the zero of which is *w*, and the relation between the rest of those *n*'s characterized by $r(n)$ such that *w*, *n*, $r(n)$ are elements of W. This represents a 3-dimensional vector space over null (=no one *n* in particular). Adding and scaling tuples is done in components, groups of *n* in *w*. So, for x_n, y_n, $(x_1, x_2, ...x_n)+(y_1, y_2, ...y_n)$ when in the same W, for $y_0=x_0$, is equivalent to $(x_1+y_1, x_2+y_2, ...x_n+y_n)$.

If we can write n-tuples in matrices as:

$$\langle w, n, r\rangle = [w\ n\ r] \text{ or } \begin{bmatrix} w \\ n \\ r \end{bmatrix}$$

Which notation, row or column, depends on how the relationship between components changes with respect to changes in basis, i.e. how the vector is viewed given reference frame change. If we translate ours into Gates' system in *The Signifying Monkey* (1988, p.48), states of affairs would be organized along semantic and rhetorical axes. Coordinates within that space represent relationships between components--i.e. features of experience filtered through the matrix of some frame, here the grid between our axes that's applied to organize that domain. They index locations for concepts we use to understand formations outlined by relationships between coordinates. Coordinates represent the intersecting forms of life of vectors whose interpretive bases are relative to these axes. Framed between a rhetorical *y*-axis and semantic *x*-axis, vectors are articulated in a *z*-direction. For us, *W* references the origin/intersection of axes framing movement; *R* sets the angle and magnitude of the vector, determining the relation between semantic/rhetorical coordinates; and *N* names the coordinate to which that is vector projected from *W* and determined by *R* in the *z*-direction.

Rotations about an axis represent reference frame change, indicating one's orientation in that domain. If selection along a rhetorical line (=use) varies inversely to semantic base, the *z*-frame rotates about the *y*-axis, mapping changes in use value relative to changing semantic bases. A different frame means the same term obtains different semantic values. If use co-varies with semantic basis, the frame rotates about the *x*-axis, mapping different uses with the same semantic base. Different frames mean different terms obtain the same value or invariant on *x*. In both cases, semantic value is a function of use with respect to changes in frames of reference. Through Gates, our model considers concepts as relations between features abstracted from a domain framed along these axes that enter our reality by organizing future experience with respect to these concepts. When concepts are projected into contexts to see which objects obtain that relationship between features, we model how concepts enter our reality.

Transformations on series of n-tuples in matrices are equivalent to the cross-product of a row/column matrix, here an $(x \times y)$ matrix, where

$$\begin{aligned} w &= x_2y_3 - x_3y_2 \\ n &= x_3y_1 - x_1y_3 \\ r &= x_1y_2 - x_2y_1 \end{aligned}$$

Formulating the cross-product to model the mutual constitution of the conditions in which a context-successor (determinate) of a possible consequence from the formation of these conditions follows from the notion that that successor *z* from *x,y* is such that $z(0)=z$ so $z(x \times y) = (zx) \times y = x \times (zy)$. So,

$$(x \times y) = (x_1w + x_2n + x_3r) \times (y_1w + y_2n + y_3r)$$

$$\begin{aligned} = xy(w \times w) + xy(w \times n) + xy(w \times r) + xy(n \times w) + xy(n \times n) + xy(n \times r) \\ + xy(r \times w) + xy(r \times n) + xy(r \times r) \end{aligned}$$

from which follows *w, n, r*:

$$\begin{gathered} (w \times w) = (n \times n) = (r \times r) = 0 \\ (w \times n) = r, (n \times r) = w, (r \times w) = n \\ (n \times w) = -r, (r \times n) = -w, (w \times r) = -n \end{gathered}$$

The conditions in which *z* emerges is such that,

$$(x \times y) = \begin{vmatrix} w & n & r \\ x_1 & x_2 & x_3 \\ y_1 & y_2 & y_3 \end{vmatrix}$$

equivalent to,


$$(x \times y) = \begin{vmatrix} x_2 & x_3 \\ y_2 & y_3 \end{vmatrix} w - \begin{vmatrix} x_1 & x_3 \\ y_1 & y_3 \end{vmatrix} n + \begin{vmatrix} x_1 & x_2 \\ y_1 & y_2 \end{vmatrix} r$$

$$= (x_2y_3 - x_3y_2)w - (x_1y_3 - x_3y_1)n + (x_1y_2 - x_2y_1)r$$

giving us each component of *z* directly. The cross-product of two vectors is another vector that is perpendicular to the originals. When two sets of conditions cross, making for a third, what we find is the corner of a cube, the new determinate of the emergent context shoots up along a *z*-axis at the point where those horizontal lines now cross. If our conditions are such that $< x_0, < x_1 \ldots x_n \gg \times < y_0, < y_1 \ldots y_n \gg$ then $x(0) \times y(0) = z(0)$ such that $< z_0, < z \mid x_n, \ y_n \gg$, thus "*z*" is applicable insofar as pair-wise ordering of *x,y* obtain.

The formation of these cubes presents a way to compose the structure of the world inhabited by those whose forms of life fall along these vectors *qua* series of contextualized events. If two vectors cross, engendering a third as the composite of the former, that resultant in relation to another creates a square. As this process continues, the grid constructed, the mapping of the world being articulated by multiple actors' results composing a three-dimensional space, whereby, if constructed by a recursive operation over finite means, that operation is not exhausted by any one determinate. For from one domain, one can construct an alternative of the same size, therefore, an alternative arrangement to different ends from the same input (Banach-Tarski 1924). As the function of this operation expresses the

concept of membership to one domain or another, we can be assured that the state of affairs modelled is not endless but that our models are discernable, each determinable from what is apparent. If we can enumerate the members satisfying a world description, then we can discern the domain (conditions) from which that "world" was articulated in relation to others from that very same domain (see Zorn's Lemma). This matrix formalizing the interrelation between frameworks enumerates possibilities, thereby illustrating the shape of the conditions themselves. Consider a grid where the vertices are the coordinates of a particular articulation represented by the set of integers: 0, ±1, ±2, ... The vertices of the axes are the determinates of the natural numbers 1,2,3..., modeled after the successor-function, $f(0)=0, f(f(0))=0'=1$, etc. The world articulated from previously determinate conditions are classes of pairs of natural numbers (m,n) where (m,n) is equivalent to (m',n') is discerned by the function of the operation of enumeration as $m+n'=m'+n$, i.e. (m,n) is $m-n$. A grid of cubes results where each corner represents a node where an articulated world lies (see Wittgenstein 1922, 5.5423 where each corner is defined from 6-6.03).



Having shown the cross-multiplication of vectors, of movement(s), without having to render the object of study static, as long as constitutive relations remain, we are licensed to substitute variables for the labels of our assumptions fitting the particular role defined within the frame implied by our analysis. Each component of the vector representing that movement, institution, individual, etc. is known as a relation between events, no one event referencing the list in total.[16] Therefore, w=context, n=identity of the object studied, $r(n)$=the function that identity plays within that context. With this in place, the cross-product of the contextual frameworks implied by the vector of each individual's affairs (W, N, R) can be written as one vector:

$$Z=W[N_x(R_y)-R_x(N_y)]-N[W_x(R_y)-R_x(W_y)]+R[W_x(N_y)-N_x(W_y)]$$

detailing the inner structure of the matrix representative of the cross-product. Resultingly, the concept of overdetermination can be formalized as well. Overdetermination is when one context sets the function of the terms of another to the benefit of the former (Hall 1980a). Thus we can model how the same systemic structural relations between individuals obtain, albeit under different names, indexed to the contexts in which the function of those terms' operations express the concepts we wish to study. Overdetermination in the W component of Z is read as,

$N_x(R_y)=N_x$ overdetermines, "names," the relation that individual components of Y, obtain in Z whereby $\neg R_x(N_y)=N_y$ states that it is not the case that R_x overdetermines the name of individuals of Y in Z, i.e. the structural relations between X,Y are determined under R_z where the structural relations constituting W_x overdetermines N_y because W_x sets the operation the function of Y-members names under the names/terms available in its lexicon.[17]

As such, $N_x(R_y)=R_y$ in the W-successor modeled by our formalization above. These relations can be discerned without having to render any component static, an object determinate from previous experience and to which we make future events identical; so either self-fulfilling or, if under a different name/or guise, we would be forced to disregard it.

So given within a series of events or an event, the relation between event and series can be formalized (contextualized) if we treat antecedents as vectors, the collections are understood by their means of construction, not necessarily what falls under a label associated with some property or concept their relation is assumed to exemplify.[18] For various relations between the components of each vector elicit several concepts. The cross-product of those series gives us the conditions in which various consequents emerge and their correlation to the matrix of conditions representative of the state of affairs in which they are deemed significant. This is to avert the issues listed above, for if we produce merely a list of what lies in each vector, the results of our analysis can be argued away: for there are other arrangements that can be found therein, or plainly disregarded because they do not fit with the expectation. Thus the assertion of our analysis is indexed to conditions, not individual things. "There exists a set of conditions, for the data" rather than "for all the data, there exists a solution" which may return void results (Turing 1938). Similar to the "of/that" vs. "that/of" distinction,[19] we can make assertions without making an ontological commitment to singular occurrences based on individual experiences that cannot necessarily be extended (generalized) to future cases because contingent upon that individual and, therefore, only necessary within that singular context.

As vectors, we can say that these series are related in ways that make them discernable from others intersecting at their zeroes (functions of construction) from which they go on to construct the possible context in which both functions jointly apply, their consequence necessary in that context.[20] The joint product is not straightforwardly interchangeable with either one. Thus, a function of context construction can be determined in such a way that we can discern what belongs in which context; its method of construction by way of the function of the application of assertions by which we claim what applies or not in those conditions can be determined without having to rest on shaky predeterminations of identity by virtue of reference between name/claim and things. As the zero of every function is equivalent in value to others before it is applied, the output of one function is not identical or interchangeable with the output of another once applied in the appropriate set of conditions, and an endowment of "signifying practices" (Gates 1988) or cultural endowment can be formalized in which certain functions are shared, others not, and an explanation regarding the formation of groups from finite shared means is possible. As the zeroes of these signifying practices equivalent before application and after application are rendered distinct, we can effectively propose a theory of how individuals and classes of individuals are related. Consider $3 \times 2 + 1$: $3 \times (2+1)$ does not equal $(3 \times 2) + 1$. Dependent upon the frame constituted by the function by which its members are enumerated, the results differ even though the functions, prior to their application over that domain, remain the same (see Smullyan on indexing, 2014, p.13). Relations between the signifying practices expressing an endowment are functions that are composite. Conceived through functional currying, a

composite function accepts others as input and renders a composite function as output. With individuals/classes related at their zeros, the function of that operation expresses their relation in the contexts in which those functions apply and therefore constructs a context successor which cites their formation, for example, the Black Atlantic (Gilroy 1993). We will call this operation poetic computation. A process which moves from a domain of selection to one of composition, producing output appropriate to context but not necessarily caused by context, is therefore not random, thus able to replicate infinite use of finite means. The final piece of this formulation, especially with concern to our example, means that from a finite domain, an individual (group or singular) can produce expressions in excess of the elements (members or lexical items) of that domain, thus extending it and valid because citing the means by which it was constructed. No one singular determination exhausts this capacity. As articulations yet to be experienced are added to the lexicon, conditions change, therefore changing possible inputs. The same function, if left to run, can produce unforeseen consequences and other functions, ways of inhabiting those conditions[21] (Smith 2007; Wolfram 2002, p. 709).

Let's attend to the syntax by which our assertions are licensed to be exchanged for the positions in the matrix modeling the articulatory process. As the means by which expressions are formed implies a means of construction (syntax), and if that function is shared, then the possibility of encoding and decoding thoughts (semantics) is provided by virtue of those functions indexed to the context and successors in which those assertions are appropriate. As functions themselves can be composite, thus constructing novel expressions, because their composite means of expression are shared, these novel expressions can be decoded and re-encoded for later use. Composite, meaning that output from one becomes input for another, making a relation hold between the conditions licensing each's use: forming a composite set of conditions indexed by that composite function. It is plausible from those means by which we encode judgments (objects of thought) regarding the constitution of the contexts (worlds) we inhabit, the syntax of how we weave together those judgments giving us insight into the underlying fabric of the world we inhabit. Mapping the territory, we can test these against what we find to be the case, their usefulness insofar as they do or do not apply, and share them. If unable to be shared, they are only useful to the one creating it and therefore do not have a means of justification.

The link between language and the articulation of socio-political and cultural structures is found by providing a theory for the faculty of individual expression from which we form a theory of how they relate to each other, expressing (articulating) culture. This iterative, recursive process of cultural articulation engenders societal formations. The propositions produced from this mechanism harbor consequences to/in a form of life. From one's expressive (language) capacity, one constructs one's sense of subjectivity, i.e. they become the subject of their and others' propositions. The term whose function is indexed to the conditions in which its use is appropriate, e.g. 'I', becomes the object of one's own propositions, labeling the context of assertion, not the individual—hence why many individuals can use 'I' to make reflexive statements. Therefore, I-statements are not necessarily "reflexive" as much as the function of 'I' references those conditions marked by the subject employing that term.[22]

Assertions, like vectors, have magnitude (significance) and direction (context in which application is appropriate). Assertions are composite, comprised of two arguments, a subject and object (Chomsky 1970, pp.184-221). The subject is expressed by the function of the object of the proposition. These aspects are expressed by way of their modes of composition. An initial "merge" of components whereby merge(x,y) results in the set $\{x,y\}$, we

gain internal—$\{x,y,z\}$ to $\{x, \{y,z\}\}$—or external—$\{x,y\}$ merge z yields $\{z,\{x,y\}\}$—merge. The object of the phrase projects the property of that item to merge with a subsequent component. Specifiers and complements are optional, yet compliments can take other phrases/components (Chomsky 1970). From this, insertion rules follow.

Formally, we can define an insertion-function such that if $a[x]$ is an assertion with one or more occurrences of x, then $i(x, a[x])$ determines a function f of a claim c such that $f(c)$. For each c, $f(c)=a[c/x]$, one can substitute c for x throughout a. Thus for the function of applying one expression a to another c, its argument, i.e. claim, is written ac. In this way, $i(x, a[x])c=a[c/x]$. Modeling when insertion is appropriate, the i-function can be read as an "if/then, else" condition such that another [if/then, else] can be exchanged at 'then' in the former, resulting in a nested composition, or composite statement, whereby means of construction (order of operations) can be modeled and we can determine when the exchange of variables for names of events are indexed to the conditions for which that function's context of initial use was marked. Initial-use is cited and shared for analysis. An *id*-function, represented $i(x, a[x])x$, such that $a[x]=a[f(x)=x]$, evaluates if x then "x" else x. Insertion, then, is modelled $i(x_1...x_n)[a]c_1...c_n$ iff $a[x_1... x_n=c_1...c_n]$ where each x and c are simultaneously substituted and the validity of assertion does not change, the relation between x,c remains constant. In this way, our assumptions are modeled and their relations in constituting the frame we employ uniquely determined so that as they compose another, those assumptions can be updated and their effects modeled as well.[23]

Linguistically, there is a surface level (assertion's phonetic form) and deep structure (syntactic-structure and logical form) to expressions, attending to the issue that a single description may denote multiple objects, the same object resting under multiple descriptions. We find that the underlying means of construction is not always projected to the surface; however, in that structure lies what is required for semantic interpretation[24] (Chomsky 1970, et al.). Linguistically, we can parse this using a tree-structure (X-bar theory) represented:

ART=A"
/\
(spec) A'
/\
A=A^0 (comp)lement

Principles of construction are had by which component accepts which: ART→(specifier), A^n; $A^n \rightarrow A^{n-1}$, A, (complement); and $A^n \rightarrow A^n$-1 so as to stop endless loops of events, so to determine the boundaries are particular contexts of assertion. We consider the function of a specifier by way of an identity function. The recursive operation composing assertions indexed to the contexts in which their claims can be determined valid or not falls in line with the logic we discussed above. A component in and of itself labels a category without objects for as yet to be applied, A(0)=A. Its use within a context renders a description of the conditions of its assertion, that description (comp) of the context to be identified becoming comp(A)=A=$f(a)=a$. Thus, specifying the context marking the conditions of appropriate assertion for subsequent use is the identity of that phrase within conditions in which it is appropriate, thus $spec(A)=A'=f'(a, f(a))$. Therefore the phrase in its entirety, a name and that name's relation in the context marking the conditions of its assertion, its use, is ART(*spec*, *comp*(A))=A". This maps our ART-structure, ‹W, N, R(N)›. Given any one n, the context

marking the conditions of n's initial use is {*n*}= "N", its relation to others is {*n*, {*n*}}= "R(N)", of which its domain, that context in relation to appropriate conditions with respect to all other *n*, is {*n*, {*n*}, {*n*, {*n*}}}=‹W, N, R(N)›. Each component is expressed by the function of its operation towards constructing what is articulated. The function of a function being compositional, we encode levels for interpretational purposes and to manipulate parameters in which what is projected emerges with respect to others rendered by particular conditions. Revealed in that identity (spec) is a secondary stipulation, not integral to the "subject" of articulation.

The surface structure of the assertion can have multiple applications, revealing that beneath is a generative deep structure from which significance is a function of context-dependent use. The generative structure underlying the assertion provides insight into the structure of the world in which that assertion's claims can be determined significant to the one employing that assertion as a state-description. This process can be utilized to model the production of almost any expression while answering questions regarding discrepancies between the surface structure, idea articulated, and deep structure, idea understood.

Take an assertion formed from the set {not, black, is}. Consider, "black is not." That assertion's content claims that the function of the individual is the object of the verb phrase "to be," rendered 'is', becoming the object of the operation of 'not'. 'black'-ness is expressed under the function of 'is'. We see what *is*, is doing by 'not' becoming the complement to 'is'. As complements are not necessary to the subject, it is revealed as an operator over the function of the identity of 'is'. 'black' is a predicate-come-specifier of what *is*. Under an id-function, if *id*(black)=black, then in and of itself black(0)=black, therefore black's content is not some one individual but expressed viz. its operation within these conditions whose function is indexed to the context making those conditions in which "black"-ness obtains. What is identified 'black', whose function is specified as identical with 'not', is affirmed as the argument to the function of "not" in the surface structure: the semantic interpretation of the phrase being, there is an x such that they are black and they are described as 'not' in this context into which what *is*, the subject—i.e. blackness—participates. Without what *is*, there is nothing to predicate or negate. The complement and specifier are of different types than 'is', for what *is* cannot be identical, i.e. interchangeable, with a complement without an object, for the resulting phrase would be incomplete. An object made identical to a function without arguments does not provide a solution. "black" and "not" must have an object, while what "is" just is. Taking only the surface structure and assuming the meaning of each term individually, or the phrase overall, there are four possible interpretations of the sentence "black is not", which does not get us any closer to understanding how the constituents forming the sentence are being used to express the function of the subject under that specifier.[25]

Let's apply this model to the articulation of culture. Society is expressed via the function of the relation between the expressions of individuals made appropriate to their environment, which are not random, but also not necessarily caused by that environment. The functional-content of those joint-expressions are indexed to their context of appropriate assertion, modelling one's affairs within the conditions marked by that context. The function of that operation expresses the concept of membership in/to/under those conditions. The mode of expressing these relations indicates one's form of life: a culture. ART-theory—mapping the relations of dominance and subordination constituting society—finds its force and applicability in the study of societal structures. To apply this method, it is important to

formulate something to which it applies. It is crucial to study how individuals generate expressions representative of how they are in the world in order to study how culture is expressed as a function of the relations generated between and obtained by these individuals. In ART-theory, projection from the deep (generative) structure to the surface (emergent/apparent) structure allows us to move towards the expression of the properties of culture. Culturally speaking, taking the contention outlined above:

Culture
/\
ID (sub)culture
/\
(counter)culture ID/Sub

there are two levels of socio-cultural analysis, structural and ideological (Jameson 1984, pp. 178-209). Each tier represents an ideological level. The terms on each level express their significance therein by way of the function of their use within that level. Terms do not readily translate across levels. Novel terms are identified and assigned a value that has a sense to those on that secondary level, but can only be used by subjects when they are the object of terms in that level; the functional-content of prior expression is assumed constant in that next level and becomes the object of another. The function of these assigned identifiers may produce values unintended by the level that produced those terms in the first place: same function, different conditions, different output.

Access to the value produced on that subsequent level to those who previously created those terms is barred. Subculture does not have access to the value-producing means created on the mainstream level, even though subculture produces the means of expressing that culture in the first place.[26] From this, a working theory of assimilation shows that an expression translated from one level of the societal structure to the next must forgo the values of their form of life. Appropriation is when one extracts terms from one context to produce value in another, a process that denies access to the value produced in that subsequent context to those who determined those objects of expression. Assimilation and appropriation are handled under the term *incorporation through dispossession.* A cultural product/expression is incorporated into one level and assigned a value different from its prior level as the former level was dispossessed of that product. Assimilation occurs in one direction, appropriation in the other.

Within the subcultural level, it is the function of the products of the language by which we ascertain a form of life that that sub-segment of society is determined. The mainstream extracts those products, running the risk of rendering subcultures homogenous. Accepting these products blindly increases the risk of becoming the means by which countercultural forms of life are forced to translate their expressions into their own subordination.[27] Counterculture acts to counteract this process, and if subsumed into the dominant, fosters the creation of conditions for subsequent countercultures to arise. When something non-determinate enters the system, due to an inability to translate what is produced in other segments within the society, what is produced in this secondary context does not become some other thing because the form being introduced is illegible. However, through the breakdown of this machinery's translation mechanism, the system reveals itself.

Recursively in language and now culturally, individually and collectively, we find a similarity in the model of a deep structure's generative capacity to make infinite use of finite means with the articulation of cultural forms expressive of society. Once something forms an

identity for itself, e.g. $[f(x)=x]=X$, if identified by the dominant culture, it projects to the position of sub-culture. However, the subordinate cultures' method of expression, of which the "mainstream" or dominant consists, counters this identity now object within the lexicon of cultural discourse. The identity assimilated into the main is "countered," taking the finite means available within that environment to produce expressions indicative of a form of life yet to be experienced by the dominant. This process is iterative and shows that an individual can be identified in multiple ways and/or create an alternative identity with the materials available to them. The subjectivity of counterculture, expressed by the mechanism of "counter"-ing, exists both as a part of society and apart from what may be seen as a dominant cultural narrative that purports a counterculture's insignificance or irrelevance. Regardless of how an individual subject is identified, there are ways in which it is not completely overdetermined by the terms of the dominant frame of reference, retaining its capacity to rearticulate its state of affairs.

Analyses are created from a particular stance through specific codes or "factual descriptors" whose function within these analyses express their role in articulating a period (Jameson 1984). It is not something behind the codes which gets us closer to the validity of their claims. Even if the code correctly describes an event, combined in various ways, the correctness of an individual descriptor does not ensure the truth of the analysis made by them in total. A re-encoding of these codes, i.e. factual descriptors of facts, does not get us any closer to the truth of the analysis and can be used to narrativize any form of analysis without having obtained any object or event. A story dictating the terms of another may be a true telling of a fiction. We find that it is in this way these codes in the process of encoding an event are used, their function forming an analysis that expresses the object of that study. The consistent use of codes within the reference frame of analysis is what indicates their validity in and only in that periodization—i.e. frame, context, ideological level (Hall 1980b). There is a way in which the analysis can be corrected by virtue of a counter mechanism built into the very articulation of that state of affairs.

Mainstream as dominant culture identifies subcultures within it; the countercultures that are produced against these identities, when made legible, i.e. subordinate, to the mainstream, become a subculture once more. Incorporated into the dominant, this process is counteracted once again. The subordinate remains generative, the dominant static and, therefore, the social structure can be changed. The question becomes, is it necessary to be rendered legible to systems of categorization by exemplifying some identity of predeterminate value in order to obtain an intersubjective relationship whereby the function of the terms of expression are shared, or to attend to conditions in which those identities come to have significance so that other options emerge? We will find that the answer is no. Let's look at some examples.

Consider the phenomenon called interest convergence (Bell 1980) in which the dominant only cede their position to the subordinate insofar as it benefits them as well. This sort of game-theoretic notion operates in political spheres under the banner of "mutual interest." Deciding between "moves" brings to the fore conditionalization and relevance-probability, gains based on choice. The manner in which choices are made is expressed by a function indexed to the conditions in which its application is appropriate (Braithwaite 1955). The conditions in which the context studied emerges are comprised of at least two individuals, indicative of two contexts, in which their self-expression was considered significant, and of which this is an extension. In the grid structuring the state of affairs in which this node is the cross-product of two individual lines of successive constitutional events related under various names, each event has a dual whereby we determine this event by way of what it is

not. It follows from each successive articulation that the compounded growth of possible states of affairs that are not represented but *implied* by the apparent necessity of this current formation, and outside the subordinate nodes leading to the one currently under consideration, increases the chance for the subordinate to rearticulate the current state of affairs by contravening that line of succession.[28] Nodes contingently connected to the dominant, but outside the framework employed, fill the set considered null within that dominant frame and from which, eventually, the changing conditions allow other arrangements to emerge.

The question becomes what is the expected use-value for each choice, as mutual interest wants to maximize gain although a concession is being made? ART-theory-wise, how do we construct alternative states of affairs in which the enactment of subordinate/dominant stipulation (which is had only from a dominant position) is rendered irrelevant, therefore either innocuous or contradicting themselves upon assertion? Equity by rearticulation means it would not be the case that both enter into a position of dominance—see King's argument below—because that would be contradictory; nor for both to be made subservient to an externally imposed state, the dominant removed by another unaccountable to those within it, resulting in those made subservient following rules unknowingly, while onboarding the means of their own subordination.[29]

Interest convergence in this framework considers the subordinate's mode of expression being rendered legible in larger political frameworks, such as voting. The analysis above lends itself to ART-theory for the determinate of a node is W-N+R(N). As R(N)=N-W and W(0)=W for a world in itself, no one name yet applies, R(N)=N. This can be expanded for N=W+R(N) so R(N) given N equals W + R(N). As W=N-R(N), (R(N)|N)=N-R(N)+R(N) giving us (R(N)|N)=N once again. We conclude, if N then R(N) if and only if W + R(N), so if N then R(N) given N so N is expressed by the function of its application, R(N) assigns values based on evidence in W to N.[30] From here ‹W‹‹W, N› R(N)››=W' whereby R is the function of N in W which is equivalent to ‹W, ‹N, R(N)››=[N(0)=N] whereby R is N only in W.

The frame in which an event that seemed inexplicable, the election of Donald Trump, references a case that fundamentally altered the conditions to which voting operates. Shelby County v. Holder (2013) falls in line with a legal vector in which Brown v. Board of Education also stems, from which the concept of interest convergence was formulated—including Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), Civil Rights Act (1964), Voting Rights Act (1965), etc., each indexed to a line of succession in which the function of political expression under analysis was determined. Section 5—requiring certain states and local governments to obtain federal preclearance before implementing any changes to their voting laws or practices—and Section 4(b)—the coverage formula that determines which jurisdictions are subjected to preclearance based on their histories of discrimination in voting—were struck down. This 2013 decision allowed for the redistricting of the voting landscape by which minority populations were created in order to render more determinate the outcome of what seemed to be an act of free association. Our vectors are constituted as such:

‹W: U.S., N: Republican, R(N): Shelby›
‹W: U.S., N: Democrat, R(N): VRA›

The cross-product's results are W: [Republican(VRA), -Shelby(Democrat)], N: [-U.S.(VRA), Shelby(U.S.)], and R(N): [U.S.(Democrat), -Republican(U.S.)]. Our translation: Republicans overdetermined the function of the VRA whereby the Shelby case's overdetermination of

Democrats' operations lessened their hold on districts in such a way that the U.S. defining the terms of the VRA were no longer applicable and the Shelby determination reformulated the conditions in which votes were made. The matrix above shows the inner generative structure of our reference frame, referencing its means of construction so that its validity can be tested against the conditions it maps with respect to others. Therefore, its validity does not point to one immutable fact which: i) if universally generalizable, with us being finite beings, there is no way in which we could verify in every possible set of conditions whether it obtains or not; and ii) as that immutable, one and only fact stands in contradiction to any other frame. Its application is valid insofar as that individual's framework applies and therefore serves as validation for a presupposed notion which may no longer be the case because conditions change. The function of that newly defined U.S. political landscape overdetermined Democrats' voting capacity such that the activism combatting Republican overdetermination of the U.S. attacked an object that was no longer present yet represented by the rearticulation of that state under Shelby as determined by Republicans. Thus, within those conditions, the necessary reaction of documenting objects of disdain to prove a point, only affirmed what was already known and did not attend to the conditions in which the result emerged and, therefore, that result, Trump's election, was unaccounted for because not present in the data collated to affirm a previously held belief.

Looking further, the relevance of our reading is the probability of Republican wins given Democrat efforts, the evidence being the probability of Democratic efforts given Republic wins to which they were reacting. Despite the superficial acceptance of the VRA, in 2012, 74% of the population wanted a Voter ID requirement, indicating a change in the view of the function of the VRA (Washington Post 2012). This occurred during an increase of ~12% in economic disparity between dominate/subordinate, accounting for the change in the function of the VRA which was indexed to a context (1960-70) in which disparity went down 8% (Brookings Panel on Economic Activity (BPEA)). The effectiveness of the Republican strategy can be based upon registered voters in counties affected by the upcoming redistricting, prior to 2013 being <50%. The result may seem counterintuitive upon first look, but after Shelby, the new formula dictating how districts are drawn after 2013 classified Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and parts of California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota as states needing redistricting.

Considering these conditions, interest convergence appears obvious. It is not about individual rhetorical ploys or superficial attacks, but the conditions in which the function of expressions (political or cultural) are being employed that rendered the outcome. Evidenced by popular support falling for the Legislative (36-28%) and Judicial (66-61%) branches (Gallup poll 2016, see Gass 2016 and McCarthy 2014, 2016), although the function of popular expression seemed to onboard and install exactly what they were fighting against. The dominant's concessions set parameters in which the subordinate accepting these concessions produced output beneficial to the dominant, resulting in Democrats winning nine out of ten "gerrymandered" districts, eight of those ten drawn by Republicans so as to limit a win's effective capacity. Republicans redrew congressional boundaries as a result of the Shelby decision in six out of ten of the most gerrymandered states. Approximately 59 seats shifted in 2012-2016, which out of 435 possible represents a ~13.6% change. This approximates the same margin by which Trump won the electoral college despite losing the popular vote. Due to strategic redistricting (gerrymandering), 20 seats went to Democrats and 39 to Republicans. Republicans gained approximately 19 seats per election, more than some states have in total. The average district has a population of 700,000, accounting for a nominal shift of about 42 million people who may have stayed in the same place, but the

potency of their vote one way or the other either increased or decreased due to changing conditions. The 19 seats gained Republicans ~13.5 million in addition to what was already in place. Even though membership might have remained the same, because of shifting conditions, the output of modes of expression worked in different ways. Even though the popular vote expressed victory for the opponent (~31% of U.S are Democrats; 30% Republican), the conditions in which that speech was enacted only allowed for that which maintained the relationship between subordinate and dominant to emerge. Even with our assumptions laid bare, we model the relation between these vectors of analysis underlying the emergence of the singular events to which we react. How concessions are given so as to limit the project and demands of activism, in some ways delimit the imagination of what change looks like. The functional-content of that project's value has been predetermined, therefore its aims are overdetermined within the vocabulary of the status quo. Furthermore, we can test the picture of the state of affairs derived from polling and reports against what is the case based on the redistricting data, which in itself would only tell us which counties redistricted or not, but in the articulatory model provided shows networks of affinities between positions constituting that state and possible relations in which the consequent affirmed by the data alone—which is only descriptive, not explanatory; predications based off that data alone would only affirm in the future what we were already looking for and disregard what did not fit— would no longer be relevant therefore innocuous, i.e. in game-theoretical terms, indifferent.

Our interest convergence model also applies to constitutional critiques. Regarding the constitution of the U.S., we can analyze the function of the operation/affairs of individuals/claims that express concepts we hold significant and study their consequences. The conditions in which our reference framework is employed relate to the First, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments: no law respecting the establishment of a religion or prohibiting free exercise of speech, assembly, redress, or worship; if a dispute's value exceeds $20USD, the right to trial by jury is dictated by common law; and excessive bail or fines are cruel and unusual punishment.[31] It is important to note that here we speak of the use of legal means, the function of those laws whose application implies a body of law, a set of conditions, in which their operation produces value significant within that frame, e.g. the concept of justice. We are not interested in an indexical knowledge of the law. In this way, when considering issues baked into the use of the law which tend towards consequences overdetermining some, abetting a system in which subordinate and dominant relations are obtained, one can construct alternative successors or sets of conditions in which those issues no longer arise. Attending to consequences alone affirms what we already know and often comes too late. A single law says no one thing save for the field of interpretation in which the parameters of its use are determined.

In the state of affairs constituted, the function by which the operation of terms within this frame are significant can be inferred, determinate upon "common law." The law under consideration is Buckley v. Valeo (1975), a stalwart of conservative platforms stating money is speech.[32] The operation of this law is indexed to the context whose parameters are the third, fourth, and fifth amendments: protections to property and person as well as against coercion without due process, ensuring the right to privacy and against self-incrimination. As speech may be anonymous, no one is compelled to reveal who they speak for akin to for whom they vote. The ruling, therefore, represents an affirmation or identification of the conditions in which socio-political expression can be said to be significant. Anything prohibiting the ability to "contribute" to the political process is a violation of free speech afforded to all born in the U.S. by the 14th amendment.

An object of study appropriate to the function of the operation of this law within these parameters is poverty. One can deduce from these premises that poverty is structural and infer an extension of this domain in which poverty can be understood, therefore reconsidering its necessity.[33] Immediately, one has to contend with the notion that poverty is not an individual, otherwise, its prevalence and iterations would be inexplicable. Poverty emerges due to the structural conditions that certain individuals obtain, hence why "the poor" appear different across contexts yet the relation articulated between the contexts in which they participate and others remain the same. Therefore, poverty is expressed by the function of one's operation in a system in which some benefit while others work to maintain the status quo.

ART-Theoretically, we test the validity of the claim made by our assertion in the framework employed over the domain from which it was abstracted. From this matrix, we infer the following theorem: an established system whose continued operation creates conditions in which the individuals that inhabit those conditions are unable to sustain themselves, as well as those whose efforts enact a strategy that maintains a relation of subordination to the benefit of others, whether they be on behalf of themselves or the system in which their actions are implicated, is inconsistent with the framework of the constitution. We test this by formalizing the negation of this claim. If it is invalid our claim is shown to be true. The negation: a system that produces poverty is constitutional. Given our premises, money is speech, and any levy against speech is a violation of rights. The right to determine one's position in society and hold them to its mandates is linked to a system that bars the ability for one to be incarcerated by this form of speech via a promise to pay social and civic debts. Effectively silencing individuals, any excessive price for release or, generally, barring movement from one set of conditions to another is cruel and unusual punishment. Built-in is a mechanism to counteract any process that impinges on these rights; therefore, our negated conclusion is inconsistent with the conditions in which its function applies. Our premises illustrate that systemic poverty is defined by limits to modes of expression guaranteed by those premises. Thus, our original assumption is valid. The conditions must attenuate to that which is implied by those parameters and be rearticulated.[34]

Our example does not state that poor individuals themselves are illegal, but that systems that enact strategies that incarcerate individuals to poverty are illegal.[35] There is also a danger wherein neo-liberal arguments, extending market principles to all aspects of life, seem legitimate. So, one creates a standardized metric to rank choices whose assumptions are universally generalized within that system and thought generalizable universally in such a way that they become invisible. Upon review, these arguments suffer the same fate, because market principles in those areas encourage divestment from less profitable segments of society which include the poor, unless one can make money from them which violates anti-coercion and carceral parameters. The fallacy of color-blindness works along these lines. It is cruel and unusual punishment to prohibit free speech, one's legal tender.[36] It is contradictory to the constitution to infringe on the right of individuals to sustain themselves. This is handled under the concept of currency as legal tender.[37] Not only can we derive our theorem from the premises but we can form a response from them that is in contradiction to the irrational propositions, and institutions, expressed by the system at large. This response is formed from means provided within the system. The corrective does not need extra-systemic verification, which in turn has no means of verifying itself. We can change the system from within even though we are subordinate to it; pessimism is no longer the only valid praxis, proving that systems of subordination can be changed by those captured within it.

It is unconstitutional and irrational to uphold a system that makes people poor, a system whose vehicle of expression imposes categorical efficacy. The 9th and 10th amendments to the constitution state that no law can be made to abridge these rights. The purpose of this example is not to be definitive on this subject, as if an answer has been provided in the passages above, but to remain skeptical of assuming that this is the apex of the social and political expression generated by these constitutional axioms. The current attitude towards any form of suffrage or welfare reveals the maintenance of an irrational attitude with regard to the organization of society. It is rational to critique and dismantle in order to rebuild irrational institutions and attitudes. The maintenance of these attitudes alongside a disdain for logic and rationality should serve as fair warning for us to analyze the function of these systems. To analyze the syntax (composition) licensing these terms' use, rather than how they are being defined, reveals the structurally recursive effects to the benefit of whom, regardless of their affiliations, reaping the benefits of our current state of affairs.

Our final example interrogates the overarching thesis of ART-theory, the emergence of relations of subordination and dominance. When speaking of relations of dominance and subordination we are talking about a relation whose function is expressed by an operation. The function of that function expresses the concept of power. Power is expressed as a function of the relation between positions indexed to the contexts in which those modes of expression are deemed significant. In some contexts, what was nominally the dominant position may be vacuous or inverted, but the relationships between positions, regardless of the individual that occupies it, stay the same. Herein lies why those who wish to assume that position, attempt to render contexts in which that position is of benefit static and stable, implying the precariousness of that stance in the first place. If the conditions change, the same position's functional-content produces alternative output. This reading also implies that if different input produces different output, but the relation determinate upon the context remains the same, power dynamics retain. This is why positions, identity-assertions, are here assumed to have functional-content indexed to the conditions by way of a context, and successors citing their contextual determinate in which their application is appropriate. Constitutionally speaking, regardless of individual, determinate positions work to the same end unless the conditions are manipulated in such a way that the function working under the same auspices no longer applies or produces output that is contradictory to its initial determination.

ART-theoretically, we introduced the concept of poetic computation to resolve the issue of relevance between the framework constructed and the state of affairs it maps. The content of that frame is functional, and analysis, whereby one constitutes objects of thought, is an operation that moves from a domain of selection to one of composition, accounting for projections or portions of the state of affairs illuminated by our framework with respect to the method of constructing one's analysis, not as/by what is given. Otherwise, theory would be up to preference. A frequentist reading, how often evidence fits the intent of the search, extrapolates from current experience as the given basis for future occurrences. However, if generalizations are indexed individuals, wildly different outcomes emerge making a generalized theory pertinent only to the individual or useless to others. ART-theory looks to construct models by updating prior evidence so that the more we measure the more we render legible the formation of the conditions in which what we find emerges.

Looking at a relation between subordinate and dominant as the expression of power, we find that dominance is rendered legible by a function of the operation (affairs) of the subordinate, not necessarily by definition alone. Thus, we look at the $prob(D|S)$, the probability that a dominant assertion obtains given subordination. Subordination is necessary for the

expression of dominance but dominance is context-dependent, obtains in particular conditions. So, if S then D given S. Thus, there is an S for all D for if not-D then not-S. This helps explain a top-down logic embedded in the choice of which is represented on top of the other in our matrix notation. Taking the reverse, if D then S given D, we obtain there is an D for all S. However, if no S then no D is the result. The latter assertion is inapplicable because it is contradictory to historical-empirical fact as well as logically. We find that the subordinate position is expressed by an operation. The dominant position's content is not a particular individual but functional. That function is determinate upon the context of its initial assertion, so dominance in itself, of no one thing as of yet, is defined D(0)=D and assertions of dominance are iterative, citing the context successors in which subordination occurs, referencing this initial determination. What happens when the dominant position is considered absolute, universally generalizable, e.g. the doctrine of Racial supremacy? We will consider this by way of the King argument.

If it is assumed that there is one and only one King, then all others are subordinate to that position. Therefore, if King-power is absolute, then the King's power is 1 and the subordinates' is 0. If our conditions are such that D given S, 1/0 renders dominance as either undefined, for there is no one subordinate identifiable within the King's domain, or infinitely recursive, i.e. non-determinate. Either everyone would be a King or all are subordinate to the context in which these distinctions would be significant. The subordinate are identified as such in the domain determined by the dominant. Therefore, the subordinate identity, $id(S)=S$, is such that $S(x)=x$ and the function of that operation, for valid at its zero, expresses a relation of dominance in that context as $D(x, S(x))=x'$, enumerating one's membership in that domain while demonstrating the inner logic by which that domain is expressed. In order for this state of affairs to be retained, that state must be constituted in such a way that, if for all x, x is subordinate, then for all x there is a y such that y is dominant with respect to x. The dynamic is explained as a relation indexed to the contexts in which the conditions those positions represent and therefore determine are explained across context, despite the individuals that may or may not be present therein. If indexed to individuals, that one-to-one correlation is not generalizable across every imaginable state of affairs and therefore is useless, for we do not know where and when these concepts do or do not apply. It is implausible that we can verify every one for we are finite beings, and so is the individual to which the concept is fixed, or the explanation does not go very far because it is only valid in this context, for the individual analyst, and contradicts all others.

The assumption is that subordinate and dominant are not the same. Otherwise, sub-dom/dom-sub entails: $union(S,D)=(S+D)-D(S)$; as $S(x)=x$ when $x=0$, then $D(S)=0$; thus $union(S,D)=S+D$. If they were independent propositions: (S given D)=S; (D given S)=D. The evidence for dominance obtains insofar as subordination occurs. As our study analyzes the formation of conditions, conditionalizing on this point entails that if analyzing dominance given subordination, our formalization entails: (dominate and evidence(=subordinate given dominance)) with respect to subordinate. Let's assume we are collecting evidence that affirms that dominance is the case, since we find subordination all around us. (S given D) = (D given S)(S) with respect to D. Considered as independent, D regardless of S, D given S is just D, so our evidence becomes D(S) with respect to D. We conclude that subordination given dominance yields the possibility that there are no subordinates at all for 0/D or as D(S)/D may yield just S, then (S given D)=S, the dominant is subordinate to the conditions in which it determines its relevance. However, this trivializes the point. So testing our original assumption, (D given S) is the cause given our evidence, (S given D), and D, with respect to S, its subordinates. As (S given D)=S, we are left with S(D) with respect to S. As S and D is

null, for sub-dom and dom-sub are contradictory, we are left to conclude that D given S as absolute entails 0 with respect to S or as just D. As D in and of itself, D(0)=D, determines a function as yet applied, we are left with our original result. Stipulations of universal dominance may turn up hollow because the affairs of the members in the domain it determined have moved on; the function of the terms indexed to the preceding context in which it may have obtained, albeit participating in the historical constitution of the context we find ourselves in now, may no longer apply. Either a dominant stipulation is empty or is expressed by the function of its application for the evidence of its being applied is propositional, the content of that proposition being expressed by the function of its application indexed to the contexts in which its claims can be deemed significant. A dominate stipulation is subordinate to the domain it determines even if the probabilities of being categorized as one or the other are distinct; dominance obtains insofar as the subordinate remains in excess of and most probably outside of the dominant's stipulation.[38]

The importance of ART-theory with respect to our current state of affairs seems resoundingly clear when looking at Black cultural studies. From above, we find an explanation for James Baldwin's critique that White-ness harbors an internal contradiction, for it must utilize a hyphen whose operation expresses a relation represented within that domain, the U.S., but not present, unable to be reduplicated, in it. By citing a line of contexts outside of the one in which they participate (Europe), which has no means of justification in the system indexed to the conditions in which they currently inhabit (Race) but appeals to an extra-systemic fact (ethnicity), contradictions abound. How does one discern or substantiate a claim of dominance based upon a cultural endowment to which those who are subordinate to the domain organized by that claim do not have access outside of assuming it as given, which is not reflective of the subordinate but of the requirement or need of the one making that claim? For Baldwin, to claim "White"-identity is to remain European, for that extra-systemic fact's relevancy has no claim, and cannot be made within parameters set by the system employed; for to be European is not necessarily to be White, so to evoke that claim [non-White White]=[non-American-American] if White=American. However, ART-theory-wise, as we are not indexing White-ness, expressed by the function of the operation of hyphenation, to a single individual, we model the formation of the conditions in which that assertion's claims acquire flesh, revealing either that it only has functional-content or that it is true that it is a contradiction.

For Blacks, we see that given the two vectors constituting this framework, ‹U.S., American, White› × ‹U.S., African-American, Black› leads to interesting results: American(Black), White(African-American), U.S.(Black), White(U.S.), U.S.(African-American), American(U.S.). In a context rendered determinate by White in the Americas defining the parameters of the U.S., African-American identity is overdetermined, significant in and only in that U.S. context in which Blacks obtain, however, as American overdetermines the U.S.; additionally, if we concede that Black is equivalent to African-American, then Black-ness *qua* African-American identity is both a part of a U.S. context and in excess of Whites' overdetermination of that context. There are Blacks that do not solely fall under that stipulated identity, even in the context of that identity's assertion. Therefore, Black-ness exceeds a U.S. context, American overdetermines U.S. and Black is a member of both the America and U.S. determinate contexts. So either African-American as an identifier of Black content is purely functional or there are contexts in which it obtains no one object, and therefore White supremacy is voided of the object it requires for its own expression.[39] For there are non-Black Africans, so strict adherence to that marker yields contexts in which African-American contradicts the intent of its assertion.[40] I am only concerned with the term

"African-American" insofar as it regards "Africans" and those descended in the Americas, not in one and only one overdetermined context. A coalition of signifying practices, appropriate but not necessarily caused by one context, by way of an affinity between individual but not mutually exclusive modes of expression, can be had in excess of any one strict identification between a people and determinate conditions[41] (see Gates Jr. 1988).

Revealed is that a singular experience universalized to encapsulate Black identity is not required in order for an affinity between modes of expressing blackness under terms significant in the contexts in which blackness is a part. As such, it is futile to mark the sole and only contexts in which blackness participates as well. The move from a log of individual occurrences to our mutual implication in the conditions in which those occurrences are significant helps us veer away from logging individuals as consequences, making it seem worse to be identified as a racist rather than experience racism. As seen above, placing blame on the subordinate in that domain in which the dominant determines is flawed. Taking individual experience and generalizing across all contexts evinces an onboarding of the means of one's own subordination; the conditions are assumed as necessary without providing the means of their construction, the possible domain in which those necessary conditions emerged (Hall 1980a, p. 325-330). As we have seen, the affirmation of consequences to substantiate already held beliefs leads down a circular path. Through our theory, we can show how lines can be drawn arbitrarily, but enacted to particular effect. In this way, King arguments can be shown as contradictory and I cannot endorse pessimist (Wilderson 2020) programs to respond to conditions unconditionally accepted. That line, drawn and accepted, cultivated towards the blanket affirmation of universalized grievances as an explanation for why what has occurred, will continue for those therein can only be to the benefit of the author. Universal application or acceptance is useless as we cannot ascertain that claims import, when, where, and how it does or does not apply. As life continues, the same frame may turn up void and eventually contradict itself on its own terms. Making an individual's experience exceptional, universalizing it at the expense of others, reduplicates what it supposedly fights against. ". . . Black excellence, pessimist died countin' my coin." - Kendrick Lamar, 07 | 2014-2016.

The only "objectivity" to be had is as the object of propositions shared at the intersection of two (or more) frames of reference. That intersection was represented vector-wise above. The edges of the frame employed to represent the context considered are constituted as a relation between a series of events or iterations of a term's use or series of acts constituting an institution or individual. Thus, an object is such only when its expression is considered significant under the consideration (formalization) of the conditions in which its claim can be validated. This is done at the cross-product formalized above, representing the intersubjective domain in which the function of the propositions expressing that object, their functional-content, within that newly articulated state of affairs is discernible because indexed to this and necessary within the frame represented at this cross-product which that proposition expressing that object references. Thus, the object of the theory's content is its function of expression indexed to the framework that makes sense of where the multiple contexts into which it figured converged. Intersubjectivity becomes the horizon of possibility in which the necessity of the object under analysis, i.e. the product of the subject(s) expressed by the set of propositions constructing that analysis, can be determined.

In closing, ART-theory shows that one can take a probability measure over the set of possible worlds (contexts) modeling sets of conditions in which one's informed credence assigns a low but non-zero weight to the ones that are necessarily-possible and those which

lead to contradictions. In so doing, the deduction (analysis) becomes an explanation which professes that one can infer method that if the conditions modeled show us how this possibility emerged as discernible from others, and that these conditions are indeed the ones to that the functional-content of our claims about the world we inhabit obtain. This deduction is necessary, for it is our experience, yet it is necessary with concerns to our reasoning with respect to the conditions we inhabit and the possible worlds we articulate therein.

> "To say that the world is not worth anything, that life is of no value, and to give evil as the proof is absurd, for if these things are worthless what does evil take from us?"
>
> -Simone Weil, *Gravity and Grace*

REPRESENTATIONAL DIVERGENCE

A small ceremony of 'cleansing' is performed...The PRIESTS take branches ...symbolically scouring the gates...TIRESIAS is sprinkled and flogged...

TIRESIAS: Fools!...Can't you bastards ever tell the difference between ritual and reality. . .
FLOGGER: It's all that incantation. It soaks in your brain and you can't feel yourself anymore.

- *The Bacchae of Euripides: A Communion Rite* by Wole Soyinka

"Representation" calls often appeal to the concept of privilege. Consider the following. There is a game that attempts to show one's implication within incentivized structures and what is entailed by their position in that structure by way of their performance. One's position on the "board" models one's position off-board, providing an explanation for the function of the term "privilege" in the world we inhabit. Participants set the board by forming a single line. Prompts are read with the instruction to take a step forward if true for them, stepping backward if false. In this way, the board is encoded and evaluated as indicative of values off-board. It is the manner in which the encoding takes place that determines how positions emerge by virtue of how they're decoded in a way relevant to each participant, as well as appropriate to the game (Hall 1973). Thus, play renders a model of an external state of affairs, represented by way of the relation between players' positions in-game. Rather quickly, players notice that their position, represented by their relation to others, is incentivized in a particular way. Relations indicate concepts encoded in the prompts as input to a move-operation whose output functions to express the resultant position's value. It seems that one wins by being oppressed (Magana 2017). In-game, players begin to play towards more "oppressed" positions because of the recognition they receive *vis-à-vis* the value implied by those prompt's function in the game, not necessarily their wording.

Certain individuals play in a way that takes up the space of representation from those whose material conditions out of game reveal that they occupy a subordinate position. The projection of that position in-game is invalidated by setting conditions so that the latter's expressions cannot be made or are cast as less significant than theirs. Those subordinates legible within the system are moved into spaces once held by the dominant, but nevertheless spaces structured by and through dominance. This is done to manage the subordinate by aligning that group's intent with the dominant for the sake of representation. Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò (2020a) explores this as elite capture. Space is ceded by the dominant without losing structural integrity because those features of the subordinate group's expression are legible within parameters set by the dominant's domain. Legibility is a function of alignment with the minimum of dominant interests. The interests of that elite subordinate group converge

with that of the dominant, if only for a moment. However, those interests diverge from the subordinate class overall. Examples of this are seen where tribal recognition aligns with nationalist projects that set up affairs in which that group works so that others (tribes and/or individuals) are not recognized, so as to secure gains made within a framework external to their own. We see this as an outcrop and extension of colonial frameworks not only in the U.S. but in Africa, Western Asia and North Africa, i.e. the "Middle East," India and Pakistan, etc. (Mamdani 2012).

The importance of this "privilege" game is that regardless of play, those materially oppressed are, nevertheless, rendered legible in-game despite everyone playing towards more "oppressed" positions. Its failing becomes readily apparent because a sort of oppression Olympics are played out as the game ensues, due to that same incentivized structure. That structure is deduced by players and determines one's strategy, as positions which now become evaluations of one's relationship to others on the board define the conditions of play. Players begin to work towards, on-board, the means of their own subordination, because that is how they've decoded the intent of the game rather than the supposed content of the prompts. Despite the intent of the game overall being that by one's position in-game, a model of their privilege out of game comes to the fore, thus implicating all in a state of affairs that models relations of subordination and dominance, the coveted identity one projects as a result of play paradoxically overdetermines their agency. Audre Lorde (1983) formalized this concept when they stated that there is no hierarchy of oppression because conditions-relevant identity positions entail that oppressions are interlocking. Upon considering the conditions on the board, a position may be of benefit at the expense of others, while in another context, that same position may be the very means of one's own subordination dependent upon an other's strategy to whose content that individual is barred access. Play ensues by way of ethically convenient abstractions (Lucca Fraser 2019); moves are indexed to conditions, not necessarily in response to the most immediate predecessor.

Traditional studies of privilege either assume its definition in such a way that terms within that definition are ambiguous, containing that concept's label in the definition itself, or they merely catalog the effects of its use based on that assumption. Resultingly, privilege is left unexplained. How the term privilege operates in-game explains its function out of game. The hope of this framework was to illustrate that what happens in-game shows that definition is dependent upon context; however, relation between prompts as input and moves as output remains the same despite changes in the superficial appearance of participants. As scholarship analyzes the results of the above paradox, it neglects the implications and entailments that go into the practices constituting various positions that become available or are foreclosed as the game progresses. As our socio-cultural and economic-political affairs are not complete, encoding/decoding practices in-game more readily model and reflect what goes on in our mutually constituted form of life. If the game is complete, then what we describe doesn't necessarily explain how we got there. It only reaffirms what we already know.

In this chapter, we model the "in-game" workings of the incentivized structure actively composing our state of affairs. First, we will discuss Articulation theory, showing how relations of subordination and dominance emerge. We will then apply that framework to a game-theoretic model of our state to explain how societies structured in that way were/are formed. Our "Privilege Walk" example proceeds by way of a representational game which will be shown to lead us into a sort of loop. One's intent in playing is to represent a position that can be identified in a way relevant to others. Other players do the same. Thus, their

interests converge on the board. However, what motivates one's move is the recognition of their intent by way of that identified position. To proceed, that player must also recognize that others recognize this motivation as relevant to the game. The emergent issue is: either we never commit a move, for prior to it we attempt to consider and answer every possible situation; or with each move to render our intervention clear, the space between the relevance of our original intent and the representation we currently employ grows. We forsake intentional relevance for relevance to our most immediate context, a context set in response to another's move considered the determinate of our current condition. If a move's content is a function of its appropriate assertion, the reference between that context and that currently inhabited travels a longer line, each probability of certainty multiplied context to context, rendering a lower and lower relevance to the initial.

This example allows us to show how circularity is embedded in incentivized structures, tested and exported to organize the actual state of affairs for groups. Game design is meant to articulate intent, but this hinges upon players' recognition of intent. Yet for the game to proceed, the facilitator must recognize that recognition by way of the representative relations on the board. Some recognize the incentive rather than the intent, and play towards their own representative detriment. To win in-game is to be "oppressed." There is an interest convergence in-game, proceeding by a divergence between representation and out-game position. We hope to show the underlying logic of this conundrum by utilizing a game-theoretic approach to model the relations that emerge within this incentivized structure, to see how one's position within an interlocking network of statements representing a framework of dominance and subordination in game affects one's form of life outside it. A model for an observer is the construction of a representation of an external-phenomenon so that the observer can utilize that representation, now an object of thought, to answer questions about that phenomenon. It follows that we can make models of those models, i.e. share those frames, externalizing the internal as an object of consideration for others, from which that chain requires a formalization of interpretation. Divergence, then, can be described by way of a Kullback–Leibler formalization, given a group, a model, and a distribution characterizing the relevance between evidence and the frame employed. We can measure the loss of relevance from the employment of that model to explain changes in distribution by coupling an event from that distribution with the change in that event given the change in our model. From this, the hope is to explain how one may onboard the means of their own subordination; how the dominant play in such a way that occupies or defines the space in which the subordinate explains their situation so as to be validated or not, insofar as it benefits the dominant; and how a subgroup of the subordinate may tailor the space in which expressions characterize that group so that it benefits them insofar as it is aligned with the dominant position. We call this *representational divergence*, the result of considering the evidence that there are divergences between intent and change given representational claims, coupled with an increased prevalence of representation, with both considered given that divergence between intent and change overall. A subject indexes their preferences (desires) within a domain of belief in which their experiences can be translated into a model within that domain so that the change they seek can then be represented to others in a way understood by them, so that change is possible (Fodor 1975). Thus, by correlating attitudes to affect behavior, one restructures the state of affairs so that new conditions disallow certain responses. Motivation to utilize representation is triggered by a recognized divergence between intent and act, i.e. divergence given representation, coupled with the significance of the representative desired change, both considered with respect to that divergence.

To begin, let's say what we mean by model. A model is understood by way of the deployment of a framework. To a viewer, a framework is a model of another individual or environment insofar as that viewer can use that framework to answer questions about that individual or environment. That viewer's "use of a model entails the use of encodings for input and output, both for [individual/environment] and for [that framework, is a] ... good model ...to the extent that [its] answers agree with those of [that individual or others in that environment]... on the whole, with respect to the questions important to [the viewer]" (Minsky 1968, p.425). In effect, to have "knowledge," then, is to have access to these encoding/decoding practices. It follows that a move or proposition's content is its function of application indexed to the conditions in which the context and context-successors of its appropriate assertion have been determined.

Given our socio-cultural and political climate, the dissonance between representation and recognition has garnered importance. Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò in "Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference" (2020b) states:

> The social dynamics we experience have an outsize role in developing and refining our political subjectivity, and our sense of ourselves. But this very strength of standpoint epistemology—its recognition of the importance of perspective—becomes its weakness when combined with deferential practical norms. Emphasis on the ways we are marginalized often matches the world as we have experienced it. But, from a structural perspective, the rooms we never needed to enter (and the explanations of why we can avoid these rooms) might have more to teach us about the world and our place in it. If so, the deferential approach to standpoint epistemology actually prevents "centering" or even hearing from the most marginalized... For those who defer...[t]he norms provide social cover for the abdication of responsibility... What comes of them [blocks of experience pegged to identities] depends on how the blocks are put together...

The goal of representation-first politics is to evoke a change of mind by way of some recognition by others. Representational claims, according to Stuart Hall, "[are] a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—i.e. a way of representing—a particular kind of knowledge about a topic" (Hall 1996, p.201). This leads to issues for ...any one deploying a discourse must position themselves as if they were the subject of this discourse," such that, "the very language we use to describe the so-called facts interferes in this process of finally deciding what is true and what is false" (ibid. p.202-203). By this recognition, a perlocution, or change in the addressee, is brought about. This perlocutionary act—a proposition that has an action as its aim, but does not constitute that action—intends to convince the other of the inadequacy of or contradictions in our current societal organization. However, representation-first claims assert that this change can only happen through the recognition of the intent of an assertion made within and filtered through a particular structure that renders intent legible. By some illocution—a proposition that constitutes an intended act—the other supposedly recognizes the structure of the world both inhabit. The issue at hand is that if this effort turns on recognition alone—assertion and evocation, effect and affect, illocution and perlocution—after successive attempts these concepts diverge. We find ourselves in a recognition loop whereby the causal link between effort and change do not seem to connect in the domain in which our affairs come to be organized by the frameworks we employ. These frameworks are indicated by the manner we execute a move in which our assertion substantiates our claim.

Besides affirming what we already know, representational primacy is hard-pressed to attend to the structures enabling socio-cultural manifestations to emerge in the first place. Representational politics ask for a re-articulation of the ordered preferences for or against certain manifestations of an inequitable system. This poses a problem. According to Kenneth Arrow's theorem, no community-wide order can be ascertained from ranking individual preferences. By definition, no such "thing" intended by that ultimate ranking has a unified meaning to a group of people. If we are aggregating views with respect to symbolic rank, there is no clear way to resolve disagreements over the contested meanings regarding symbolic representation outside of individuals' reference frames. What tends to occur is the implementation of a mechanism for aggregating viewpoints, focused on confirmation of pre-established interpretations rather than attending to enabling conditions. We treat this space as one where symbols become pieces within an incentivized game. This representational game pivots on the recognition of what that representation is meant to persuade others of, to a cause or to affirm the validity of one's own position. However, in asserting an indicative conditional, e.g. "if Blacks were more apparent on TV, then…", is the presupposition that the antecedent is possible, based on another implication that is not always certain.

A set of assumptions is being employed just to say that if Blacks were more represented in that domain that they would achieve some sort of change in the world, that if more Blacks were on TV then their political situation would change. The problem is that there is nothing to which we can appeal to assure us that persuasion, uptake of the intent, occurred in the general population. Stuart Hall in "Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse" (1973) has shown that most often none has. Denial of the assurance regarding the object of persuasion is not a denial that there are acts indicating that it has occurred, but that we should attend to how one can formulate appropriate claims within a framework of conventions whose method of construction are clear. Frames lay out the structural connections between reports of subjective experience. For that change to be considered relevant within our state of affairs, a move in this incentivized structure implies a system of shared meanings which itself is substantiated in the socio-cultural context in which individuals give those claims significance (Hempel 1952). Our task is to steer clear of the idea that representation, particularly in the U.S., actually captures what is yet to happen, therefore, rendering intent hypothetically. The sets of conditions in which representations are salient to addressees, i.e. are licensed or disallowed, must be modeled in order to account for those symbol's function as constituents of our apparent state. These causal antecedents are not necessarily found in the context of their assertion but are represented in how that context is organized.

With an increased frequency of a representation's use, each begging the requirement for recognition, its significance or novelty wanes. Information is lost due to a decrease in that assertion's significance within the state of affairs with respect to more novel ones. With lack of interest, more distance comes between representation and its initial claim for use is normalized. Representation and claim begin to diverge as representation is divorced from its functional-content, becoming associated more with its presupposed value. Its use is tailored within that state as its definition is narrowed to a stricter set of contexts from which it was deemed to be appropriated. Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò (2020a) has described this process under elite capture within identity politics. Group interests are narrowly tailored to what the subordinate has in common with the dominant. As more of what does not align with the top is eschewed for a more coherent representational claim, the dissonance between the original claim and what is espoused increases. The context in which the functional-content of the original claim was determined and the operation of its representation in the latter instances

diverges with each application of that symbol; use structures the conversation regarding the organization of our state of affairs. From here, we call this representational divergence. Information loss will be characterized as entropy. The incentivized framework organizing our state of affairs, then, licenses a game-theoretical representation of how our world is structured (Nguyen 2020). We want to show the content (significance) of an expression, i.e. move in this game, as not where it ends up on the board, i.e. the location of its representative token, but as a function of its application insofar as the extension of the contexts of its successive use. Each move, then, refers to the conditions marked by the context of its initial determination.

Below, we think of a way out of what Derrick Bell Jr. (1970; 1980) called interest convergence, a dilemma that arises because the dominant will only cede a position to the subordinate insofar as it benefits them. Interest convergence will be within the context of recognition divergence. Observers recognize that you are making a claim, not about the representation, but about the disparities manifested by the deployment of a system as a matter of policy, granting certain representations significance and others not. The representation loop formalized above with respect to the "Privilege Walk" models game-theoretically what happens as a result of incentivized systems implied by society organizations. Recognition divergence conceived through a representation game models this process with respect to position, and that position's relation to others, thus determining the domain in which how people are sorted into the categories implied by a particular frame's use can be explained. This is done by evaluating which positions can be taken and which are blocked by virtue of the arrangement of those currently occupied. There is an asymmetry between who is represented and the recognition those representations attain. The representation game analysis based on a model abstracted from the "privilege" game shows the tension between a measure of personal harm and the structural conditions modeled in-game simply by asking the question, "Has this ever happened to me?"

The more frequently a representational token is used in order to guarantee some recognition of the scarcity of its appearance, the farther the distance between the recognition of intent, e.g. politics animating that representation, and the significance of that token with respect to the discursive construction of the state inhabited. Considering discursive construction as the state of affairs in which agents (players) are implicated as they construct it by way of their modes of expression (moves made), lends itself to a game-theoretic model because successive moves can be considered algorithmically. The socio-cultural and racial political connection between algorithms and what appears on the board was made in David Theo Goldberg's "Coded Time" (2019). Goldberg helps us to develop the idea of a Race condition. The order in which the logical outcomes of decisions with respect to the reference frame employed, even if shared between constituents of that state, leads to asymmetrical relations between the positions occupied by tokens and those that come available.

An algorithm is a set of practices, each indexed to certain conditions within the domain to which it responds. As conditions either from the outset or as a result of prior practices shape, i.e. organize, the domain in which these algorithms, i.e. strategies, are a part, the domain itself changes, affecting the options that emerge or are foreclosed. If foreclosed, conditions make them unavailable at present, not non-existent. By positing exchanges in this way, we appeal to less extra-systemic facts regarding what caused a particular move - facts that cannot be justified on the board and require substantiation outside of the game. These appeals lead us into a loop of justification and substantiation of justification, representation, and recognition of representation. By modeling implication by way of play, and entailment by way of emergence and foreclosure, we explain game progression, thereby state change, by

way of the manipulation of conditions. The function by which a move-operation is motivated, thus one's implication, in the game, can be abstracted from play. This posits a model of the framework in which that function was defined. We model how the game is organized as it proceeds, lending insight into the claims made by one's mode of expression as indicative of their participation in that world. Thus, subjects are implicated in the state constructed by way of the moves (expressions) they employ.

Here, a representation is not taken as re-presentation in the mind. Below, it's not a mental model of some phenomenal or extra-mental object indicating a concept in the mind representing something of the world; nor is it a mental construction produced as a model of the extra-mental world whose use expresses a concept that can be grasped by being represented in a way relevant to the mind of others. Below, a representation is taken as a token produced in the extra-mental world mistaken as identical, i.e. interchangeable, with a thought. It is symbolic. It is not the case that the use of that symbol expresses the thought it represents, its function in the world indicating a concept that can be understood because shared and tested between parties; rather that symbol stands in place for that thought and, therefore, its function must remain rigid, protected by any means necessary. Otherwise, the thought that symbol represents would not be the case anymore. We will interrogate the issue that arises when representation is taken in this secondary sense, for when the symbol is not apparent, neither is the thought. If its function in the state, as both member and means of constructing said state, cannot be shared, then one is hard-pressed to explain how, where, and when that concept applies, if at all. If taken up by one party, access to that thought would be denied to others and therefore is inapplicable where those others are located. The concept is dead on arrival. It cannot be a member of the world. As Toni Morrison once clarified, if in the world it is determined in relation to that world's constituents, then obsession over symbolic representation distracts from how the world of which we and others are members and, therefore, the concepts we employ, is/was/are constituted.

Here, "position" comes from Herbert Blumer's analysis of racism as group position. Dominant positions only cede movement insofar as it benefits them:. "the dominant group is not concerned with the subordinate group as such but it is deeply concerned with its position vis-à-vis the subordinate… defining their positions vis-à-vis each other. It is the sense of social position from this collective process of characterization which provides the basis of race prejudice." Thus, a model of this incentivized structure is expressed by the function of moves laying " …claim to certain positions of control and decision-making…" So, "[t]he sense of group position is clearly formed by a running process [a game] in which the dominant racial group is led to define and redefine [encode] the subordinate racial group and the relations between them (Blumer 1958, pp.4-5).

For example, a game's content is considered turn-wise. A person makes a move followed by a response. The game progresses by mapping the probabilities of a player making one move versus another based on what the other does. Eventually, the probabilities considered on their own make it seem as though players choose randomly, but we know this is not the case. One's choice presupposes a strategy that unfolds based on prior moves, entailing a particular response by the other. In effect, a move makes it so that the other player is not necessarily playing against the pieces on the board but against the other's presupposed strategy, indicated by the shape of the relation between that player's pieces considered within the context of their own. Each player is implicated in the shapes—relations between pieces representing closed and open positions on the board—the game takes on in its various stages. Moves, then, are not random. Possibilities emerge as conditions change, explaining how a seemingly inconsequential move long ago may effect one's current position overall.

Our method takes up recent inquiries into and applications of Standpoint theory, specifically Standpoint Epistemology in Feminism. Introduced by Patricia Hill Collins (2000) with a version formalized by Liam Kofi Bright (2018), their major premise is that people within particular contexts have "better" knowledge of that context than those external to it. My reduced reading of this leads to a host of issues. Collins' and Bright's more nuanced analysis shows how considering the case of Black women as outsiders within overdetermined contexts underscores the value of this point. Standpoint Epistemology is not universally interchangeable with lived experience. As Bright puts it, "Situatedness Is Not Reducible To Evidence." Otherwise, we get an oppression Olympics with stance becoming a way to measure one's experience against others, encouraging false narratives in order to gain access to the perceived benefits of assuming that position given the situation. With a theory's conflation with critique rather than seeing critique as the mobilization of theory and theory as developing a method of critique before application, the result silences others, because they do not have access to or speak with a canonized, incentivized vocabulary.

Interrogating frameworks that presume greater knowledge over others than they have over themselves, Standpoint epistemology works to formally intervene in this process through a framework analyzing the ontological-epistemological formation of the categories of licensed expression organizing a state of affairs. Whether in matters of the unconscious, colonization, racialization, gender or sexuality, or those of cultural and political-economy, the deferment to experts as masters of frameworks over a particular context that is imposed to manage and organize the form of life therein, and to which those studied are denied access so that their claims are validated insofar as they agree with that external party, has been shown to lead to a host of problems, noted in particular by Táíwò above. Standpoint epistemology is about developing frameworks from the stance of those within certain conditions. Sharing that framework allows for its verification by those who reconsider (re-present) and, therefore, can occupy similar conditions wherein responses would be similar given those conditions. If inapplicable, the framework is discarded; if not, the frame becomes a means of building coalitions by revealing affinities of practice across contexts. That others who inhabit similar conditions test and verify frames makes it necessary that the framework is shared in order to be valid; that an intersubjective basis is required before an identity politic by way of frame employed obtains a sense or purpose at all. The Combahee River Collective (1977) meant to show through intersectionality theory, a concept developed by Collins and Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), that identity politics reveals how identity, as primary, ushers in the relations of subordination and dominance one seeks to overturn. If a framework cannot be shared or is only applicable to an individual's lived experience, universalized across contexts rather than positing a relation between them, it is either contradictory to those who live therein or is useless because it applies nowhere. Our game-theoretic model helps us conceive of how these concepts work in tandem and explains how the subordinate can inadvertently onboard the means of their own oppression due to a conflation between representative identity considered primary and opposed to the subjectivity that animates their movement. Empiricism is Standpoint Epistemology (Bright 2018), mapping presuppositions and entailments to model the extent to which frameworks are shared, insofar as they do or do not apply given certain conditions.

Within this, we surmise that representation primary acts intend to render one's mode of expression legible to others through the frame organizing the state of affairs in which the "conversation" is structured. Since adhering to the structure in which what is sensible is deemed as such, hopefully, the other will get the content of the message. This effort fails to recognize that what is sent is interpreted in a way relevant to the receiver. Considered

within the realm of political or cultural action, being rendered legible also renders one susceptible to erasure, for the representation's claim to stand in for the group allows the dominant to take that group as a whole. If the messages show up in an unexpected way, they are disregarded. By eliminating what is deemed an "inconsequential" move within the game, structuring which expressions are considered valid or not, one assumes to eliminate the strategy, i.e. a socio-political and cultural movement (Robinson 1980). We will take our cue from a theory of games that sets up a state of affairs whereby conditions are manipulated so as to render agents indifferent to certain actions (Braithwaite 1955). This "equilibrium" implies that no move will change the outcome, from which it follows that the result is common knowledge. How we define "common knowledge" is the key. For example, if we have encoded symbols, i.e. tokens and rules of manipulating those tokens (an algebra), then we have moves that in all players' strategies are "common knowledge." If there is a common strategy for which one's own is determined by that strategy given another's, and theirs by the common given yours, then the chance that that strategy is common knowledge with probability greater than zero is understood by the following state of affairs: the probability of a common strategy to which one's move is indexed is equal to that of that move being in each strategy. This is common knowledge by definition. So if a move in one is identical to a move in another, it cannot be common knowledge that we disagree.[1] This process presents us not only with a theory for how representational efforts, even though meant to challenge the status quo, are normalized, but also a way to model the divergence between functional-content, claim, and effect. Divergence will be shown through the concept of entropy in information theory (Shannon 1948) with respect to the way in which encoding and decoding practices (Hall 1973) model what Henry Louis Gates Jr. (1988) termed signifying practices. From there, through the work of Stuart Hall and others, how modes of expression model the modalities in which one inhabits the worlds in which those expressions actively construct become clear. This normalized "equilibrium" takes indifference as the moment when actions towards or sustaining inequity, be it by or against one's intent, are rendered innocuous.

Representations are encodings of conditions in which a token's use is appropriate. The manipulation of conditions can be conceived in the following way: we manipulate a set of features modeling the "world" under consideration to represent a framework in which entities that obtain those framed circumstances are determined as having certain characteristics, e.g. encoding/decoding occurs for a message's receiver in a way relevant to them, thus imposing a restriction for the sender who encodes that message in a way assumed relevant to that receiver. Implied in the sender's knowing this is a set of conditions, rather than a list of correspondences between identity/assertion and thing/response. This is exactly what is needed, because a successful search through that interminable value-assignment list is less plausible and presupposes that one already knows what the receiver's response would be. Parsing a list of conditions abstracted from experience, represented in the language known to the encoder, and from which one knows how to elicit certain groups of responses and disallow others, allows the encoder to test an assertion that can be confirmed or denied by the viewer, which is how "conversations" proceed. Issues of reference lessen substantially, for if reference to a list of definitions presupposed by the sender as exactly the same for the receiver was the case, although we know that words have multiple definitions and the same definition applies to multiple words, conversations would never get off the ground - a component of the list which is not the list overall would have to reference the dictionary itself. Those characteristics are denoted by the application of labels indexed to those conditions. It is by the function of that label's application that we categorize those things that have those characteristics.

Through this process, we organize our state of affairs to explain some process in that world (Appiah 2017, p.78). As this set of conditions does not represent the world in total, we take it to be the case that we are mobilizing something that is not in the world in order to make sense of a concept that emerges, that concept posing an explanation of a process or relation between entities we find in the world. Game-theoretically, one does not have to take into account all the moves made; one need only consider the relation between pieces a few turns back in relation to how they are now. A move in those conditions manipulates the conditions for the next move. Thus, a move is representative of a relationship between beliefs and desires such that given a particular situation, one adjusts the probability of an expectation (belief) to account for possible outcomes conditional upon assigning desirability to an act (move). Calculating their new desirable with respect to the shape of the board, one's move responds to the apparent conditions appropriately, though not always "correctly." As there are multiple options on the board, we do not need to predict the outcome of every possibility, but only the moves that could be made appropriate to current conditions. This is a smaller subset of the realm of possibility. If all possibilities were to be taken in before a move, including the one as yet to be made, the player would be rendered immobile, for they would have to take into account "move" itself rather than a move being expressed by making some decision. Therefore, the function of a response to a move is indexed to conditions, options for both players, not a single move as yet to be made, which is the only such move whereby theirs can be said to have been correct, which is also impossible.

The result from the improbability of agreeing to disagree shows how a Race condition is embedded in incentivized structures. Since a game involves taking pieces off the board, it may appear in some situations that it is better to surrender pieces, to cede one's position, than play on. But if each side believes it'll get more by playing on regardless of circumstance, say, if each thinks it will win with a probability greater than 50%, then if a representation appears that indicates that I win, then it would seem to be common knowledge given the situation that one player's probability to win is higher than 50%. However, that is impossible, for there is a trade-off that cannot happen due to asymmetries in available information. Both players cannot rationally expect to win. If a game is zero-sum, either acts irrationally or mobilizes different assumptions. Outcomes generally take the dominant's position into account, generating higher benefit to their moves which both would have to agree to, even if neither expects to win. The dominant/subordinate position is assumed in the structure of the game even if both apparently start with the same information. So to "win" is to set conditions in which harmful moves are rendered innocuous because shown as contradictory, therefore cannot even be asserted. The game, however, proceeds by something not on the board in order to explain what happens on it.

The issue that comes to the fore when considering representation as primary within the socio-cultural and political sphere is that we quickly fall into a vicious cycle. If the goal is to forefront representation in such a way that that illocution is recognized as a challenge to the status quo and, in so doing, the perlocutionary a/effect of that assertion changes or effects the mindset of other players so future actions are preempted and those negatively affecting that person's position deterred, then that person must also recognize that their goal relies upon the recognition of the other. The other player must also recognize that a move indicates the other player's recognition of the intended goal by way of what is represented by the board once the turn is up. This spiral turns upon how illocution and perlocution link. I say something to evoke a response in you, but I need you to recognize my effort; but, then, I need to recognize that you recognize it to ensure uptake of intent. The loop continues to the point where no action can be taken, no link forged, and leads to a particular sort of pessimism regarding our state of affairs.

Interest convergence, then, is the process in which working towards equitable gains falls short because they fall in line with the interests of a dominant class. When one wishes to convey that intent, one addresses the dominant in a way one thinks is relevant to them to ensure they understand. In order for conditions to change, one whittles down their intent to an actionable goal. However, by whittling down intent, what is unsaid presents a gap between the original intention and what is asked; a gap filled with the interpretations of that ask by the dominant. As we try to get clearer and clearer on the ask, the space between original intent and what is conveyed grows, to the extent that message and intent are nearly impossible to link back together. For example, to overturn the structural exclusion of Blacks, the ask was to have more Black faces on billboards. Now, Blacks have our own network. But, can we say with confidence that our original intent about increased representation to rectify past and current injustices was made any clearer than it was before, despite the proliferation of "Black" faces in those industries? Or have we set conditions in which the dominant can reply, "At least you're on TV, what are you still upset about?" Herein lies the divergence, that Táíwò showed as the result of deferment to individual experience. The dominant no longer need attend to enabling structures, just defer to the experience of the determinate subordinate insofar as it benefits them. The argument can be made that Blacks have done so much to gain representation, but the gains received, though not minimal, are not as great as the harm that's been and is done due to an organizing principle that is not a thing in the domain it organizes, but is represented by the relation between its members. We've been caught up in dealing with the complexity of that system's consequences, rather than attend to its enabling conditions.

That "reverse racism" is a concept that was normalized by the mainstream and utilized for decades before its equivalence with "it is only racism if it is a system" is evidence that, by definition, racism implies a system. A game-theoretic model of this concept shows how a racist act implies a system of Race and a process of racialization that is employed even if the coded term is not defined as racist *simpliciter*. Its function, once decoded into the reference frame of the addressee, enacts racist effects. Within this, calls for recognition based on representation alone present us with a politic that pivots upon reactions to trauma or impossibility. The link between illocution and perlocution, a performance invoking an image in the other, is key here. The loop results because uptake of intent cannot be guaranteed.

The illocutionary circle is a model that explains the pessimist's stance where a coalition between signifying practices of Blacks and others is impossible due to this Gricean, self-isolating loop—see Wilderson's *Afropessimism* (2020). A coalition based upon the ability to be considered a viable player, i.e. "personhood" within socio-cultural and political contexts, makes inter-personal, i.e. intersubjective, relations unattainable based upon how that player is pre-theoretically defined. This recursion reveals a prior constructive capacity that is necessary for any representation-wise identity stipulation. This undermines the pessimist's ploy. The crux is the assumption that one's position on board equals one's position in the game. Presupposed in playing the game is an intersubjective basis outside of identity relations on the board. It is by this necessary intersubjectivity undergirding identity relations within the framework implied on the board that they make sense in the first place. The subject expressed by the function of the constructive capacity animating the various identities represented by way of the moves taken is only appropriate within the context of the game in which subjects actively construct as they play. This means that they had to have some sense of the game outside of identity on-board prior to play, even if norms are being actively negotiated on the board. They cannot agree to disagree on-board, but moves assume

a pre-theoretical notion of what it means to participate, thus their mutual implication of players on the board.

An example of this is the concept of omega inconsistency (Bright 2016). On the board representing our state of affairs, players agree to a particular claim about the game itself. However, a subset of the players will also agree, whether explicitly by pact or implicitly through a convergence of interests (Bell Jr. 1980), to actively deny any instance of that claim during play. With Race, it is almost universal that racism is not allowed, for who would want a player who is openly cheating on the board? There will always be zealots but they're usually disregarded as outliers. Yet racism persists. When a banal term is used that when translated into the framework of a subordinate racialized class furthers inequity, regardless of intent, its effect is denied. This is because either as a matter of policy that term was predetermined as not actually "racist" by the dominant, or because accountability is eschewed for the dominant claim that it's not really the term but rather the framework employed that is racist. Therein lies the deferment of accountability (Táíwò 2020a). The one using it is not to blame. The divergence is clear; it seems the game presupposes it to be more harmful to be called a racist than to experience racism. As for omega inconsistency, this is akin to making up the rules as one plays, which is either cheating or not a game at all, but merely a mechanism of control.

Game-wise, once a play is encoded in such a way between certain players, a seemingly innocuous move is employed or a benign insinuation is made across the board, challenging the other's competency at the game by virtue of some "fact" external to the game. When other players bring it up, it is either denied, because not necessarily a move and therefore not explicitly tied to a piece on the board, or they are asked to re-contextualize the conditions in which the game is played. The effect is framed so as to explain away the perpetrator's accountability. These "ad hoc" disassociations ("it's not me, it's the game") or flat out denials ("that has nothing to do with what's going on, on the board") can be brought up *ad infinitum*. However, each use of this tactic seems to undercut that player's own position, for their reasons cannot be justified by the very rules of the system they seemingly want protected at all costs.

So how does this all work together to illustrate how the mobilization of frames (e.g. Race), which are not things in the world but are utilized to explain how it's organized in a way beneficial to those of dominant position within incentivized structures? A link between Articulation theory, how relations of subordination and dominance emerge, and information theory is useful. A model in which the emergence of norms from non-normative means, one that does not exhaust the capacity to rearticulate the state of affairs represented on the "board," is needed. The hope is to provide a possible way out of the representational loop engendered by recognition divergence, one dealing with the issue posed by rearticulation: one's initial position is articulated but the manipulation of these parameters makes certain options emerge and mutes others. Rearticulation poses a problem for players on the board, because the board changes as the game continues.

Let's suppose that the content of an assertion is functional. Kenneth Taylor in *Truth & Meaning* (1998, p.201) states:

> We can represent a proposition [i.e. move] by a set of possible worlds [i.e. various board arrangements]—the set of worlds in which the proposition is true [i.e. obtains intent of strategy and is considered a move by others].

> Equivalently, we can represent a proposition as a function from possible worlds to truth values... More generally, we can represent intensions of various kinds as functions from possible worlds to extensions of various kinds ... we can represent the intension of a predicate as a function from possible worlds to the set of objects which falls under that predicate in the relevant possible world. Similarly, we can represent the intension of a singular term as a function from possible worlds to individuals.

Possible worlds are the appropriate domains application of an assertion (move). A world represents a snapshot of the conditions licensing a move to which the determinate of the functional-content of that assertion is indexed and that context-successors, possible worlds, reference, i.e. cite. Truth conditions are a set of contexts (state-descriptions in which move applies) in line and in non-contradiction with each other, in which a chain of context-successors model consecutive use/moves. This chain is emblematic of a strategy. As a strategy cannot be laid out all at once, it is expressed by how successive moves relate to each other. Intentions, the content of illocutions—content being the function of their application so that use can be replicated by others given those conditions and the worlds to which they extend—represent a line of citation, i.e. chain. This chain holds amongst the context-successors in which a move in those conditions cites previous conditions, not other moves, thus forming another link in that chain. The intension (content) of a predicate (description of the conditions on the board) is a function of possible worlds (contexts indexed by that predicate) of relevant (appropriate) assertion. Therefore, the intention of a move is a function from this state to possible "worlds" (= states), the set of conditions indexed as a context-successor of its appropriate assertion. A game-theoretic model provides a map between player intentions and what occurs on the board back to the player implied by that move.

Taylor continues:

> ...intensions 'determine' extensions and that they do so as a function of the way the world is...On the one hand, there is the identity of the proposition itself. On the other, there are facts about what conditions obtain in the world. If we could imagine ourselves holding a proposition fixed, but varying the conditions which obtain in the world then the truth value of the relevant proposition would vary as a function of the identity of the relevant proposition and the conditions which obtain in the world.

It follows that, from a move on the board, the function of its application can be abstracted given that move having been made just so long as that function satisfies a context-successor in which its application is appropriate, because it references a context-predecessor in the line of citation.[2] If discourse can be considered a game, then our model maps particular moves made in exchanges by players as a function between representational claims and the contexts of appropriate assertion. In lieu of stipulation, we reveal the individual but not mutually exclusive constitution of our state of affairs by way of identifiable positions and their relations, without having to forgo the subject animating those positions for the sake of an in-game identity. Forsaking subjectivity (= subject + activity) for label negates most of what that subject supposes, in order to align with an extra-systemic strategy or policy—see Church (1956) in note 2.

This brings us to Articulation theory and the concept of entropy considered through encoding/decoding (signifying) practices. Articulation theory is the study of how relations of

subordination and dominance emerge. It attends to enabling conditions rather than cataloging effects to substantiate what we already know or presuppose. In our model, if the constitution of the state inhabited is considered by way of its manner of construction, as moves within an incentivized structure, then if the goal is assumed, each move positing a probable relation to that goal, our having to encode a thought, a strategy, is twofold. It must both be understood as a move by others, decoded in a manner relevant to their strategy so as to determine options for their move, but also relevant to the game. As the moves articulate the options on the board, the game is structured by way of these encoding/decoding practices.

The connection between Articulation and our model is provided by Stuart Hall (1973) with respect to his theory of communication as a means of constructing socio-cultural states. A sender encodes a message in such a way they feel relevant to the receiver who then decodes that message in a way that is relevant to their situation. Mistranslations occur when sender and receiver occupy different forms of life within that state of affairs. Each form of life is organized by a different reference frame. The way in which symbols are encoded, then, are of importance, not necessarily the object to which that symbol refers. Language as encoding/decoding mechanism makes it a module of the mind (Fodor 1975). Language is considered a mechanism for creating thought. One can construct propositions, sentence-like structures, without externalizing them, i.e. talking to oneself. Externalization is not necessary to language; it is only an aspect of that module. In fact, speech is a tertiary aspect, for one can construct thoughts and represent them to oneself before externalization. Hearing others' output as input for one's own mechanism of interpretation presupposes a domain in which that input is translated into a representation relevant to the domain upon which "decoding" occurs for the receiver (Fodor 1975). One can also form expressions that are syntactically correct but semantically ambiguous (e.g. garden path sentences). As such, there are redundancies in sentences or conversation. Repetitions either slow or confuse semantic uptake. If the superficial appearance of an expression is taken as primary, solutions to how that structure came about seem arbitrary, for they are fixed to the conditions of an observer who may not have access to those representations. Without a mechanism that takes input and translates it into the representational system an observer already knows and vice-versa, meaning that both parties have this sort of mechanism, a loop ensues. For since there are many ways to express the same thought, those many ways would be mistaken as different thoughts.

So, if one formalizes syntax in a manner that is useful for explaining how expressions are produced, the material required for semantics arises as well (Chomsky 1957). The reverse does not provide an explanation for production, only how what we already know harmonizes with what we see. Semantic material is found in the way an expression was encoded. A proposition's function of construction can be abstracted from data thereby providing how context and proposition are related as conditions change—see notes. We contend that one can talk to one's self about themselves from their position in the world. From this, one develops a framework and applies it to organize the world they perceive in a way that makes sense to them. One then encodes that set of conditions as the world represented by that frame, valid in its relation to other positions. This mark of validity is only obtained when shared, for if another is able to represent the conditions captured within that frame, they will gain access to the same concept, even if their externalized representations appear different. The function of that thought remains the same, albeit in different clothing, because appropriate to ongoing affairs. We conclude that the object of thought is not a thing in the extra-mental world, but is accessed by means of applying certain expressions given the conditions to which a framework is indexed. The conditions may not look the same, but the

relationship between its members are and, therefore, so is the relationship between the position one assumes with respect to those assumed by others within the framework organizing those conditions.

When talking about encoding/decoding practices as language, proof of this capacity is found if we are able to conceive of what "self-signaling" entails. If that mechanism can be described in itself, the possibility of its projecting representational-content via the use, not definition, of the tokens available to others becomes clear. An explanation of what that capacity is can actually be achieved rather than just a catalog of its output. Signaling pivots on the classical economic notion of informational asymmetry. To signal something to another player implies that I know something they don't. In classical models, it's assumed that agents know everything there is to know about their preferences toward current alternatives based upon their prior decisions up to this particular point in the decision making process. It's assumed that they have full access to this stock of preferences, that they are in full possession of the information regarding these alternatives. Unfortunately, it has been shown—and many of us know this about ourselves already—that we forget things all the time, "signaling" that complete knowledge of self across all possible contexts is impossible. However, we cannot talk about forgetting something without understanding what it would take or mean to remember. Thus, self-signaling can be about what kind of person one is to one's self, characterizing the conditions in which they inhabit now as a function of prior states, i.e. concept formation. One abstracts from prior conditions so that when those conditions arise once more, a move/utterance appropriate within those type-conditions applies. One recognizes that they inhabit the same position now, relative to others, as they had done in prior contexts. The contexts to which they refer describe relations on the board, not necessarily individual pieces. The signal indexing specific conditions only makes sense in particular contexts if the function of the application of a type of move is triggered once that player is in those conditions. Thus, the functional-content of a representation/signal whereby one's disposition to the state on the board is triggered is indexed to conditions, not the things that inhabit them from time to time, or no longer. As conditions on the board evolve over the course of many moves, a signal comes about to which the player reacts when a collection of moves has taken place. As a single move does not denote the shape of the entire board, a player does not necessarily respond only to the most recent single move (Brodner and Prelec 2001).

There's a connection to the socio-political and racialized state of affairs we are considering by way of David Theo Goldberg's (2019) notion that Race acts like an algorithm. An algorithm models a set of rules ordering a series of operations. Algorithms act as hyper-discriminating machines reliant upon encoding/decoding procedures. They can run supervised—categories predetermined by a label or identity—or unsupervised—by measuring correlations between data points, creating categories by which it proceeds in subsequent searches to organize the domain as it runs. The question becomes, are these mechanisms just grasping perceptual categories through statistical correlations or are they utilizing abstraction and analogy to formulate concepts? Considering Race, racism works to "differentiate and distinguish between relevant and irrelevant data, between what's of interest and what's not, based on past patterns that then don't just inform but drive relevance." Adding Goldberg's concept to Hall's model, we see how omega inconsistency is codified then reified in the system: how it is not present, but represented in how the game proceeds, i.e. how the board is organized. If Race is akin to a protocol or algorithm, then an unsupervised protocol can explain structural racism by way of modeling Race conditions, seemingly innocuous actions whose function perpetuates that system.

Race conditions occur when output is dependent on a sequence of uncontrollable events, those outside the domain or data upon which the algorithm was trained. If an algorithm maps a process along a line of nodes, and if one node's input depends on the output of another line, then there are moments in computation where contradictions arise but dissipate when the dependent node receives the output of that other line. One such condition is time. When the solution is the same, it takes longer to compute a larger formula or one that depends on the output of other or sub-formulae than it does a shorter one. If we consider a function as some sort of abstract object, a concept then being some sort of mental object, then if Race is expressed by the function of an operation that categorizes individuals based upon prior stipulations, a single step does not reference the system it constructs, only prior steps. As a result, the relevance between later steps to those earlier in the process decreases exponentially. The function of some operation can be defined by way of there being a position in the domain of play and another that is an element of the range of options, such that an action from domain to range is an element of the function "move." This makes that function an object of thought. Use of functions indicate a form of life by virtue of a reference frame relevant to the user. One's position on the board becomes more relevant to prior moves rather than the ultimate strategy. Race conditions occur if we consider this sorting mechanism as a logic gate—true/false—which, at certain points, prior categorizations are combined after having traveled along different paths towards predetermined goals. There are many ways to move pieces to articulate the same position, and many positions that become possible or are foreclosed by the same move.

Consider that at the beginning of one's turn, one is presented with move A to assume one position and another that is not-A to assume the same position. Logically, (A AND not-A) cannot occur simultaneously. However, if a process in which that move was formulated takes longer to recall at this turn than the other, there will be a moment when both options are equally valid. This inductive puzzle applies to racial categorization as well. Consider that before a particular time an individual is characterized by some property that categorizes them as one Race and after that time as another incommensurable to the first. So if we consider a future time, e.g. attempt to predict the outcome of this move before making our turn, then at that time in the future it is possible that that individual obtains both categorizations because they possess both and possibly many more unaccounted properties at this time (Goodman 1983, p.74). Racially, this results in moments where there are non-Black Blacks and non-White Whites, making the system of categorization employed, here and now, arbitrary yet utilized to particular effect.

There are two forms of Race conditions: critical—the order in which tokens or moves are introduced to the algorithm determines the state of the system—or non-critical—order does not change the state. Within that, the system can be static—aggregating turns or individuals under a single evaluation or category—or dynamic—multiple stages occur when only one is intended. A game-theoretic model is dynamic. Critical conditions locate and model this Race condition as turns where moves change the outcome by way of players assuming what are ever-changing subordinate or dominant positions. Considering that the object of this paper is to model how particular reference frames attempt to organize our state of affairs and, in so doing, categorize, validate and invalidate, allow or disallow certain expressions to emerge, Race conditions map onto state construction. As turns are rearticulations of conditions on the board, Race conditions are normalized, i.e. are able to be handled by adding redundancy in systems of categorization. As such, we model what a Critical Race Theory entails: it explains what we meant above by state construction mobilizing a contradiction (e.g. agree to disagree, "separate but 'equal'") to certain ends. Racism is a past conception projected into the future so that at present a person's position is overdetermined. That contradiction is

allowed to propagate, for one's value is simultaneously predetermined before they are forced to act in accordance with current conditions. Black individuals' previous definition as property having been overturned, that series of propositions takes time to render current interaction as either counter to what is now or as what affirms a previously held belief. Racism cannot be justified despite allowing, at present, it to be the case that one is a member of a state of affairs in which that very membership is being denied. Current acts formalized to maintain the status quo into the future propagate more quickly because they reference the nearest preceding state in which that dominant relation obtains. Disproof must reference a series of states, each dependent on priors to disprove the discrimination referenced currently. Racists only reference prior consequences. The anti-racist references consequences and their relations, i.e. enabling conditions. Hence we see the deferment from dominant to subordinate to explain, so as to validate or invalidate, their position.

Race conditions and our game approach connect through a reading of information theory (Shannon 1948) translated into socio-cultural study by way of encoding/decoding practices (Hall 1973). The same thought can be expressed in many ways and the same expression encode many thoughts because a sender encodes a message in a way they feel relevant to the viewer, hence parsing a library of conditions, groups of applications, not a dictionary of definitions to no end. The mechanism we seek to elucidate models the manner in which a thought is encoded by some move relevant to the game, i.e. our mode of expression. If language was only what came from one's mouth, one would presuppose semantics without an account made for construction, how what semantics map onto got there in the first place. The board is the medium upon which the encoded message is sent. Factors outside the board may make reading the move's intent more opaque. However, based upon that encoded information, the receiver, by way of the norms of play, decodes the thought whereby certain options emerge, others are foreclosed, and the process begins again.

Encoding thought as a move relevant to the board, a simple yes/no for each possibility indicating agreeance with frame or not, reveals redundancies. Consider a Boolean conception of encoding. One codes 'no' as 0, where a position is open and a move closes it off for others, and 'yes' as 1, a position is occupied. 0 and 1 are prime for encoding purposes since they are idempotent. Operations can be formalized on them wherein their identities are unchanged. These laws are $0 \times 0 = 0^2 = 0$ and $1 \times 1 = 1^2 = 1$, where each number $x * x = x$ represents an operation whose function expresses the idempotent law, for $f(x) = x$ only when $x = 0$. Thus, 0 becomes a constant, thereby the determinate of the function of x. Not 0, then, is 1 and whatever is not 0 remains 1. This constant can be characterized by X(0)=X labeling a category whose only member is its function of application and by which X-types are determined. From this we take Kenneth Taylor's lead and state that the function is the content of an X-assertion whose operation enumerates X-type objects, x_1, x_2, ... falling under X. So if X encodes "Black", successive applications (noted by ') of that function enumerates Black contexts, so X, X'=X_1, X_1'=X_2, etc. Once this is done, "...these are not 'numbers' any more. As symbols for [totality] and for [nothingness] they are the cornerstone of the very structure of the human mind and of human reasoning..." (Diagne 2010, p.66). By encoding one realizes, "...that the procedures of human thought could be translated into the language of algebra and thus made mechanical can be considered the creators of our civilization ...and that 0 and 1 encapsulated the power of the human mind to reason in the universal [here shareable] language..." (ibid., p.66)

Let's apply this to our game-theoretic approach. Initially, the open spaces on the board are encoded for each player as 0. Arguing from positions not pieces, positions are expressed by

the relation between tokens of different values and expressed by the function of a move-operation that captures spaces. Tokens are traded with others if that token's value is lower than theirs, thus maximizing that player's position on-board. Therefore, "move" is a triplet: a value representing the initial placement, last placement, and the value of the token. An evaluation function is assigned where for a position p, $f(p) = p$ determines a function over a range of options within an overall position P prior to execution mapping a p-member of P unto itself, thus no move as yet. So, $[f(p) = p] = P$. A successful move encodes the gained position as 1 paired with the value of the token, for if $p = 0$ then $f(p) = p' = 1$ for $p' \neq p$. If a player has the opportunity to take another's token, then that option would be encoded as -1. The function of that operation indicated by a move, i.e. choice taken, expresses one's position on the board, for $P(0) = P$ and $P(P) = P$-successor, characterizing one's position by way of the execution of a move. Thus, the set move (M) is a subset of P, where a function maps a selection from available options that maximizes one's subsequent position on the board and pairs it with a token that can complete that move in M; thereby minimizing the other player's position. The function characterizing this is $f(P(M)) = f(p,f(p))$, mapping a move from 0 to 1. One chooses the maximally weighted position (value * open/close) available within P. It follows that in response, one selects from the options at the intersection of their and the other's domain, a move whose range in P minimizes the other's position, which, for them, is the maximum available in their domain. So, as in chess, white is $f(P(M))$ and a response is $f(P(M,P(M)))$ (Shannon 1950). Thus, we do not consider each token on its own and consider each possible move it could make one-by-one, which leads to an insurmountable and improbable amount of variations; instead, we consider positions by way of conditions on the board, which options are open and which move fulfills the best option given the circumstance.

Move takes a rank function as its object, thereby enumerating successive moves in a strategy. As encoding proceeds, the transmission of a strategy begins, as decoding occurs on both sides. Options appear as paths to openings one can take. Moves are decided upon within the context of their priors—see the X-chain above. Operations such as conjunction, i.e. AND $(\times)$, disjunction, i.e. OR $(+)$, and negation, NOT or NEG $(1-\dots)$, can be used to decide the validity of a move within the domain of a given strategy. Logical deduction, thinking through or gaming out consequences, then proceeds via algebraic transformations. A function of x, $f(x)$ above, can be developed into the form $f(x)=Ax + B(1 - x)$ which when $x = 0$ or $x = 1$, encodes options in A and B. This is why in Boolean algebra $1 + 1 = 1$, no options are left, no spaces unoccupied. In sum, if a piece within a position takes another of lower value occupying some placement in the other's position, the result is 1. Conditionalizing on the encoded domain makes IF/THEN, ELSE a Boolean operation where $Bool(0) = 0$, $Bool(n + 1) = 1$. If m=move, s=stay, and r=true-value-rank, taking coded place-values n, then evaluate $f(p) = Bool(r(n)) \times m(n) + Bool(r(n)) \times s(n))$, where if $|r(n) > 0|$ then m obtains, else s. Thus, move occurs because $1 + 0 = 1$, stay because $0 + 0 = 0$. It follows that multiple m or s occur given the encoding of current players positions on the board. So the domain of availability provides an evaluation that has a series of interspersed strings with lakes of 1s or 0s, e.g. 10101… or 111000000110001, etc. As long as there is at least one 1 after a player evaluation, a move occurs, and in this way we see how multiple options can be the case in which ranking comes into play. If no 1 is apparent, then the player resigns.

Each type of token is coded with a value, thus token positions are calculated by a move function combined with token placement. That value is assigned to a rule that characterizes that token by defining its movement. Every open space on the board is coded 0, occupied

spaces 1, with tokens for the other players coded negatively. Move, then, takes a function of evaluation over a set P, whose members are defined by a triplet of features, each characterizing an option's rank and whose sum constitutes the overall position of the player. This triplet is comprised of the placement of a token, the nearest desired/open location and the closest token valued ‹0. Converting an open to an occupied square takes the output of a function that orders placements as input for an evaluative function that produces a move as its output. So the evaluative function runs over the domain of token locations and openings on the board, encoding them as the triplet: ‹placement ‹desired, - token››. Based on rankings of available placements, for *r* changes the sign of encoded spaces thereby converting a desired placement or token from one within another player's position to one within their own, the player's overall position is recalculated. Based on a token's rule of movement and opening/capture options, desire and position are exchanged whenever the desired location is 0 or negative. External to operations, a move is towards the location that is valued highest for the opponent, with the lowest negative value if captured, thus maximizing that player's position while minimizing the other. The operation of this function expresses the concept "move" in the game.

Choices are made by ordering the options available based on one's current position on the board, not move history. The first scan evaluates all 0s and negatively encoded squares, ordering them in descending rank to provide whose turn it is with their position on the board. Paths are revealed with respect to the tokens and those options with the highest value for the opponent, thus lowest negative value if captured and valued highest to maximize that player's position while minimizing the opponent's, hence coding the other's player's token locations within the context of their own as negative numbers. So instead of having to calculate each move separately, one first encodes current conditions, because only certain options appear (since they represent paths minimizing subsequent positions for the other), thus maximizing our position which can only be fulfilled by certain tokens. Functionally, we can treat these representative paths as abstract objects in their own right. A ranking of which moves to take and which not emerges in a way relevant to the conditions on the board, instead of having to be determined before and in despite of what the other player does. The positions change by the function move but the encoded value on the board of the token replacing another remains the same. Socio-economically and politically, this can be seen when structures remain the same, but for the sake of representation alone a minority is placed in a position of power, and yet that tokenistic position still functions within the overall structure to subordinate the very class from which they were selected. The position in which one is left after their move leaves no options: they cannot move at all, or the move taken terminates that series of moves with that piece, revealing the overall strategy's boundary.

By removing redundant moves, i.e. ones that do not further play, one compresses the thought so that once a move occurs, the object of thought transmitted is nevertheless relevant to the game. That move's content includes both on-board and off-board (opponent) considerations. As redundancies are eliminated in that transmission, the narrow tailoring of the intent behind the move into a norm understood between players makes it such that some of the information motivating it is lost. On-board, the subject is taken as its token, i.e. symbolically. This can either be to one's advantage, hiding one's strategy, or disadvantage, becoming lost in their own strategy or that of the opponent. Once the move is made, a thought is transmitted across the board. Based on the same probabilities between move and subsequent options determinate upon priors, the receiver attempts to fill in the holes of information eliminated by virtue of being compressed in a manner that makes the move relevant to the game. This

translation is into terms relevant to the reference frame they employ based on prior games, not moves. It is not guaranteed that uptake of intent occurs, hence the game structure. Games show how these asymmetries are manipulated. A move may be based on what is relevant to them and not the player across.

Quickly, it's apparent that as a strategy is enacted, a single move cannot reference the strategy itself despite being a component of that strategy. If nothing was communicated, if encoder and decoder keep missing each other, relations of subordination and dominance emerge. This is evidenced by how the decoder re-encodes the information received and transmits a message (move) that supposedly answers the situation constructed by the former. Thus, Rousseau, in *A Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men*, formalized the emergence of inequality by way of language and translation. As consecutive moves towards categorization as "good" or "bad" are made, each move represents a component of the strategy but does not reference the strategy overall, only the priors by which it, as an option, emerged. This brings in probabilities. Above, we treated them as conditionalizations on a domain, IF/THEN, ELSE operations. We'll see why a frequentist interpretation of move falls short below. The distance between move and strategy can be measured through the concept of entropy whereby a transition occurs in which players are no longer trying to beat the game but the other players. Players are treated as abstractions.

This can be represented in a tree structure.



1 or 100% certainty is reached by the determination of a domain, the initial set-up or upon completion of the game, the sum of all branch nodes. Multiplying down a line of successive moves gives you the probability of a move's relevance to the strategy. It follows that one can know the game, but fail to interpret the subgames, i.e. situations, in a manner relevant to others or beneficial to themselves as it progresses. Consider each level as an exchange of moves. Move evaluation proceeds by logical division, a concept utilized in our example regarding the Census below and explained through Goldberg's analysis of Race with respect to algorithms. Say a subgroup is structured [.50 [.25] [.25]] = [X [Y] [Z]]. Y,Z express the same "thing" in different ways. Their functional-content are indexed within the context of X. Y,Z on their own, however, are not interchangeable although their positions are equivalent. A branch indicates OR whereas a path represents AND. Following a path, one multiplies along the branches. Groupings of options, nodes horizontal to each other in the context of the node from which they stem, are summed, thereby contextualizing a node with respect to others. If one surveys a state of affairs taking an option as a yes/no proposition, the contextual relevance of one choice versus another to the extent to which the strategy has been expressed is halved. It seems the more one adds to the bulk of the conversation, the more obscure the original point becomes, despite the overall intent to clarify. As we get more specific, we break apart what is being discussed into more parts, to the point where we have lost exactly the thing we wanted to explain. This is what we mean by divergence: the more a representation is pursued as the primary goal, the less relevant it becomes with respect to the original goal. A longer path indicates an increased emphasis on symbolic representation, more frequency of assertion with respect to others, entailing less relevance by way of the compounding weighted probabilities of choices given how deep we are in the game. When

made a symbol assumed to be identical to the original goal, these mistranslations are grave. A cycle results because no path results in 1.

To offer a solution, we contend that what is manipulated are groups, i.e. conditions, not singular nodes. A node's "position" is conceived in relation to others, so Y in relation to Z in the context of X. Thus, when we speak of a node we are speaking of the grouping in which it appears. We see that linear, frequentist considerations of causality fall short because they only consider one output as the result of successive changes of probability, moving from sole input to output. The group approach looks at multiple inputs with respect to multiple outputs and considers their relevance as a network of nodes related by their weighted probability.

Group manipulation follows from what Fodor (1975, pp.128-134, p.149 footnote 35) called the "single node constraint" (=SNC) in concert with our functional interpretation. The content undergoing computations is functional; the primary node represents the domain and through composition we ascertain the range of application for subordinate nodes. Tracing where licensed substitutions occur based on derived position within the underlying structure of the state of affairs illustrates how certain expressions become available at different levels during the articulatory process, since the functional content of an expression or move is indexed to the conditions under SNC.

This makes sense within a tree structure with parent node X to Y,Z branches; the structure [X [Y] [Z]] models entailment and implication with respect to our presuppositions, the framework assumed. Y,Z are entailed by X as shown in the nested structure above. As such, X implies Y or Z. Resultingly, presuppositions are modeled by decision procedures (moves) evidenced by a statement the likes of: if (if X then Y) then if (X or Z) then (Y or Z). Y given X allows Z to be ascertained for Z presupposes X. So if X entails Y, it implies Z with respect to Y given X. Decisions procedures are inferred from this structure, motivating our treatment of moves resulting from the manipulation of conditions in order to make certain claims. Moving down a branch, if we decide upon Y given X, then if X or Z then Y or Z. We can reduce this to a single expression which we will return to below: X(Y + Z) = XY + XZ. Choosing Y given X, implicated in that context is Z given our presuppositions because Y is entailed by X and Z is implied with respect to the state of affairs characterized by X for X(Y + Z).

Consider, Race is not a thing but within a particular framework we can use that concept to account for its material a/effects within our socio-cultural/political affairs. With representational primacy, the number of branches is aggregated so that the number of factual instances substantiating the belief in the consequences of utilizing this model to organize our state is taken as interchangeable with the path itself. We think this evidence for the concept that emerges from considering how paths, histories and means of construction are related to each other in this framework and become lost in what follows. We conflate the frame with a thing in the extra-mental world. Quantifying over the many paths, it behooves one to take the quantification itself at face value. Once it's been decided, we are forced to maintain the shape of our state in accord with an arbitrary quantification rather than considering benefits to explain the current structure of discourse. A buffer is placed between the position we assume and what is the case because what is the case is constantly changing. One then requires it to remain the same lest they undermine their own position. As a path is an encoded representation, paths become symbols for groups, representing their only mode of expressing a goal. However, there are many pathways to the same object. If we take the content of the representation to be the thing whose probability is fixed, thereby fixing one's degree of belief in that goal, a Race condition ensues. One path can be composed of nodes

weighted .50 and .25 while another is weighted .50, .25, and .125. Although the latter is more specific, its relevance is lower. One path takes longer to propagate than the other—they are not the same but at a given time prior to completion, both are valid, although to take one path is distinct and therefore displays a different process than the other. As more decisions are aggregated, a node in one path may contradict one in another.

The further the distance, the less relevant to the original determinate of the discussion a single node becomes. This is not necessarily a bad thing, for this entropy can be calculated as steps toward the termination of the game, thus the full transmission of the strategy. It follows that termination is not "complete," meaning decidable, for all games. Draws can occur or games progress without end even though the endgame is conceivable—e.g. the game of Monopoly can seem interminable. We find that even if we take a series of moves that are a subset of all the turns one takes, their joint probability with regards to their relevance to the overall strategy will never end up 100% guaranteed. However, if a path representation is constructed whereby we take the disjoint union of branches, options that emerge relative to particular conditions rather than multiplying along a path, we get closer to the original conception. A node at the end of a path is not identical to the original thought, albeit a successor *qua* appropriate consequence, inductive response, to the conditions set by the original. A group contextualizes a node, thus probability, here, is choice given conditions. Therefore, that option's function with respect to composing that subsection of the tree can be deduced, and from it we infer possibilities and test them. That subset is formalized, linking the sub-condition it represents as a successor of prior groupings.

If representational content is considered functionally, linking nodes as choices taken within conditions, then representation = [form + content]. Thus, content = [representation − form] giving us the shape of the response, the path itself, not just its consequence, which we already know. The dissonance between moves and the overall strategy leads to a divergence between a move considered on its own and the game itself. The rate of the loss of relevance considered as information entropy is the decrease of the relevance of a singular move to the overall strategy. It is calculated by way of the summation of the probable emergence of options as outcomes of each exchange multiplied by the logarithmic growth of the probability of making that move with respect to what remains open. We will see how the manipulation of these shapes, i.e. conditions in which representations have form and content, get us out of a host of issues. Representations are empty unless they encompass the union of their function of application and a descriptor of the set of conditions in which that function obtains an object of thought.

Here, growth is logarithmic because there are more options that emerge in the beginning of a game, but as we proceed, limitations arise. The number of options one can take begin to decrease as other players foreclose opportunities or factors external to the board, but a part of the game impresses on one's ability to play. The "decomposition" of the game is characterized by the number of turns until there are no moves possible and/or one's objective is obtained. It can be calculated as a function mapping a choice (x) from the set of all possible moves (m) to a subdomain (n) of moves relevant to the current conditions on the board. Thus, $xm = n$ and when x is selected $x = \frac{n}{m}$, i.e. choice is from what's available given what's appropriate from all possible. Logically, n conditional on m is represented in the domain upon which choices are evaluated by available given choice and the value of that choice with respect to the domain as a whole. This function is recursive, moving from a domain of selection to composition. It continues to select from that set until we reach the nth move and the game is over.

Moves in a game, as for exchanges in conversation, are akin to the levels of articulating the thought, i.e. strategy, whose components are encoded by way of some word, signal, or move, and transmitted until the conversation terminates, the thought is articulated. This "decomposition" can be characterized as a function over the set of all possible choices that extracts a choice from that set and encodes, i.e. exchanges, that choice for a 1, indicating its being converted to an occupied space. That choice is then coupled with that function evaluating the remainder of that set, now a subdomain of the original, and over which that function can be applied again. Added to this is that function's evaluation of the set from which is extracted values ≤ 0, revealing the opponent's position with respect to theirs. That summation represents one's own position. This process continues until that originating set, now encoded by 1's and 0's, is exhausted. Once this occurs, no matter what the move, the resulting evaluation will return no availability for capture/occupation, with respect to what tokens are left, that can complete those moves or that would not undermine their own position.[3]

The function of a move operation expresses because articulates one's position in the game. Looking to Black Cultural studies, LeRoi Jones, later Amiri Baraka (1963), would formalize Black subjectivity by way of a maxim that claimed that modes of expression are the modalities in which one inhabits the world. Our model connects moves in the game to language by way of information theory, where language is the mechanism by which one encodes thoughts that are projected into the realm of discourse and decoded by others in such a way that they make sense to them. Strategy comes to the fore because if one encodes one's thoughts in a manner that makes sense in the reference frame they employ, and projects that thought onto the board in a way that should make sense and is relevant to others, then when that move is decoded, divergences between intent and translation may occur. Strategy attempts to manipulate these discrepancies to the advantage of the sender, ensuring uptake that harmonizes with the goal relevant to but not always caused by token location/placement and yet satisfies and motivates the maintenance of their position as expressed on the board.

Finally, formalizing our model, let's consider a move in this incentivized structure as a function that maps the projection of an encoded representation from a domain of selection to a domain in which that move is considered with respect to others, thus composing the shape of the game. "Move" maps a choice from a domain of selection to one of composition in ways relevant within the purview of a strategy whose range consists of moves appropriate to and therefore indexed to successive contexts of application, i.e. situations on the board. As the execution of a strategy terminates at the fulfillment of a condition determined at the outset, that function is captured by the conditional availability of a move and the probability of that move as the highest ranked option as the game progresses. Through Boole's formulation of logic in *Laws of Thought* (2017 [1854], p.213), a model can be provided whereby exchanges occur in such a way that an equilibrium between strategies can be obtained. This equilibrium indicates mutual information regarding the conditions constituting the state of affairs represented on the board. This can be considered in the following way: with move p in strategy A and q in B:

$$P(A + B) = pq / [\, pq + (1 - p)(1 - q) \,] = P(A) + P(B) - P(AB)$$

This is our affinity formula. It models the probability that, regardless of the move, the thought expressed translates between players in such a way that the output is equivalent in

both strategies. So, *p* or *q* are conceived with regard to what's relevant (*n*) with respect to those possible (*m*) with *m* given *n* characterizing one's degree of belief in the success of a choice from *n* based on prior moves. Thus *n* given *m* is $\frac{n}{m}$ wherein one may project that moves equivalent in accordance with a strategy (theory) on the board (world) can be abstracted from a past context (situation) into this one. From this we can measure what possible outcomes (responses in accord with the other's strategy) would be prior to that move in accordance with the framing of current condition within the strategy employed. The probability that A or B obtain is measured by moves *p* and *q* together with respect to either *p* AND *q*, or not-(*p* AND *q*)=(not-*p* OR not-*q*). This formula provides a basis for what relates players on the board, i.e. their mutual implication. However, we have shown that the evocation of a player's recognition of their move as a move relevant in some way to their overarching goal, rather than that of the game, leads us into a circle. Shown above, uptake is not guaranteed despite moving towards a joint goal.

As exchanges proceed, there is an asymmetry in the transfer of information regarding what the other does. Entropy explains how relations of subordination and dominance with respect to one's position emerge from information loss. A move made by A and some other move considered individually may seem inconsequential, but when considered with respect to the chain of moves constituting the overall game represents a framework that can be related to B. The affinity is between frames, i.e. positions, not moves. We see this when the subordinate is made to explain its position to the dominant, whereby the dominant validates or invalidates their point with respect to the framework they employ. As seen above, there is a model in which those explanations, responses to moves made by the dominant, are not stipulated by appeal to facts that cannot be substantiated within the game and, therefore, are a matter of policy. They emerge with respect to where in the line of contextual considerations this move (response or explanation) falls. In other words, by a consideration of enabling conditions.

This subordinate/dominant relation is conditional upon a consideration of the presupposition of one player's expressions being overdetermined, theirs defined within the context of the other. The probability that a move by A presupposes B's, i.e. B given A, can be written:[4]

$$P(B \mid A) = P(pq) / P(p)$$

Some move from A means *p* in game just in case there is a convention among players that A is to be used by players to mean that *p* (Grice 1957). However, A indicated by *p* on the board intends by playing *p* to produce some effect in B that does not undermine A's efforts, i.e. *q* will not foreclose a *p*-successor. This models interest convergence (Bell Jr. 1980). A accounts for B insofar as it benefits A. It seems that that convention cannot be justified by that move, as it does not reference the game itself, only its priors. To specify what A intends by their move, one must specify the effect that A intends by that move. The problem is how one can expect *q* prior to playing *p*, that B should recognize that by move *p*, A means for them to play *q*? In other words, if *p*, *q* given *p* seems as though *q* characterizes *p* in some way, but how does one know that *q* is *p* for B before that *p*-condition is set by A? That one intends for you to recognize that they intend for you to recognize is conditional upon (*pq*) given *p*. This is a circle with respect to the relevancy between the two results.

There is a way out of this circle. A Bayesian rule can be abstracted whereby a move conditional upon another updates prior assumptions, indicating that it is not necessarily the

uptake of one's intent that is required, but a consideration of the conditions themselves. As a move from B given one from A is evaluated by the probability of moves *p* and *q* together with respect to *p*, we can reformulate this under the probability of our prior evidence (= *p* given *q*) for what A has done throughout the match, coupled with the probability for *q*, all with respect to *p*. So:

$$P(B \mid A) = [\, P(p \mid q)P(q) \,] / P(p)$$

By bringing this into our considerations with respect to position as the game progresses, baked into longer bouts of play, and from the material present, the strategy one player utilizes will become more apparent as the game progresses. From this it is possible that the function of the operation whose goal is to express one's dominance on the board will be able to be abstracted and, taken by its mode of expression, routed.

The issues explored above rest on a confusion regarding illocution, assertion implying conditions of assertion, and perlocution, the effect evoked by illocution. Intent and recognition conflated within some representation led to the spiral above, causing a divergence between subjectivity and recognition (= identity). The move or illocution is not necessarily employed to achieve a convergence of belief by way of recognition, but rather to set conditions in which certain options for response remain open while others are foreclosed. We found that encoding a thought by way of some representation and placing it on the board of discourse, thus structuring our state of affairs as we participate, locates redundancies which in effect add noise to the conversation from which the viewer may take away unintended intentions. Unexpected responses follow from a move evoking the wrong sort of uptake. By removing the redundancy in communicating norms articulated by way of negotiations on the board, uptake is not guaranteed but conditions are disclosed in which certain responses are appropriate and others are not. By skirting the recognition requirement, we avert the vicious cycle.

> Suppose that one lives in a society in which it is forbidden to assert what is contrary to received dogma. One can defy the authorities simply by asserting the forbidden whether or not one intends anyone else to believe what one asserts…Suppose that I intend to persuade someone of a certain proposition. In general, I do not intend that my audience's mere recognition of the fact that I intend that they come to believe the relevant proposition be part of their reason for coming to believe it. (Taylor 1998, pp.318-319)

It seems that from a move the system or strategy from which a move was employed implies the conditions in which that move is relevant. What is left is to figure out how implicature applies in this incentivized state of affairs. Consider: X says something of Y; X provides no information regarding Y's position; however, as X is related to Y, because speaking of Y, X must know something of Y and, therefore, is not not cooperating by way of the norms seeming to structure the conversation; thus, X must not be providing relevant information; but by their participation, X must know that this would violate our norms and therefore must have intended our recognition of this hole in the conversation by the consequences associated with it. Therefore, from these conditions, the uptake of intention emerges rather than being dictated at the outset in a way relevant to the other players such that what is not said is the object of the conversation.

The structure of the framework in which moves are relevant in the game without having to entertain notions of recognizing recognition of intent is as follows. The board becomes the shared conditions in which expressions are identifiable by those who participate within that state of affairs. The state of affairs evolves as a model of the world we inhabit. Parties privy to prior moves attenuate their strategy to shapes relevant to them. They do this in ways mutually accessible as a move in the game. Thus, making an assertion in socio-cultural and political discourse means that an expression is mutually accepted as relevant on the board. Players take turns offering responses to be either added or subtracted from the board. This has little to do with its validity, for in order to invalidate a point it must be made, and if a point cannot be represented as a position on the board it has no use in the game. A mutually invalid point can be considered a move to no end or one that negates a previously held position. Thus "acceptance" or membership on the board is determinate upon a player *x* mobilizing a move from A so that *x*'s position is expressed via A such that: *x* accepts A and for other players, *x* believes that they accept A so that for each player, *x* believes that they believe that *x* accepts the consequence of A and they believe that *x* believes that they accept A.

This seems circular but recall affinity above. If *p* entails *q*, then *q* is accepted as a consequence of *p* and is represented on the board as an option or placed on the board given *p*. Moves already on the board and identified with a position expressed by the location of tokens in relations of subordination or dominance may be removed but no mutually accepted placement can be changed without effecting all that move implied, all that made it viable in the first place. A move presupposes others which when considered as a set, cite their enabling conditions, through the context in which they were played back, to the initial move constituting those conditions. This can be formalized as well. The proposition P presupposes Q only if neither P nor NOT-P is assertable unless Q is or was a possibility. By rendering presuppositions this way, we find that there are relations between moves that hold outside of player agency. A player moving from a domain of selection to claiming a position on the board does so by way of a function of conditions. These conditions change as the game progresses. As conditions change, so do situational responses, licensing certain assertions and disallowing others, with unexpected options emerging while others disappear. With these relationships in place, a move implies the framework organizing the strategy employed. We no longer have to worry about recognition of intent to persuade. One's presuppositions are laid bare on the board as a consequence of the options left. We do not have to rely on an identity between move and strategy to guarantee the relevance of moves on the board, but their relevance is revealed by the activity of the subjects animating those positions. A move presupposes a strategy if players take it to be a mutually accepted position of the game by virtue of one's participation in that game.

The incentivized structuring of our state is made sense of by modeling presuppositions, i.e. modes of encoding thought so as to be relevant to the viewer. Consider P(AB) = P(A)P(B), except if A entails B. Projection from selection to composition can be explained from the validity of one move when composed with others. Even if unaccounted for in prior strategy determinations, it can be combined with the collection of others that compose that strategy. The validity of the strategy is projected from the validity of its components. By presupposition, P(AB) is not universally identical to P(BA) for if B presupposes C while A entails C, then BA together does not suppose C. Otherwise, outcomes would be impossible to discern. Move order does have some bearing on the progression of any game. The manner of encoding is key when we disengage the content of an assertion from some predeterminate object(ives) across all possible contexts and replace it with its function of application. The

order in which a strategy unfolds, the constitution of one's position in the game, must be taken into account. If a player asserts A then B, i.e. switches strategies based upon the game taking shape on the board, then a move in A is a function of what was played prior and, therefore, posits the proper assertability conditions of that identity, position, expressed. If A entails B then B is also added to the board as an open option or considered as a direct consequence by all on the board during the employment of A.

We formalize this in the following way:

> (AB) is assertable within a context C (current shape of the board viz. options open or foreclosed) so long as A is assertable with B being assertable relative to the state of affairs, i.e. situation, S where
> $S(C + A) = S(C) + S(A)$.

Now suppose that context C does not contain some option T, yet A entails T while B presupposes T. Now with the assertion of the strategy (AB) where the presuppositions of A are already in C, A and its consequences are added to C articulating the state of affairs S(C + A). It is with respect to S(C + A) that B's assertability is able to be considered. But since B presupposes T, and T is already entailed by A in S, then B's application is considered with respect to C. Since A is assertable relative to C and B relative to S(C + A), (AB) is assertable with respect to C. However, if B was first, then B is asserted with respect to only C. Since C would not contain T, B would not be available and neither would (BA). From this, given the shape of the board and provided players' positions, a function of the operation by which we arrived at the shape of this state can be ascertained. Depending on the players and their relative positions, the shape of the board represents the players in such a way that they're implicated in that state by the methods they employed to construct it. Accountability with respect to encoding/decoding practices is retained. From the context of an assertion the function whereby that assertion and the conditions enabling its enactment can be abstracted and translated into a framework in which its consequence can be evaluated in a manner relevant to the one that must pose a response to those consequences. We find one plays the situation. They cite the succession of contexts, not a rote response to the most immediate preceding move. One manipulates conditions, not necessarily tokens.[5]

The problem of rearticulation, then, is one of the successive application of the frameworks to which moves are indexed. How do we get back to manipulating enabling conditions instead of affirming consequences which inevitably leads to searching for evidence for previously held beliefs (Gettier 1963)? In Articulation theory, rearticulation can be modeled by way of functional currying. Currying is the result of a function that takes multiple arguments as a sequence of functions. As functions are indexed to their contexts of appropriate application, one can model how contexts feed into others. We, then, model multiple contexts within the same conditions much like analyzing composite functions. Strategies indicating a particular subject at work are modelled along vectors, having magnitude and direction, so as not to render static what by definition is a dynamic process. These vectors are comprised of the triplet: a context of assertion, an identity, and how that identity relates in that context. A move's use implies a domain and its range is determined by a sub/co-domain of appropriate applications. A calculus of relations between two or more individuals as expressed over the course of a period of time could be modeled without having to make a single move equivalent to that individual's overall strategy. The cross-product of these vectors gave us snapshots of the state of affairs in which a turn, a move from both A and B, took place without having to predetermine the outcome of the move (Peterson II 2018, Appendices). That snapshot represented a segment over the arc of those vectors. Thus, individuals are understood by way

of their method of articulation, their mode of expression. However, problems do arise when we get to a second or third level articulation based on the cross-product of multiple cross-products. Rearticulation is described but not necessarily explained, leaving an open question.

Redundancy is everywhere considering that the functional-content of our expressions are employed again and again. Rearticulation is similar to re-encoding a previously encoded message. Taking a snapshot as a symbol produced when a token's path is made interchangeable with the concept it expresses, rearticulation takes that as the object of a subsequent articulation. Thus, to occupy a position becomes a thing in that world. Re-encoding a concept as an object, rather than that object's function representing the concept by way of its operation in that state, can delude one into conceiving the piece and what moves that piece as interchangeable. From Gödel (1931), we know that we can formalize a method whereby these re-encoded messages make meta-statements regarding the system, the game itself, from that game's components. This is done by assigning numerals to the operators and variables of the system. From there, we construct statements by raising each item in an ascending series of prime numbers to the power of the number that encodes that component of the formula in the order that they appear. We then multiply that series through to obtain the Gödel number for that proposition. Prime factorization ensures that we can translate from original sequence to Gödel number and back. Via operations on these numbers, we can encode statements regarding those statements, thereby encoding statements regarding the system itself as well as testing those operations based on the framework of definitions we encoded for validity. As translatability between different levels of encoding is now possible, we can decode back to enabling conditions by removing redundancy. Decoding allows us to provide a method of construction for apparent statements in a manner that is relevant to the framework employed, for one can abstract a function of application relevant to the use from that assertion (Church 1956).

A solution to our rearticulation problem emerges. Once a function of composition is abstracted, redundancies are revealed and can be removed, thereby revealing enabling conditions. Compression after the removal of redundancy, then, represents the token or "piece" that is moved on the board. These pieces have different values, like different racialized classes, in and only in frame, which is not an aspect of the thing to which that value was applied but the system employed. Higher levels of encoding can be understood as nominal coefficients detailing properties. These names have functional-content within the framework in which their operations have been determined, e.g. $[A(x) = x] = A(f(x) = x)$ or $A(1 - x) = A - Ax$ are both nominal assertions whose content is expressed by the function of an operation of x. Thus, the same entity can operate under different names dependent upon the viewer but their operation across viewers remains the same, thereby ensuring an understanding of the concept the function of that operation expresses in a mutually constituted state of affairs, i.e. the game. The same name can function differently, for the ways in which that name was encoded across frameworks differ. As concepts are articulated and rearticulated, we can effectively show how Hall's encoding/decoding explains why a message can be encoded and sent without racist intent, but when translated into the form of life of the viewer, that encoded symbol's use organizes their life in such a way that their position within that state of affairs is overdetermined. Options are closed for the viewer and the sender retains the ability to deny their involvement in that enclosure. This blames the viewer for their own predicament, e.g. "it's not me: it's the game and you don't play well." The function of a move in the game expresses the presuppositions licensing that move, those required for play in the first place, albeit not apparent in the move itself.

How does this model apply to our current state of affairs? If modes of expression represent the manner in which we inhabit our world by determining domains of belief by way of our participation in it with others, then this game models the formation of socio-cultural and political affairs. Entailments and presuppositions allow us to model our implication in the worlds we construct by the reference frames we employ. Considering our model, we can say that enabling conditions account for not only the formulation of expressions from what is apparent but why certain expressions emerge with others disallowed. Consider the chains of citation we showed above. If C "causes" E, and C-successors reference C, then a C-successor causes E as well for $C = C(0)$, $C' = C_1$, $C_1' = C_2$, ...These relations represent the extensional effects of a set of conditions, i.e. "cause," expressed by the function of a set of priors. So where A = action, B = belief, and C = causal-relation, if A events cause B events and all A events are of type C, then C events cause B events as well as A events in conditions characterized by the C-chain above. C "causes" B, then, with C-types emerging insofar as C-successors occur, i.e. can be referenced. Therefore, A's of type C cause B's. Causality, then, is not so much a connection as a set of conditions in which B given A emerges and, therefore, are C-related.

Let's now consider applications. If we look at the world, in particular our state of affairs expressed through incentivized structures, in gaming out the effects of their decisions, agents will only make moves that further their position in relation to dominance. One place in which this is evident in a U.S. context is the Census. If we model the changing categories of the Census over time, the number of individuals under categories labeled Black or whose labels' operations are isomorphic with Black, have either stayed the same or have decreased with no explanation for where the Blacks are going. However, when movement is conceived within the model we put forward, we see that some opt out of categories and move into categories that are more expedient, assimilating into the society structured by those categorizations. For example, growth in immigrant populations from historically categorized "Black" countries, i.e. countries where ancestors of those currently considered Black in the U.S. came from, previously and now, has grown 71% since 2000 according to a PEW Research Center studies.[6] In 2000, the Black population of the U.S. stood at 12.9% and in 2010 at 13.4%, a growth of 3.9% according to the Census Bureau. Right away we see that a divergence has occurred, for according to the very same Bureau approximately 9% of the Black population is not counted (Chalabi 2020). If we see individual movement as a function of the manipulation of categories whose relations posit the conditions in which their identity, made equivalent with a category label, is allowed to emerge or not, we can account for change via interest convergence. Either individuals upon gaining access to the framework organizing the affairs of the U.S. opt out of Black identification or are simply not counted. We also find this where those harking from North Africa and Western Asia are, under the 2020 Census, precariously located under White categorization despite being defined within the U.S. Central Command as tribes with "Negro blood"—see 2018 *Welcome Booklet*, U.S. Department of Defense, Military Training Mission.[7] This casts doubts on any behavioral or politico-economic characterization of Black conditions, whose extension is based on these facts apparently cultivated to maintain the motives of the study rather than people. If a politic is to be built off these representations, then, it is built on an ambiguity, because it cites ever-shifting sets of facts determining the floating signifier (Hall 1996) relative to an external goal. The impact of this can be directly seen not only with respect to changes in federal spending earmarked for these categories. It's also found in the devaluation of prior moves toward equity made by Blacks as the dominant concede positions insofar as the outcome benefits them. Evidence of this is the voting redistricting and gerrymandering after the demise of sections in the Voting Rights Act in 2013 (Shelby v. Holder). The process of

drawing these districts is directly tied to the Census. The real question is why the fear in the dominant regarding the supposedly changing make-up of the state, when the "statistics" have been made to show that the object of that fear is diminishing to their benefit?

This state of affairs stems directly from the inductive puzzle we listed above. Considered within the context of a Race condition, we see that an individual would be considered non-Black before entry and Black after entry; another non-White before and White after. Onboarding the system of categorization implied by the Census as a discriminating mechanism, if we choose a time in the future wherein persons from various nationalities upon entry will be considered Black or White, then prior to that time those same individuals could possess both properties, i.e. there would be White-Blacks and Black-Whites. Implied by their move is the presupposition of a particular framework whose entailments upon entry disallow certain positions. Thus, individuals opt for positions that may be contradictory to their categorization after incorporation into a U.S. state of affairs, but are not now because their antecedents indicating Black-ness within the state have yet to propagate through the system. The system no doubt catches on, but prized gains have been made during that time, thereby aligning this subgroup of the subordinate with dominant goals—see Táíwò on deferment and narrow tailoring as well as Bell Jr. on interest convergence. This Race condition explains how that system's categories continually change in reaction to certain conditions in order to allow the newly introduced to occupy positions previously unattainable for those currently in the system but allowed for them because the status quo must be maintained.[8]

This puzzle regarding Black identity and legibility within the Census organizing our state is akin to another paradox. Black-ness, considered by the means with which it is expressed rather than Black identity and other isomorphic terms indexed to the contexts in which their operations are equivalent to what is considered Black here, seem to be in excess of any one "Black" identity, e.g. the identities m,n expressed by their function constituting categories M,N are equivalent if and only if in B, $B(m)=B(n)$ thus relating M,N by B-ness. The set of even natural numbers is not itself a natural number and yet both sets are infinite; Black identity is a category in the U.S. but not always a part of the value derived by its constitution. As a non-member member of the U.S., Black-ness seems to be the set of all these non-members members, those here and as yet to come. But how, then, can it be a member of itself? If the determinate of a function is its zero, Black-ness is represented in context as the 0-member, whose function expresses Black identity by way of the operation of its application. Thus the context itself, in disavowing Black-ness by way of some identity, is only conceived by the function of its construction and, therefore, admits that the operation whose function expresses Black-ness is a member of the context. As such, the operation exhibiting Black-ness is the function by which what is determined a member of that state is possible. Black-ness is somehow a part and in excess of any one identity stipulation and is revealed as such by the method in which that stipulation was made. Resultingly, Black-ness is the only entity in that state of affairs whose method of construction is able to cite itself, for it is, in itself, a recursive function, expressed by the way in which that state is inhabited, not a singular thing in those conditions. As James Baldwin once intimated, Whites cannot be White in the U.S. for they cite European antecedents to substantiate their position; Blacks, however, can be very Black. Blackness is expressed by an operation, not a mere label over things.[9]

What, then, is Black-ness in itself if that entity references a mode of expression indexed to particular conditions? Richard Wright would state in *White Man, Listen!* (1957), "Let me recall to you once again the concept we started with: Entity, men integrated within their culture;

and identity, men who are at odds with their culture, striving for personal identification." The entity is expressed by the function of an identity's operation, not a thing considered under that identity. What is "Black" or "African American" is a matter of quantification over individuals, features, or facts both historical and physical. However, this is a process that presupposes an understanding of Black-ness, understood by the capacity to articulate what comes to animate those categories. We can say that Black-ness (B-ness) as an entity is understood by its function of expression[10] which when applied constructs various identities known under some predicate appropriate to the context in which it appears. Then for every context n, B(n) being valid implies that B(n-successor) is valid. Thus, B-ness is present for every context n of which B is a part. Even as a 0-member, that context is still a context in which B-ness exists[11] for it can be formulated as the zero-constant of that group's enumerated members. Black individuals not labeled as such may express B-ness for $f(b) = b$ where b=0 and without extra-systemic arguments, 0 can be exchanged for B(0)=B=B(b). The concept is present for displayed in our formulation, even if as a matter of policy one negates 0-members, the negation of 0 evaluates to it is valid that that member is a non-member thus affirming its presence in other contexts despite its non-representation in this context.[12] [13]

Returning to our Race condition, consider if Race is based on an algorithm that works by negation in a system organized by logical division. Almost any recursive system as such is incomplete because it eventually articulates arguments that are undecidable, e.g. if to be Black in this context is to be descended from "Africa" and yet newly arrived Africans may or may not be "Black," then whether or not its determinations are correct by way of classification begins to fail, for none of the categories are finite. Their arrangements are manipulated to capture certain populations at different times, making non-Black Blacks abound. Therefore, a coded language which means something by the use of some other thing, a sign, symbol, or token with regard to the operation with which it expresses itself, quickly shows signs of strain. The function of a sign that entails a racist outcome organizing society operates under national, economic, or cultural signs when taking into consideration their enabling conditions fails, because they inevitably end up in contradictions or are ambiguous or lead to recursive loops. Slippage occurs around origination with respect to Racial categories in the U.S. People move from one context to another, so that a "Black" person coming into the U.S. can check a box due to some distant antecedent relation—distant as in due to slavery, colonization, nationality, etc.—that is contradictory to their lived experience as Black in their home context. However, in this future context, they can opt for another categorization. According to the Census Bureau, people of Hispanic origin can claim racial categorization based on heritage, nationality, lineage, or country of birth for themselves or ancestors. Hispanics, including Latin Americans and Spanish-speakers, may be any Race. So to be White on the Census one has origins in Europe, the Middle East (!), or North Africa (!). To be Black or African American is to have origins from "Black" Africa—consider the referential puzzles that arise from a term that is included in its own definition. By coming into the U.S., however, persons from "Hispanic" countries may choose to be racially codified as White even though it may contradict their lived experience based on heritage, racialized class, and/or phenotype. It appears that origins are ontologically necessary but epistemologically contingent. Identity is epistemologically necessary but ontologically contingent (Kripke 1980). The identity is necessary in and only in the system in which reference of origin is codified. However, it follows that the same individual with mixed antecedents may have multiple origins, thus living under various identities in and outside of the system employed. The concept of interest convergence and its connection to representational divergence comes to the fore with the conundrum outlined above.

Our game-theoretic approach explains how causal inference alone falls short, for these lines are conditional upon the particular strategies and frameworks employed. This becomes increasingly apparent when considering the statistical propensity of occurrences of representations of, for instance, racial inequities or other co-dependent relations of subordination and dominance. Considered as moves from one node in a network of related positions to another, A to B to C seems an appropriate map from A to C. However, as considered above if A to B to C is the case but C implies D, this means that A also entails D in its route to C. Lily Hu in *Direct Effects* (2020) shows how both maps "correspond to two different theoretical quantities" indicating different direct effects with regard to the causes of C. With regards to Race, Hu shows that Race has an effect on access to education which then has an effect on wages; thus Race has an effect on wages, but in another map, we see that one's wages are implied by their position in the labor market, which is entailed by Race. Our path changes as we acquire more instances representative of the state of affairs we wish to explain. Thus, differences in framework (i.e. strategy) entail differences in the quantifiable measure of the effects of racialization. Different frames lead to different statistical outcomes despite both being models of the same subject, making the analysis either arbitrary but utilized to affirm what one already knows, or useless because no justification can be found within the frame employed for the choice of frame. The more causal lines we draw, the less the effect seems to be of the concept we sought to explain on the data we have, even though we abstracted the presence of that concept from that data. We see rather quickly how omega inconsistency functions to organize a state. One can admit to the rigging of a game but discount any proof of what was determined to be the source of the asymmetry of position as a matter of policy. Another causal framework based on accumulation of statistical data can be formulated and called into action by the dominant that either contradicts what was just said or renders that proof inconsequential.

We utilized a game-theoretic framework to show how certain positions emerge or are foreclosed based on the manipulation of conditions rather than statistical occurrence. In pursuing enabling conditions, i.e. abstracting the functional-content of expressions via moves within the incentivized structure that is our current socio-political and cultural landscape, rather than cataloging instances as representative of previously held assumptions, we formulated how the function of moves express the existence of a concept within that state of affairs. These concepts operating on the board at that time, structure the game itself. "…[T]he objects of our inquiry do not exist in the world of statistics. We are interested in whether there is … discrimination, unfairness, injustice in our world and whether, more narrowly, these observational data …are manifestations of it" (Hu 2020).

How does this relate to what we studied above? Namely, recognition divergence as a result of treating representations as primary requires recognition of intent for uptake to occur, which then requires recognition of that recognition, leading us into a vicious circle. We found that what is actually going on is not the manipulation of identity so as to render, in this case, a politic that narrows the intent of the group to that of a minority representative of that group, but that if we consider the manipulation of conditions which result in the mobilization of symbols, we can account for the content of identity claims in relation to others by way of positions that emerge and are foreclosed by ascribing to a particular framework or strategy. Efforts should be focused on the manipulation of conditions, which for those in the subordinate entail the construction of alternative conditions from the material available so as to render prior harms innocuous, because now irrelevant to the conditions on the board, or contradictory, for to make that move would undermine one's own position.

From modeling presuppositions and entailment within incentivized structures we were able to show the enabling conditions in which certain options emerge and abstract the function determining the operations that constructed them. We were also able to show that recognition is conditional upon a divergence between representation and intent. Thus, within the context in which a representation is posed, if there is divergence then there is recognition given that divergence, but the relation between representation and intent gets more tenuous as repeated appeals to representation alone are made. We've shown that the function of a representation presupposes a framework in which that representation is significant. So by attending to the use of the frameworks indicated by those representations, we attend to the conditions in which those representational appeals are necessary. From the onset, representation helps but hardly ever gets the job done.[14]

In showing the failures of recognition uptake by considering representation as primary, we see why Articulation theory with regards to recognition divergence is of interest. Acts of restorative justice based solely on symbolism—like Kwame Nkrumah assuming power in 1957 yet making Osu Castle, formerly the slave hold Fort Christiansborg, the seat of government after Ghanaian independence—do not resolve what they set out to prove. Efforts wherein the subordinate merely occupy the position of the dominant do not solve the issue of that position's structural overdetermination. The relation between positions remains the same. Constant affirmation of consequence (much like the logical fallacy it follows from) only reaffirms already held beliefs or places us in reactionary positions. Therefore, these stances perpetuate the apparent as a necessary successor to this context; projecting what is already the case into the future in different clothes. Although we are comforted in proof of our condition, we do not attend to nor posit a relation between the antecedent condition from which given that condition this consequence arose. By attending to conditions, even if a belief is held, only certain consequences emerge; others are either barred or revealed as ancillary to the problem. In this way, when structures change, racist actions become either vacuous or contradict themselves upon assertion.

We found that affinities between players are possible, that there can be coalitions of signifying practice on the board. Once a domain, a set of conditions or a sub-game within the game, is formulated, what emerges therein is necessarily possible[15] (Barcan Marcus 1946; 1947). Our affinity formula formalizes the possibility of taking positions resulting in a mutually beneficial effect, implying the mutual harm of, for example, Racist frames.[16] Asymmetry in the game is not furthered. The inverse of that measure is that of overdetermination: a move posits an asymmetrical relation between positions, a move to the benefit of one or more players and to the detriment of others. Overdetermination occurs when one strategy's concepts have been predetermined by the other with a degree of success (Hall 1980a). The probability of mutual information is always low, for one cannot know in advance with certainty how others play and, in most instances, many minor games are played throughout the course of a match. From the start, the setting of a position of subordination and dominance as a function of the conditions of the game itself occurs. However, the necessary possibility of subverting those conditions is guaranteed from our conception taking into account evidence in relation to abstracting the conditions presupposed by one's opponent. With each move, one reveals more of themselves, revealing their implication on the board, in the state constructed. We should not be overly optimistic, for the inertia that comes with more moves aligned with one strategy over the other makes it harder to overturn. However, with the increased number of moves aligned one way or another, the possible outcomes of the game change, for the output of a strategy places on the board what becomes input for others, thus determining context successors that ever so slightly do not align one-to-one with the models the strategy was trained upon.[17]

In Axel Honneth's *Struggle for Recognition* (1992), we see that an intersubjective basis is required for the interpretation of an identity that is recognizable as such only insofar as its relation to other "positions" on the board, as a function of role in society, can be ascertained. From Hegel, Honneth writes, "...practical identity-formation presupposes intersubjective recognition." That "...the intersubjective foundation of a ...community is said to be a specific relationship among subjects, for which the category of 'mutual intuition' emerges" whereby "personal self-realization" is a function of intersubjective recognition. This is "creative work." Our affinity formula shows the degree to which this must obtain in order for the game to start in the first place. As the degree to which divergence arises is always higher from the onset, we've shown there are always strategies derived from what is apparent that can be formulated in-game and tested in such a way that we can inhabit alternative arrangements on the board at various times. Individuals are given space to experiment, to test, and to cultivate those capacities, coming to the realization that, as finite beings, they cannot be good at everything and therefore need others. Through this, networks of affinity emerge. Notice that identity has not yet come into the picture and therefore, a misconstrued identity politic doesn't arise. Within networks of affinity, one does not have to forgo themselves for the sake of an identity imposed from outside the form of life articulated. Black-ness results as a network of affinities between context-appropriate identities through signifying practices, rather than taking a multiplicity and reading for a singular identity. If the latter were pursued, our strategy would emulate exactly what we're fighting against.

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NOTES

(ART)ICULATION THEORY

[1] Affirmation of the consequent generally fails. The logic of conditionals state that it is not the case that a true antecedent and a false consequent obtains, thus, if *p* then *q* given *p* results in either *p* is not the case or *q* is the case conditional upon *p*. So, if *p* then *q*, *q* therefore *p*, is false: e.g. "if red then apple, apple therefore red" assumes that all apples are red; apple=red is either vacuously true or contradictory. To say consequences alone explain or are identical to causes makes current occurrences essential to the entity studied, even if that occurrence never came about. In effect, one's affirmation would claim that an event is its cause.

[2] The pessimist conflates a (N)ot-operation with the predicate "Not." If a predicate labeling a category, not in itself, without an object as of yet, a formal identity would be represented: N(0)=N. As an operation, the function of that operation, i.e. negation, is represented: *f*(N)=N for not-0, e.g. N(0), is 1, i.e. valid. Thus, the content of the category indicated by the predicate "Not" is functional, not necessarily one and only one object regardless of context, otherwise, contradictions would arise for a name can label multiple entities and a single entity be known under multiple names. The pessimist wants "not" to be universal for Black-ness. As universally generalizable, this assumption seems invisible, without structural critique. From this, "not" known by way of its function of application, labeling those known under that name, formally, is N(N)=1, i.e. modeling successive application of N. To enumerate what *is* "not," affirms the existence of what it negates lying outside of the parameters determinate upon use of N. Thus, *f*(N)=N, so *f*(*f*(N))=N-successor, e.g. counting. This is valid because N-successors reference, i.e. cite, their means of appropriate application, the context in which N is applicable, not the objects to which it is affixed, i.e. an object in the domain which its use dictates is outside of its own parameters. Therefore, if the pessimist is correct, the identity they claim for Blacks only has functional-content, expressed by its mode of application, indicative of the one applying it, not the entity to which it was applied. The pessimist is either wrong or only describes a predicament applicable to and only to themselves.

[3] Traditionally, this difference is revealed predicate-wise. Consider a (T)heory of (C)riticism or T of C. If it were the case that T=C, naïve readings of identity as interchangeability result in contradictory results: if T=T and C=C, then there is a context in which C=not-C for T=not-C. An identity function can be set up whereby T(C)=C, i.e. if C then T given C, theory is a function of criticism. T(C)=C is such only when C is zero. The zero of a function then is that function, so C at its zero is C(0)=C, C defined by its function of application. Thus T of C, predicates overall, in themselves only have functional-content. C assumes/brings-with-it a theory of its application. Conversely, C of T, C(T)=T is true at T's zero, thus T(0)=T. That criticism may be empty for T does not obtain or C states that it is true that T is false. If we assume that the function of T and C are identical, C(0)=T(0), C and T are both empty, they apply no one where or are undecidable. We conclude that the criticism of a theory is expressed by the function of a "function's" operation. C(T)=C(T(C))=C-successor, thus criticism is expressed by virtue of its application, enumerating what theory is or is not the case within the conditions determined by C. If T(C)=T(C(T))=T-successor, i.e. T(T(0))=T-successor, enumerating another theory related to others. So if C=T full stop, then what we are talking about is a theory of a theory.

[4] We will discuss below, however, the logic is pretty straightforward. If the label (*a*) identifies an act that determines the category (A) by which various acts can be defined, then that category in itself, without any one object as yet, for that label has not been applied, is A(0)=A. As such, what populates that category is determined by the function of applying the name that labels that act. The content of a category itself, known by name alone, is functional. Labeling the enactment of what that category exemplifies enumerates contexts of appropriate application. Thus, A(A(0))=A' where A' is an A-successor, the context in which the label *a* applies based upon prior use. Therefore, *a*, known by, *f*(*a*)=*a* determines when/where A(*a*)= "A" assertions are valid. Names, then, are indexed to their contexts of appropriate application. They refer, if at all, to their determinate, i.e. conditions of application, through the line of A-successors which cite previous use back to their initial determination, not one and only one thing in the world regardless of context. This way, regardless of where in the line of citation one is introduced to the

proper application of that name, subsequent use falls in this line. If it does not, one can determine whether use is incorrect or creative whereby one starts a new line of application. In a line of A-assertions, we are licensed to assert/exchange/apply *a* in an A-context determinate upon "A" in itself at its 0, i.e. $A^0{}_a$ when [*f*(*a*)=*a*]=A. Therefore, *a* applies in and only in A-successors. Formally, there exists an *x* such that [A(*x*) and *a*] is the case, where there is an *x*, A(*x*)="A" so "A"=A.

[5] This can be summarized in the following way: i. if *p* then *q* is valid given *p* then P(*q* | *p*)=P(*p* and *q*)/P(*p*); ii. as evidence accumulates, i.e. P(*p* | *q*), each time we verify that given an occurrence of *q* we find a connection to *p*, then P(*q* | *p*)=P(*p* | *q*)P(*q*)/P(*p*); iii. if P(*q* | *p*)=P[(*p* and *q*)/*p*], then P(*p* | *q*)=P[(*p* and *q*)/*q*], therefore (ii) becomes, P((*p* and *q*)/*q*)P(*q*)/P(*p*) from which we update our original assumption P(*p* and *q*)/P(*p*). From this, we can say that P(*q*) itself is equivalent to $P(q^p)$, i.e. *q* insofar as *p* does not apply or *q* given *p*-conditions.

[6] Consider if, if *p* then *q* given *p*, then if *q* then P(*q*) given *q*, i.e. *q* satisfies P-conditions. However, *f*(*q*)=*q* iff *q*=0 i.e. *q* is a function, thus Q=Q(0); if [*f*(*p*)=*p*]=P is valid, so P(Q(0))=1 i.e. valid for *f*(*f*(0))=1 so a "P"-assertion can be valid even if its content is null for there is no one *q* by which it is disproven for the function of *q* is as yet applied but determinate upon a P-condition.

[7] Consider, if *q* then P(*q*) given *q*. However, if 0 then P given 0, the truth conditions are either not-0 or P.

[8] We can represent this set-theoretically. As *r*(*n*)=*n*=*r*(0), for no one *n* in particular thus the content of any one n-context, {*n*} would represent a world, i.e. a context qua subset of N composed of a particular collection of *n*'s. An *n* related to others in that set, {*n*, {*n*}}, represents a function that determines that *n* with respect to others. The set of those sets represents a particular world's internal structure in respect to others as {*n*, {*n*}, {*n*, {*n*}}}=*r*(*n*, *r*(*n*)), determining a certain subset of N, a *n*-domain, a particular *n* in that world and a relation between that *n* and others in that context whereby its function can be determined, its range. Some n on its own says no one thing, the set {*n*} on its own would mean *w*=*n*, and a relation (function) without a domain would be undefined. As that context's determinate is known as *w*-*n*+*r*(*n*), we show that *w*(*n*), a name's use being valid within that context results from *r*(*n*, *r*(*n*)), a function that enumerates valid instances of that names use in *w*. As *n*(0)=*n*, we know that *n*=*w*+*r*(*n*); *w*=*n*-*r*(*n*)=*n*-*r*(*w*+*r*(*n*)); this evaluates to *n*-*r*(*w*)+*r*(*r*(*n*)); solving for *r*(*w*), that worlds relation to itself for *r*(*w*)=*w*(0) and as *w*(0)=*w* then *r*(0)=*w*(0) which means *r*=*w*, we obtain *n*+*r*(*r*(*n*)) which is to say 0+*r*(*r*(0))=0+1=1.

[9] We simplify this formally by saying *r* is a function that assigns a value to a particular relation between name and world. T being valid, F invalid, in those conditions, *r*(*n*)=*n* evaluates as valid (T) in *w* just in case T(N)=[there is an *n* such that *r*(*n*)=*n* and N]. In this way, *r*(*r*(*n*))=*n*' valid in *w*'. So *r*(*n*, *w*) reads *n* is *r*-related in *w* so that the following holds: i. *r*(not-*n*, *w*)=T iff *r*(*n*, *w*)=F; ii. *r*(if *n* then *n*', *w*)=T iff *r*(*n*, *w*)=F or *r*(*r*(*n*), *w*)=T; iii. *r*(necessarily-*n*,*w*)=T iff for all *w*', *r*(*n*, *w*')=T because *r*(*r*(*n*))=*w*'(*n*). Taking the determinate we modeled above, W-N+R(N), we see that W+R(0) means either W entails null, no one *n* in particular, or is non-determinate (0); W+R(R(0)) entails either W is empty or enumerates an instance in which N obtains W conditions for W in itself is 0, W(0)=W and R(R(0))=1. Finally, in W, N is necessarily the case iff a W-successor entails *n* and for all *w*', *w*'(*w*) in W, i.e. W-successors reference their means of construction in W. Our definitions come freely at this point: <W, N, R>=0; W-N+R entails N=W+R, a name (identity) is expressed by virtue of its function in the domain (W) it obtains, W=N-R, for without a function, no name can be determined whereas it fulfills W-conditions or N=W so N and W are indiscernible, and R=N-W=R(0)=R for *f*(*n*)=*n*=0 and *w*(0)=*w* so *r*(*n*)=*r*(0)=*r*=0. Even if we are at an initial state, W(0), then N=1, otherwise, the state is unknown and R(1)=1 because R(0)=R and R(R)=R'=1. Thus, each definition is true whereby, 1=0+1, 0=1-1, and 1=1-0.

Consider if N=W. If N then W(N) given N entails that N enumerates W-members. If reading the predicate traditionally, W(N) means N is W. We know that N has functional-content for N=W+R(N) and as W(0)=W, N=R(N) when W is 0 means that the content of W(N) is the function represented by R(N). So, N_0=W and the function of the operation of applying N in W entails R(R(N))=N_1. N in itself, N(0)=N, is the case when N_1-N_0=N, so <N_0<N_1>>={0, {0}} detailing a function for R(N)=N when N=0. So if a class N is made up of the set of sets of *n*, then it follows that there are more subsets that can be made of N than N-members. Even the null set has more subset, determines classifications or possible arrangements qua "worlds" than members, namely all sets without members, i.e. determinates (zeroes) of functions whereby those sets are constructions than individual members. If a classification is expressed by the

operation of a set of sets, then sets are the objects of these functions thus the content of the assertion of a classification, not necessarily their members. Therefore, N references that set qua condition, not some one and only one thing.

[10] The zero for any series, starting from "*n*"=N, can be determined by the function of the expression of that series as *f*(*n*)="*n*." The zero of 1,2,3 is 0 for "0"s value in the set {1,2,3} is 0. If we start at 5 such that {5,6,7} the "zero" of that series is "4" whose value in that set is 0 determining the function *n*+1 nonetheless.

[11] Proof that null as the only non-member member of every possible articulation is as follows. Consider the domain A with *x* members. Take a subdomain of A, call it B, naming the members of A, *a*, and B, *b*. Thus, *f*(0)=*f*, *f*(*x*)=*a*, *f*(*f*(*x*))=*b*, and *x*=*x*=0. B-members are not of A, therefore *b*=not-*a*. However, as B is a subset of A, a and not-a are members of that original domain for both domains are composed of *x*.

[12] Take an assertion *p* and its function of application *f* such that *f*(*p*)=*p*. Then, ((if (if *p* then *f*) then *f*) then *p*) is valid. In other words, if an assertion *p* is valid given its function of application, then as that function is valid given *p*, therefore *p* is the case. As functions are indexed to the domains, conditions, in which their application are appropriate—otherwise they return contradictory or no output—it follows that if we can derive an assertions functional-content, we can model the conditions in which that function is applicable based upon the current conditions in which one finds that assertion has satisfied. The context of that assumed as a successor from prior use (see Carnap 1956).

[13] Remember that although something is necessary, necessity is inextricably linked to universal quantification. The domain in which a claim is necessary may be necessarily empty without contradicting the universality of the claim. This conclusion arises in the following way: i) if necessarily not-*p* then not-*p*; ii) by contraposition, if *p* then not-necessarily-not-*p* (=possibly-*p*). So, if possibly-*p* then necessarily-possibly-*p*. Discerning which propositions are actualizable without contradiction follows: i) for all *x*, if necessarily *p* then necessarily *p*; ii) from (i) if *p* then *p* is necessary; iii) if (i) is necessary then if an *x*-domain is possible then necessarily-*p* is possible in *x*; iv) if *x* is possible and *p* necessary in *x* then *p* is possibly-necessary; v) if possibly-necessarily-*p* then *p*; vi) for all *x*, if possibly-*x* necessarily-*p* then *p*; therefore, if for all *x* necessarily-*p* then necessarily for all *x*, *p*.

[14] This is clear using Brouwer's analysis of modal frames. Per Brouwer, (B) such that if X then necessarily-possibly-X, i.e. if X is the case, then X is necessarily possible. Ambiguities arise with regard to the scope of modal operators. From (B), if possibly-necessarily-X then X is provable. Taking semantic interpretation as primary causes the ambiguity, for we take "If X then Y is necessary" to express the conditional "'If X then Y' is necessary" i.e. necessarily-(if X then Y). Sometimes we interpret that statement as (if X then necessarily-Y). Due to this ambiguity we mistake (B) with necessarily-(if X then possibly-X). These are not equivalent. The latter can mean, if necessarily-X then necessarily-possibly-X which entails either not-necessarily=possibly-not X or necessarily-possibly-X given necessarily-X. Without a domain stipulation, the latter claims that that statement is universal, i.e. if Y then possibly-Y from which we then state for all Y, if Y then X such that X is necessary in Y. Even if it is universal, an empty domain where there is no Y so the statement about X says nothing gets us into trouble, for its validity is contingent upon the possibility of a Y which is not determinable or relevant.

[15] The function of beliefs made determinate in a system of beliefs engenders a modal interpretation. Consider the following: B=possibly; not-B-not=necessarily. Does [B(B)=B]=necessarily-B? Does not-B-not-not-B-not-x=not-B-not-x? With respect to ideology, the function of a (b)elief can be shown as *f*(*b*)=*b*. The content of B(B) is B(*f*(*b*)=*b*)). Therefore, systems of belief are expressed by the function of their construction. We see from our argument above that there remains the possibility of articulating beliefs outside the system. Furthermore, the more stringent that system becomes, the more probable that no one belief can inhabit the parameters determined (see Gödel 1931): in order for a belief to be true, ([*f*(*b*)=*b*] and *b*)=B(*b*); however *f*(*b*)=*b* is true when *b*=0, for determines a context without any one object, only determines what would satisfy those conditions, i.e. B(0)=B; therefore, ideological determinism universally imposed can be vacuous or undecidable. However, because we can show the means of constructing the conditions *b* would obtain, B, as the categorical predicate (label) of those conditions, is possibly satisfiable, for we can construct statements that are true given those conditions, although unprovable within the system determined, or that system cannot prove its own consistency with the machinery it employs. Taking what is apparent and relating those objects of belief in alternative ways,

each citing its function of application/construction abstracted from experience and testing those ways of relating objects of belief against what is the case, one can inhabit those conditions, if only for a moment. If proposals do not hold up, try an alternative. A predetermined belief does not necessarily hold across every context determinate upon the conditions to which the function of a belief is indexed. If one's assumption regarding the conditions in which they inhabit does not agree with the frameworks employed, it is possible to move towards, persuade, an agreement over the conditions themselves, not necessarily an immutable interpretation of an event, now object, under discussion. In this way, prior inconsistent judgments are rendered innocuous (because assumptions are updated) or contradictory based on the means of constructing that context in the first place as soon as the claim asserted is uttered in a subsequent context from that initial reformulation. If one retains that predetermination, regardless of conditions, they reveal that that judgment is only applicable in the context of themselves and cannot be generalized.

[16] Considering our grid with respect to our theory of poetic computation: an operation that moves from a domain of selection (the plane of any one thing as no one thing in particular) to one of composition. If this operation is rendered static, thereby ART-theory, nothing emerges; when everything is moving, known by way of their operation within particular parameters, their vectors acquire mass: they matter. What is articulated is expressed by their function within a composite reference frame in which the function whereby those vectors articulated reference the determinants by which they are discernable, e.g. take two oscillating vectors: [$a(sin(x))$, infinity), i.e. the rise of a is a function of x on to infinity, rendering the domain of every thing; and [$b(cosin(x)$, infinity), i.e. the fall of b is a function of x to infinity rendering the domain of no one thing in particular. Per Georg Cantor's proof (1952, pp.19-21, 24, 26-27) we know these series converge. The vertices on our axis proceed 0, $pi/2$, pi, etc. Above that axis, each zero or crest of a rise in a is +; below the line, each zero or valley of b is noted –. Head on, each crest and valley appear as blinking dots. With increased speed a,b, and the axis look as though they're steady lines. If we abstract a theory based off of a positive (above) or negative (below) dot along some plane, we infer two separate straight lines, however, this is merely the collection of evidence to substantiate an already held belief, that the lines are straight. Change perspective again, a,b become oscillating lines that converge at various points. Each convergence represents an articulation. From this perspective, we see their underlying functions whose output appear static from one view and dynamic from another. Each encounter between a,b, i.e. [$a \times b$], is spatially conceived. Separate planes are measures of a tangent off of these convergent waves. The grid or array in which the determinate of each encounter between a,b at each convergence can be recorded, +−+−. . .

What are seen as separate, static, and strictly defined events are conceived as such within the framework employed. An alternative conception, consistent with other readings, is possible; some may be inconsistent and therefore the frame must be updated, over the same state of affairs. Per Cantor, if a plane can be defined as an infinite aggregate of points each determinate of a point by way of the functions above defines a limit to the frame employed. As there are infinitely many points around that determination, another frame can be employed in which that prior determination obtains. Thus, each point determines an interval in that space, the zero of an operation whose function delimits the shape of the frame indexed to the conditions determined by its function of construction. This directly translates into ART-theory for the determinate of a vector, form of life constituting an individual, that emerging from the conditions of an encounter between others, shoots perpendicular from the convergence of the former. As vectors have direction and magnitude the growth, impact, or intensity of what emerges' significance from, say, conditions [$v \times u$] is equivalent to ([u] × [v])$sin(x)$, where $sin(x)$ because the cross of two vectors is never more than 180 degrees (pi radians), gives us the direction of the determinate of $log[v \times u]$.

[17] The underlying logic of this argument being the syntax of what we wish to express follows from the principle:

if (for all x, if x then N(x), and R(n)) then, there is an x, where $x{=}n$ and W(x)

This follows from,

if x then A$x = x$ is a member of A
if y then B$y = y$ is a member of B

if (if A and B, then x_n and y_n) then x_iy_i or x_iy_j or . . .

meaning we can enumerate the pair-wise couples of A,B-members constituting C. If we define the function R such that $r(n)=n$ then we can state if n then $w(n)$ for by Church's axiom (1956):

if (if (if n then $r(n)$) then $r(n)$) then n

and $w(n)=r(n, r(n))$ for going back to our notion of conditionalization,

$P(r(n))=P(n|w)=P(w(n))/P(w)$

Conditionalizing on w is a function of the operation of n in w.

Formalizing articulation, we understand that a w-successor emerging from the intersection of two individuals/events x,y is equivalent to the probability of y given x and the probability of x understood with respect to y. This assumption is based on there being subordinates in order to measure the efficacy of domination, the object(ive) of the function organizing that state of affairs. According to Heyting and Gödel, in a state of affairs (w) in its totality, the nth component enumerated as a W-member is equivalent to its function of construction. Considering x,y,z such that $<x,y,z>$ with z being the nth component, we know that $z(0)=z$ so $<<z_0,<x,y>>z>=<x,y,z>$ by way of enumeration. Thus, $z_n(z_0)=z(n+1)=1$ when $n=0$. Thus, $z_0 \leq z_n$ for if $(x \times y)$ then $z^{(x \times y)}$, z insofar as pair-wise couples of x,y obtain.

[18] Traditionally, conditionalization is read thus: it is not the case that if not-p then q so to ensure relevance between antecedent and consequent (as in Aristotle). Later, it was proposed, if (if p then q) then it is not the case that (if p then not-q) (as in Boethius). Here, this notion was considered under the formation of the conditions licensing these statements, taking it to be the case that given an assertion, that assertion implies that the function of its application is indexed to the context(s) in which it is appropriate. Thereby, its claims are validated in successive applications insofar as citing priors, thus referencing that function and not some one and only one thing produced. The functional-content of these assertions was formalized as A(0)=A as the initial context of assertion whose content is $f(a)=a$, a at its zero. Successive applications, $f(f(a))=a$-successor, are indexed to that initial context by way of an A-successor because A(a)=A is valid. Formalization of conditions requires a theory that does not list consequents as explanations themselves, losing the connection we hope to elucidate. We attend to this by illustrating the probable correlation between antecedent conditions and the possibility or necessity of the consequent given those conditions. Lists of consequents in themselves cannot provide their means of verification save by what is brought to the data by the analyst, making any theory based on that data contingent to experience.

[19] Is it necessary OF Victor THAT he is Black? Or is it the case THAT there is a Victor OF which is Black? Consider if this distinction turns on whether V=B in all possible worlds. Exchange one for the other and we lose the relation we wished to elucidate. The former states that Victor is expressed by the function of "Black," B(V)=V; the latter that Black is expressed by the function of "Victor," V(B)=B. These functions are indexed to the context in which their application are appropriate, thus the functions themselves, $f(v)=v$ and $f(b)=b$ as objects of an operation, show us that $f(f(v))$ and $f(f(b))$ have different outcomes. B-ness is expressed by the function of the operation of V. What *is* B is necessary in the context in which its assertion is appropriate, marked by the function of its operation in that context $f(f(b))$=B-successor, B'(B(0))=B(b). B-ness is not exhausted by any one context, because Victor participates in multiple contexts, in some of which that label applies. So in B(V)=V, B has access only to the functional output of V whereas V takes input which may be those of B or may not. B-ness is not exhausted, for B of another function does not have access to the objects in the context that latter function constructs; there are aspects of B-ness which are in excess of the context in which certain subjects, objects expressed by the operation of a B-assertion, are made identical to B. An argument against innateness of concepts but for the expressive capacity when objects are put to use in particular frames of reference, we edge closer to an explanation of why there would be distinct cultural endowments that evolve over time dependent upon the contexts in which individuals participate and are introduced to/allowed to access.

[20] Take "if red, then apple." This does not disprove the Aristotelian or Boethiusian schema; it only states that this proposition is true within a particular reference frame/context, i.e. true at the intersection of all "apples" and all "red." Considering assertions as having only functional-content indexed to the contexts marking the conditions in which they apply, the conditional above is valid when prob(a given r)=prob(a

and r)/prob(r) is not null. The function of the assertion for each is found at its zero, so $f_a=a_0$ and $f_r=r_0$ which before application in independent contexts $f(a)=f(r)$. Their value prior to assertion is nondeterminate, but after $a_1 \neq r_1$. Their intersection, implied by the conditional, constitutes a composite context in which $f(a_0,r_0)$ are jointly asserted, so it is not necessary a priori that apples are red, but of some apples red applies. As there are collections of instances in which to the object of experience we apply the label "apple," and those for "red," the zero of each collection is the function that actively constructs that collection. So, if r then a is valid as long as if there are apples, either no thing is red or there are apples, which is incomplete. We wish to say if r then a given r, there are some applies that are red, thus a context in which this conditional applies. A necessary a priori truth description can be vacuous, but a function a priori can be inferred because verifiable, proved or disproved, by a reference frame, updating our assumptions as we add or subtract from the collection of instances in which red and apple are jointly applicable. So, $f_{ar}=_{ar0}$ goes on to enumerate the members of a context in which both applies; a_1 does not equal r_1, but ar_0 can be the case.

[21] Smith's proof is evidence of Wolfram's theorem of computational equivalence. Natural systems can perform computations from which we deduce our formulization of poetic computations, the function of which expresses the concept of subjectivity. Poetic computation is an operation that manipulates parameters over a particular domain so that certain options emerge and others do not so that more combinations of elements result than elements previously in the lexicon. From the perspective of what is produced alone, what appears to be the case seems random or improvisatory. However, ART-theory-wise, and by way of poetic computations, we can discern an underlying generative structure that produces what comes to be apparent and without which no one thing would emerge.

[22] A self-reflexive statement obtains insofar as the context of an I-statement's assertion satisfies the conditions in which its initial use was determined and of which this context is successor citing that initial context. Reference, then, is between contexts not between statement and individual. In this way, an I-statement's use can have a sense even if there is no body to which it can be attached present. However, we can speak sensibly about the contexts in which the concept of the person expressed by its use inhabited or inhabits by way of an I-statement whose function relates those contexts in a way that provides continuity of subject.


That function is $id(\mathrm{I})=\mathrm{I}$, which is only the case when I is at its zero, its operation determined but as a function as yet applied. Its initial use marks those conditions as the context in which its assertion is appropriate. A proposition categorized as an I-statement, in itself, is a category without objects, thus $\mathrm{P}(0)=\mathrm{P}$. P, then, only has functional-content. So $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{I})=f(id(\mathrm{I}))=f(f(\mathrm{I}))=\mathrm{I}'$, an I-successor indexed to the context which cites its determinate predecessor for $\mathrm{I}_0=\mathrm{I}$, $\mathrm{I}_0'=\mathrm{I}_1$, etc. Therefore, that statement references the means of constructing contexts in which its application is appropriate, it cites its conditions of application, not some object(ive) thing for many can use an I-statement. If one to one with a single thing regardless of context, that statement would be ambiguous or contradictory. As finite beings, it is implausible that any one can occupy every possible context in order to verify that one-to-one mapping holds. As such, $f(f(\mathrm{I}))=\mathrm{I}'$ is such that there is an x such that (x="I" and I)= I(I) for x=I=[id(I)=I] and it must be the case that "I" is I in the contexts in which it is asserted. In this way, we model how the use of the I-statement fulfills these conditions and this context cites the previous conditions in which use was determined appropriate. "I" doesn't necessarily reference a body but denotes the concept indexed to the contexts in which the one using it participates.

Here is where the difference between subject to and the subject of (one's own propositions) is a key distinction to make. The former presupposes the necessity of a singly definitive identity, regardless of context, being interchangeable with the subject. Most often, that predetermination does not account for the construction of said identity save by the history of its use which implies, but is not stated, that another subject employed that marker to its own means. Programs to combat this overdetermination call to eliminate that identity, but in its confused stance the elimination of that identity (position) results in the elimination of the subject animating it which is what we were supposedly saving in the first place. Discussions of this sort seem to hover around the notion of "humanity." The latter seeks to ameliorate this failing, due to the seeming interchangeability in those analyses of to/of distinctions, and upon which many a program of rearticulation, subverting overdetermination, is based. There is a difference between identity construction and the act of identification. Due to our notion of I-statements, we are skeptical of calls to move towards the "inhuman," for the sake of formalizing what subsists before identification or construction, while claiming that the treatment of peoples overdetermined by their identity is considered

inhumane just the same. The confusion that arises from failing to provide a theory of subjectivity, that which is formulable before its assertion in the contexts in which that subject comes to be identified and yet remains available to participate in others, pivots upon the use of "subject" when one connotation or the other is employed when convenient. We find this in pessimism—i.e. Blackness is the unthought region suffering from cultural death—and accelerationism—capitalism is inconsistent, therefore speed up capitalism's demise—the consequence being that if capitalism destroys Black life, acceleration whereby we go through to solve the issue, results at the end of it all. Black life would be gone, which might be their point (see Aria Dean 2017).

[23] This can be considered by looking at a relation between (T)heoretic statements (statements resulting from accepted principles that utilize certain rules of formation and result in conclusions that do not contradict our principles) and (C)orrespondence rules (a function determined within a reference frame whereby observations and theories can be related). We wish to existentially quantify T-terms for both T-statements and C-rules in such a way that T-terms can be eliminated and an account of a theory's content, whereby the function of its application satisfies conditions in which that T-statement can be said to be significant, i.e. "observable," can be exchanged as an explanation for an object of experience. The process proceeds: i. make a theoretical assumption, TC($t_1 \ldots t_n$, $o_1 \ldots o_m$); ii. substitution of variables with T-terms, TC($x_1 \ldots x_n$, $o_1 \ldots o_m$); iii. quantification of variables whereby we claim there is an x such that, $x_1 \ldots x_n$TC($x_1 \ldots x_n$, $o_1 \ldots o_m$). In this way, TC=(there is a relation such that TC(x, o) is satisfied when assigned), which is to say, relations $r_1 \ldots r_n$ is such that TC(x, o) is satisfied when $x_i = r_i$. This formulation licenses the substitution of evidence for variables in the theory employed such that if the relationship between variables of the theory and evidence and conditions implied by theory are maintained, then the theory is valid and can be shared for others who consider/reconstruct those conditions can recreate similar results; if not, our assumptions are to be updated.

[24] From the set {not, Black, is}, one forms the sentence "Black is not" in the following way:



Composition proceeds from the bottom up: i. [is not]; ii. [Black [is [is not]]], for we notice that Black merges with 'is' which has been merged with not already. As such, 'is' appears twice in the process of construction. We notice that the lowest copy of what repeats, here 'is', was removed on the surface, but remains in the deep structure, available for subsequent operations, e.g. transforming the sentence into a question (the copy of 'is' in brackets above moves to the front of the phrase instead of deleting it, thus '[Black [is [is not]]]' → '[[is] [Black [is [_ not]]]]'→ "isBblack not"); iii. The result: "Black is not." The entire structure is taken in mind, only the highest constituent of the doubled component surfaces. Those constituents not projected to the surface remain in the deep structure as they are required for semantic interpretation. The semantic content of the expression is the object of the function of the deep (syntactic) structure: e.g. semantic interpretation is derived from the initial position of 'is'. Considered by way of merge, we have x,y,z, $\{x,z\}$, $\{x, \{x,z\}\}$, $\{y, \{x\}, \{x,z\}\}$ whose ART-interpretation becomes, <W, <N, R(N)>>=<black <not, is>>.

[25] The above formalizes a refutation of the Afropessimist paradigm: blackness operates out of a cultural death and, therefore, is identical because interchangeable with absolute nothing (see Patterson 1982, Sexton 2011, Wilderson 2020). We show that this cannot be the case, for if 'Black''s modality is identical to 'not', they are interchangeable whereby we can infer not just is not - otherwise, something would both be and not be simultaneously. This, then, is not a proposition about Black-ness, for black is Black and not identical to not. The Afropessimist displays the internal contradiction in the form of their proposition, thus having nothing to talk about. Their position revealed, the problem of the ontology of blackness as it fits within a particular paradigm of knowledge does not arise and should be passed over, by the Pessimist, in silence, for their point of view is not, not necessary to 'Black'-ness itself.

[26] With the function (mainstream) of a function (subculture) being indexed to the domains containing the arguments that produce relevant output, if one function is used in the other's domain, that function being the object or input for the other, that input comes without the arguments by which it expresses any one

thing and from which it, as the relation between input and output, can be discerned; or it produces nothing because no argument satisfies its conditions. Subculture being embedded in yet a rearticulation of the main utilizes what is available therein to different ends, as the name of a name names no one thing; the concept of a subculture is revealed as a recursive, constructive operation akin to a merge operation in language, producing the objects of thought indicative of one's subjectivity.

[27] This can be seen as the appropriation viz. the subsequent commodification of protest to be consumed by counterculture, and in so doing consuming the means of their own subordination—see Justice Lewis Powell Jr.'s Memorandum of 1971. Mapping this process reveals a mechanism of controlling populations with which the dominant organizes the surface structural expression of society by and through what it subordinates. We also see how markets are created, not found, in order to sustain predictable revenue streams (Lippman 1922). Tavia Nyongo (2005) states that homogenous subcultures are evidence of a mechanism of control whose operation works for the dominant in society as a known subculture is marketable and forms of expression predictable.

ART-theory models how categories are devised, markets created, into which we place what is produced. Systems of categorization do not account for this process but presuppose knowledge of what is being categorized. Thus, there are entities and forms of expression that exist outside of categorization. We also provide a model for what Fredric Jameson calls the preconditions to the conditions producing the objects of social-political discourse before they become an object of an assumed *qua* dominant "historical" narrative in the process of articulating a historical "period."

[28] Take two individuals A,B at node [A x B] representing the conditions articulating C. Thus, A,B are causally connected to C which becomes the dominant context of interpretation for the pairwise consideration of those lengths or segments of the vectors A,B become necessary to C. Upstream from this encounter, however, not-A, not-B are logically implied. Therefore, if, if [A x B] then C, then D is such that [A x B] becomes a sufficient logical condition of D, however C is the necessary cause of D as it implies A,B. So if [A x B] then C, then if D or [A x B] then D or C. Art-Theory's expansion of the cross-product of (encounter between) A,B models locating these contexts and their relation within sets of enabling conditions. A and B lead to C, however not-A, not-B are implied, are possible outside those determinate conditions, and equivalent in the context of C, meaning that there is a network/frame in which not-C obtains but is valid under not-A, not-B. The probability of that dominant node D given what is upstream or subordinate to it (S), renders a reading of the probability of D and S with respect to S. The logarithmic growth of branches, the links leading to D, means that which is subordinate to D—C, [AxB], A, B—have decreasing probable relevance to D individually—if 100% sure of D, which is highly unlikely, the relevance of the others would be .5, .5, .25, .25 respectively. This is why the notion of interest convergence is key, for there are obvious gains/losses to be had when choosing amongst the possible anchors to one's analysis regarding its relevance or the benefit of ceding that position.

[29] To calculate an equilibrium is to model what occurs at the encounter between two or more vectors of experience and propose what one's credence towards the cross-product expansion we formalize as a theory of that encounter might be. An equilibrium whereby the probability assigned each node along a vector qua thread in the fabric representing the underlying constitution of our state of affairs, can be put in relation to other nodes constituting a subsection of that fabric that is indicative of a particular context and its form of life (inner constitution of that subset/segment) within that whole. Given a particular state-description (matrix) the expected use-value (EU) i.e. significance of a particular arrangement is expressed by a function of that probable arrangement equal to $prob(x) + prob(y)$ where x,y represents the value of that component within that particular framework of points constituting the state of affairs. So,

$$EU_{(D|S)} = f(EU) = p(x) + (1-p)y$$

What we seek is $EU_D = EU_S$. The dynamic in which the subordinate's expression is extracted to explain their position (value) to the dominant so that the dominant can validate or invalidate their point, and if invalid disregard, sets up parameters wherein concessions can be foregone. Most often, this tactic is employed under the guise, "we gave them what they wanted", albeit defined in terms beneficial to one side, so that if value is gained, the claim is that all have made gains; if not, only the subordinate loses and the dominant relinquishes its accountability, "it's not us, its the system" or "you can't say that we are___anymore, we gave you---" (Robinson 1980).

If we render a dominant stipulation irrelevant, then the function of their choices would be exposed as the function of its application, $f(0)=0$, which would be made equivalent to what they had defined the subordinate's value, so $f(0)=f(0)$ whereby $f(D)=f(S)$ from which it is plausible to state that $f(f(0)=f(0))=f(f(0))$=f-successor, an alternative frame for $f(0)\neq f(f(0))$.

[30] The proof shows that R(N) with respect to N is the probability of N's relevance in the domain in which its function is employed, thereby constructing an extension of that domain in which its subsequent use is justifiable. Thus,

$prob(\mathrm{R(N)|N})=\mathrm{X}(w,n,r(n))$

Each individual is measured as a vector over a series of named events constituting that subject's continuity. Therefore prob=X with respect to R(N)|N with respect to the domain in which that function applies. This probability is distributed over these components whereby each 3-tuple represents a domain and a name's functions within that domain. Given two individual X,Y the state of affairs denoted by [X × Y] is such that $prob\mathrm{X}(wy)=\mathrm{X(Y)}$ and $prob\mathrm{Y}(wx)=\mathrm{Y(X)}$ for each component. The subsequent context Z is articulated is valid insofar as the sum of the pair-wise series of the components of X,Y obtains, creating the vector components for Z. Therefore, $f(\mathrm{Z})=\mathrm{Z}$ is valid as Z referencing the means of its construction. From here, our cross-product rules follow (see Baez 2013).

[31] “Excessive” and “bail” are the operative words here. The concept of bail is a sum paid to guarantee the arrival of the person charged with breaking a law to their trial. The equivalence between bail and punitive measure—including penalties, incarceration awaiting or time served before trial, and other fiduciary penalties—is tied to a debtors system.

[32] "The First Amendment requires the invalidation of the Act's independent expenditure ceiling, its limitation on a candidate's expenditures from his own personal funds, and its ceilings on overall campaign expenditures, since those provisions place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate" (Buckley v. Valeo 1975). The court’s *per curiam* (unsigned) opinion affirms this matter: "Virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money. . .The electorate’s increasing dependence on . . . mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech."

[33] This includes incentives that withhold or curtail circulation, as well as subsidies to produce in one sector which in turn deprives another at the expense of the larger population. It pays to acknowledge that the latter is incentivized and subsidized to the benefit of the former. Both are implicated in the same state of affairs. Quantification so as to determine benefit in an opaque context, most often leads to empty predicates—for the constituents of that context are nondeterminate—or contradictions. It follows that whenever, wherever, there is a mass accumulation of wealth, there is one of greater poverty. Surrounding wealth as a hedge or buffer, validating its being defined as such, that core must maintain the state of the periphery in order to ensure or solidify its own position, e.g. settlements in and around Dubai or the banlieues of Paris.

[34] This logic works for those both documented as citizens as well as those who are not. The jurisdiction of the law applies both to citizens and others while the U.S. otherwise undermines its domestic edicts. Just as well, if the system is determined unconstitutional, its rearticulation will not only benefit the citizens but those who are also within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Thus, it is illegal for the government to allow for institutions, i.e. Race, Patriarchy, Homophobia, etc. that produce poor people. It follows that a more “perfect”-able union is tied up with the rearticulation of its system of categorization, especially when the signifier of import within that state of affairs is one’s ability to obtain said categories. Hence, to improve the union, its system of expression must improve the conditions of those subordinate to it. Ultimately, with this recognition, one’s own improvement is tied up within that of others, trivializing the subordinate/dominant distinction.

Consider Wong Kim Ark v. U.S. (1898) and Boumediene v. Bush (2008). The U.S. cannot retroactively construct a provision that violates its own. The latter case protects the writ of habeas corpus for citizens

and those not yet within the borders of the U.S. The former case makes it so that 5th Amendment rights extend to non-citizens within the U.S. as well. Also, nowhere in the Bill of Rights does the term "citizen" appear, which makes the distinction between who is and who is "not" arbitrary with regard to those rights. The extension of a weaker and more expansive definition of "crime" in order to produce and capture, through that caveat, individuals whose role are equivalent to a slave, in a society that has outlawed slavery, is of high importance in this context. As conditions change, the way in which that symbol is used to express infringements and therefore removal from the categorical parameters enforced on the benefit of civic membership and order also changes. As strict identity between term and definition is contingent to, and only necessary in and only in, the context in which that term has a function, a term cannot appear in its own definition. That definition, then, would require definition upon definition *ad infinitum*. Each definition would be an alternative interpretation, a new function, appropriate to the newly articulated state of affairs and assigned to what/who is determined criminal based on one's membership within an ever changing set of acts considered such. The categorical label "crime " is defined by no one thing, only certain things. Each singular act, considered individually, could and does gain one access to a different categorization by way of the property assigned to that act, which again enforces the context (temporal) and state (legislative) dependency on definition. As such, the function or scope of the label "crime," changes with the articulation of an alternative form of life. The domain in which it applies shifts when conditions change. If the form of life in the context, as well as that context's method of construction, changes the predetermined function of the label criminal, will no longer incarcerate the objects it used to. For on its own, a label has no scope, for it must be assigned. However, if its use is indicative of its function, even the same function over a different domain renders different output, a different set of outcomes. If the conditions change and the image of what obtains that categorization and created by the operation of that term displaces another, then functional, therefore structural, change has not occurred. One must change the conditions so that the issue no longer arises, such that the enactment of that label is rendered innocuous to those it used to harm, even if the label itself persists. In the least, by attending to the conditions in which the issue emerge, instead of stopping after the problem has been identified, those beholden to the use of that term for their own benefit are revealed.

[35] Indeed, if the major innovation of capitalism is the commodification of labor, regardless of its appearance, and, thereby, the commodification of people's production *qua* mode of expression, then this result should be uncontroversial. The fact that these findings come as no surprise is the point of this paper. As a system that constitutes relations between individuals in society as mutually constitutive of that society, we assume that all are implicated in the expression of that system if a member of the context of its expression. In that way, we can propose a change to the system. Changes proposed or made external to it are either incorporated to substantiate or further its reach—as per its design—even if valid; obtain no object in that context, for how would one know what they are talking about; or is self-refuting, contradicting the very proposal it offers by its application.

[36] The syntax of that language expresses what should be the standard welfare as articulated by the constitution. Thus, a system such as Race, whose enactment, i.e. racism, stipulates that Black individuals are defined by a condition of poverty, (Huntington 1975; Kerner Commission 1967 (Executive Order 11365); Moynihan 1965; Powell 1971) is illegal. There is an explicit connection between capitalism as a system of circulation of currency, of speech, and its enactment through and foundations in racism (Robinson 1983).

[37] We are not under the delusion of believing that those who wish to further inequities actually do or will play by their own rules, nor accept that these are the only axioms they, we, have. One need only look at abuses regarding the interpretation of the 13th Amendment, where incarceration leads to a revocation of one's right to speak—in particular the vote as speech act. This seems in blatant contradiction to what has been laid out above, making it cruel and unusual, albeit still within the domain of legal means to articulate political will.

[38] Dominance is expressed as a function of subordination, thus, $D(S)=S$. When $D(S)=S$, then $D(0)=D$, for D itself, as the label of a category whose members are characterized as "D", is as yet of no one thing in particular so $D(S)=S$ when $S=0$. Thus, $D(D(0))=$D-successor, the context constructed after the application of a function of dominance via an operation of subordination. In this way, $D(S)=S$, so $D(S, D(S))=S+1$, enumerating what constitutes a domain-member in which a subordinate-dominate relation obtains. In sum, the operation of subordination that expresses a dominant relation does not have any content save its function of application.

[39] Let *b* be an immutably racialized object made identical with a context-specific label upon which W-supremacy is defined. As such,

b=B(b)

b is only known by the function of its assignment. So,

$f(b)=b$

when *b* is 0, the function of its assertion, its name, can still be determined prior to application. B is left without explanation save that the object *b* is only known insofar as it obtains the conditions indexed by the context labeled B. Recall N=W+R(N), B is a function of b. Without b, B(0)=B, a categorical label without an object. If b satisfies the conditions marked by B, then we know that the content of B is no thing but the function of its application, i.e. B($f(b)=b$)=B. Even if B=A, this is the case only when B(0)=A(0) which are b-related for $f(b)=b$ at zero. And yet, "A", "B" are distinct identities—individual yet not mutually exclusive if *b*-related. Due to the above, we can show the function of the operation that is b-ness valid in the contexts in which B obtains and we can show the operation that animates the identities applied to those affairs, related identity wise by way of the subject underlying them all. b-ness, then, expressed by the function of the operation of that determinate of the contexts in which it obtains, is exhausted by no one context in particular and participates in many.

Above, *b* is supposed to obtain in W which can only happen through B, so W and B are not interchangeable. As W(0)=W then W(B)=W($f(b)$)=W($f(0)$)=$f(f(0))$=W' as an extension of W-supremacy. However, this proof shows that W only has access to that immutable object through its identity under B and as B in and of itself is 0, W-supremacy is either hollow or, more likely, W'=W(0)=W which is a contradiction.

[40] T. Thomas Fortune, 19-20th century proponent of the term Afro-American, made similar arguments. Its most recent definition, from within blackness itself, was decided in 1988 at a Chicago Conference in which Jesse Jackson proposed the universal acceptance and governmental recognition of the identifier, for it was assumed that 'Black' and 'Negro' had negative connotations, and blackness in the U.S. was, at the time, void of the ethnic content required as a referent for political direction. Here, blackness, as expressed by its mode of articulating a self in the contexts in which it participates with the means available therein, is constructive and therefore could not have a cultural endowment void of content. Although with good intentions, Jackson and others missed the point.

[41] Proof that overdetermination is incomplete comes directly from our formulations via a Tarski-schema regarding the validity of identity assertions. If there is an immutably racialized individual *b* such that the identity B holds, the identity B is true iff [$f(b)=b$ and B] such that B(*b*). However, $f(b)=b$ is valid only when b is at its zero; so, [f(b)=b]="b"=B and therefore B(0)=B for that identity to hold necessarily across contexts. We find that "*b*"="0" so "*b*" is true when "0" obtains the frame implied by the use of B. However, the content of "*b*"=B is zero for, e.g., $f(0)=0$=F, then F(0)=F($f(0)$)=$f(f(0))$=1 or valid for F=F(0)=F is necessarily true. Thus the statement is true iff its content is zero; if the content is zero the statement is true, for the zero of a series is (the means by which) its function of construction (is determined), but the system has just formalized a statement that cannot be proven to have content or not, satisfiable or not, by its very terms and therefore is incomplete. "B"-content is functional. Although the function by which *b* is expressed can be used to construct systems in which what obtains that system cannot refer to itself, prove its own validity, what is not a member is defined upon which what is, is determined. If the function of *b* express *b*-ness by way of the application/use of B, then blackness is not necessarily the case for every Black identity, yet blackness marks the conditions by which the contexts in which Black exists is necessarily possibly (see Barcan Marcus' (1946, 1947) treatment of Brouwer). If according to Kwame Anthony Appiah (2020) Black-ID then blackness is expressed by how that identity operates, according to Heyting algebras for logic, blackness > Black-ID for if Black then blackness=Black≤blackness for blackness insofar as the domain of Black-ID obtains but Black-ID obtains given blackness due to the relevance of conditionalization discussed above.

"0" content should not worry us as 0 is an element of null, and null is guaranteed at least one member, itself, i.e. 0. Every other element is built up from null. This is the case for the intersection of anything with

null is null itself, thus each thing is a function of null and itself, i.e. 0×0=0, 0×1=0 i.e. 1(0)=0, etc. So either set theoretically--0, {0}=1, {{0}} or {0, {0}}=2, etc.—or considered by the disjoint union of the domains an enumeration denotes—0+0=0, 0+1=1, 0+2=2 and so on—everything is null related. Thus, null is a member of every one thing constructed, for null itself is no one thing in particular which are equivalent descriptions, since the null in each construction represents the point-wise identity of its function of construction. So to say "null content" means that the function defined in itself picks out no one thing in particular, thus any one thing is possible until that function is applied. So if null=0, for the content of null is the zero of every function by which a possible domain is constructed, then $null^0=1$, the class of no one thing or set in particular is made up of every one thing from which anything can be articulated.

It is easy enough to show that blackness can operate under multiple identities that are not mutually exclusive and indicative of a form of life across contexts. If African-American is not interchangeable with Black then A(0)=A and B(0)=B, therefore, A(0)=B(0) is the condition for their being related but not interchangeable, otherwise, contradictions could arise. As $f(b)=b$ is zero, then $B[f(b)=b]=A[f(x)=x]$ so that $x=b$, their content being the function whose operation constructs the contexts in which A, B are members. A,B are *b*-related with *b* being both a part of and apart from the domains indexed to A or B for the zero of a function represents its determinate before its application, so necessary within those contexts but the function of their construction is determinable before its application in either one, e.g. zero is both a part of and rests apart from a defined series of numbers, and yet the zero of a series can be uniquely determined regardless of where one is in the number line. Thus, if there is any discernible "fact of blackness" (Moten 2008) it is that blackness is expressed by an operation, not indexed to one and only one thing/ID or by definition alone. That operation *qua* object of thought, can be formalized, illustrated, as a function as yet applied before it resides under any one identity. As such, blackness is constructive. The contexts in which its identities are indexed to the contexts in which blackness participates under various names are related in such a way that there is subject continuity outside of identity stipulation, for they are incomplete. Thus, an affinity between these identities whose operation express the concept of Black forms of life are in excess of ethnic or national distinctions, because only the names appropriate to those contexts are fixed, but blackness is known under many names and phenotypes. Blackness is in excess of any one identity. The way in which blackness is expressed is by how identities operate within various conditions.

REPRESENTATIONAL DIVERGENCE

[1] Proof: if my strategy is A and yours is B, a situation S that occurs in both is “common knowledge.” So, for any arbitrarily chosen strategy X, let Y=S(X given A) and Z=S(X given B). Take a common knowledge situation S where the probability of its occurring is P(S)>0 and where moves in each strategic response to that situation is Y=*y* and Z=*z*. Then, a strategic appropriate response is a subset of the moves in that strategy overall given that situation such that, $P(S)y=S(Y_1)=S(X_1)=S(Z_1)=P(S)z$ by S’s definition. So if $y=z$ then it cannot be common knowledge that we disagree.

[2] Let strategy A be expressed by a move-function *f* such that: (if ((if A then *f*) then *f*) then A) (Church, 1956). So, if the expression of A entails a function by which it is expressed, and that function is the case, then A is the case. From this, from any strategy the function whereby its expressed can be abstracted.

[3] So, in the context of one player, decomposition is defined: $f(X_1, X_2, \ldots X_n) = X_1 f(1, X_2, \ldots X_n) + X'_1 f(0, X_2, \ldots X_n)$ where *f* evaluates the conditions at the start of each turn (left-side of the equation) and encodes options representing board conditions by way of the sum of the products of the evaluative function and each option (right-side). From this, a logic can be formed whereby which moves are valid/appropriate can be deduced, i.e. wherein a move would not result in $1 \neq 0$.

[4] An explanation of conditional statements is due here. We treat conditions not as truth functions in themselves but by their assertability conditions. The truth conditions of a conditional statement is generally taken to be that it is not the case that one obtains a true antecedent (A) and a false consequent (C). However, this in effect states that a conditional is true just as case C is true which provides no information regarding the connection between A,C as well as making it seem as though anything can follow from contradiction, making the relevance between the two trivial. So, either the antecedent

represents an empty or one contradictory to the consequent, or the consequent is the case given, insofar as, that antecedent condition. Thus, the truth value of a conditional statement depends on the possibility of there being a domain in which A is the case and from which C follows; but also that if A is true and C false or if A,C are incoherent/incompatible with each other, that the conditional statement is either false or ambiguous because the connection is irrelevant. Obviously, if both A and C are false, then the conditional is false, i.e. inapplicable anywhere. In this way, a conditional statement represents a function which maps an antecedent from one domain to a consequent in a sub/co-domain. If the domain is empty, there is no range of applications between a domain of selection of antecedent to one of composition with compatible consequents. So, if A is not the case in this context, then C does not follow, however, if A is not of this context it posits an alternative in which some other C may follow just not this one. Therefore, antecedent conditions contain multiple consequences but once the domain is stipulated, what follows necessarily follows.

Formally, if A then C, A therefore C given A evaluates to C given the validity of A so if A is false so is the inference from A to C whereas for the domain in which A is the case at present, it is not the case that A and not-C, e.g. (1) if red then apple, red, therefore apple given red seems to characterize that apple predicates red. However, this seems implausible for red is not a thing necessarily and there are apples of other colors so apple does not necessarily follow from red thing. (1) is either ambiguous or contradictory for its validity hinges upon it not being the case that we have a red thing and not an apple which is too strict to posit in most cases. (2) if apple then red, apple therefore red given apple posits red as a predicate of a domain of apples. (2) then is more likely than not and therefore the conditions in which it can be asserted is more plausible and can be determined for situations in which it is not the case that we obtain apples and that those apples are not red. So, red apples with respect to all red things has a very low probability of being the case or positing a meaningful relationship between antecedent and consequent. Red apples with respect to the domain of apples is more likely to yield a meaningful, i.e. relevant, relation between antecedent and consequent. Therein lies our analysis above. The conditional is valid insofar as it is applicable and its assertability conditions are more likely true than false given those conditions.

[5] As a quick example:

a. They were born, they lived, they died.
b. They lived, they died, they were born.
c. They died, they lived, they were born.

Each presupposes various frameworks in which the order makes sense, conveys a particular narrative, while each remains distinct. If all were considered simultaneously, some are ungrammatical, others incommensurable. Kenneth Taylor (1998) considered this model with respect to language and action. This result, considered in the cultural studies framework we have been trying to elucidate, shows how modes of expression represent modes of inhabiting the world by way of the means of formulating and, therefore, employing those expressions. These expressions are indexed to the contexts in which their assertion is appropriate for citing those enabling conditions by way of the prior contexts in which those expressions were made and of which that context is a successor in that chain going back to the initial determinate of those conditions.

[6] See A. Budiman, C. Tamir, L Mora, & L. Noe-Bustamante, (2018) "Facts on U.S. immigrants, 2018 Statistical portrait of the foreign-born population in the United States," PEW Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/20/facts-on-u-s-immigrants-trend-data/; K. Bialik, (2018) "5 facts about black Americans," PEW Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/22/5-facts-about-blacks-in-the-u-s/; and M. Anderson, (2015) "A Rising Share of the U.S. Black Population Is Foreign Born 9 Percent Are Immigrants; and While Most Are from the Caribbean, Africans Drive Recent Growth," PEW Research Center, https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/04/09/a-rising-share-of-the-u-s-black-population-is-foreign-born/#fnref-20232-2.

[7] Removed as of 2018 (https://www.centcom.mil/Portals/6/usmtm/USMTMWelcomeBooklet.pdf), full story can be found: Rempfer, Kyle (2018), "CENTCOM apologizes and removes manual containing the phrase 'Negro blood'," https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/11/02/centcom-apologizes-and-removes-manual-containing-the-phrase-negro-blood/

[8] This is not an argument against participation in the Census, as it has dire implications for how and where government funds are assigned, how they're appropriated to communities, how services are apportioned, voting and representation determined, etc. But know what game you're playing. Even in resignation, one affirms the board. This Russellian paradox offers a set-theoretical explanation of incorporation by dispossession, how in our Census example Black-ness seems to be expanding in the US and yet its measured identity seems to be shrinking in proportion to others. We see how the subjectivity animating the identity under which Black-ness is known in this context is disavowed for its products (Moten 2003; Mbembe 2013) as it seems that Blacks are not considered American (Brown 2015) but produce what is of value and later exported as American (von Eschen 2004). How, then, can discrete identities be indexed to their respective contexts and yet Black-ness, expressed by the function of those identities, remain continuous, i.e. a member of various contexts yet under different names?

[9] The concept of a cultural endowment (Hurston 1934), then, would posit a set of identities that are individual but not mutually exclusive. These identities are mobilized under various signifying practices representing different operations but whose function produce similar effects in the contexts, domains, in which they are embedded (Gates Jr 1988). The set of these practices, these functions as yet applied and related at their zero, presents us with the repertoire that populates that endowment. We saw this with our C-conditions above, C(0)=C, here representing a category labeling a context without members. Therefore, that context's only content is the means of applying that label which has no scope in itself—for names as tags see Fara (2015), Kripke (1980), Russell (1921). However, a "C"-assertion after application references its prior which is not the thing labeled, for now in a successor context but the means of application deemed appropriate in this context. So C(C)=C' such that C'=C_1, C_1'=C_2 etc. but $C_1 \neq C_2$ and yet are C-related. Projected into each enumerated context is an aspect of C-ness, the C-relation showing that C itself is continuous but in contexts in which C is not represented, it still is present as a 0-member. So C's zero is present in each C-context but is only represented as 1, 2, . . .in those contexts so that C-ness is both a member of both 1 and 2 but if in the context of 2 is not the same as it is in 1. Signifying practices become practices introducing the as yet from the endowment of C into the various contexts in which it participates. The historical progression of these citations are retained albeit in some contexts are not known under names as they were previously defined.

Formally, we can see this in the following way. Consider a function *f* and a function *g* such that:

a. for all *x*, if *f*(*x*) then not-*g*(*x,x*) for *f*(*x*)=*x* thus positing the content of an X-assertion whose "object" falls under the category now uniquely defined by the property X constructed by the application of *f* because X(0)=X by virtue of its means of construction.
b. for all *x,y,* if *f*(*x*) and *f*(*y*) and *g*(*x,y*) then $x \neq y$, thus providing the means of articulation of *x,y* which are individual but not mutually exclusive for under the context of G, so X,Y are *g*-related.
c. for all *x,y,* if *f*(*x*) and *f*(*y*) and not-($x = y$) and not-*g*(*x,y*) then *g*(*y,x*), the manner in which thoughts/moves/subjects *x,y* are articulated is significant, they're well-ordered.
d. for all *x,y,z,* if *f*(*x*) and *f*(*y*) and *f*(*z*) and *g*(*x,y*) and *g*(*y,z*) then *g*(*x,z*), the projection of a representation for *x,y,z* from a domain of selection to one of composition relates those identities by way of their means of articulation. The same endowment can contain individual, at times contradictory after application, identities and yet as the content of the endowment are functions before their application, once applied articulate into different contexts of appropriate assertion and yet their products are not mutually exclusive for applied from a particular endowment.

What is most interesting is that a continuity of subject is shown possible by way of providing a means of conceptualizing how the functions of particular expressions can be united within a domain, a repertoire of signifying practices housed within a cultural endowment. This intersubjective basis under the function of *g* in which the function mobilizing *x,y,z* identities does not violate that the various contexts in which those identities play a role makes it such that given particular conditions, if that identity is valid by way of the function of its application, then it is necessary within but only within those conditions. Thus from this set of tautologies (0), we obtain the following:

i. if necessarily-B then B
ii. if necessarily-(if B then B') then (if necessarily-B then necessarily-B')
iii. if B then for all *x*, B
iv. if for all *x*, (if B then B'), then, (if for all *x*, B, then for all *x*, B')
v. for all *y*, if for all *x* B, then B of *y*

And as B ≠ B', then B'=A or C, etc. The same subject can be expressed via different identities, those identities necessary to the contexts in which they are deemed appropriate, however, as that subject participates in multiple contexts, that subject's capacity is not exhausted by one and only one context.

[10] An operation that pulls from while also cultivates an endowment whose content is a repertoire of signifying practices marked appropriate for certain conditions can be defined by illustrating the condition that any two "moves" *x,y* of that endowment is such that every property inherited by *x* is so by *y*. A property expressed by the function of selection to an operation of composition with other moves, i.e. displaying B-ness, is indicative of a particular form of subjectivity, i.e. inherited from one's being a member as well as cultivating a particular endowment, is such if for any aspect of that B domain, *b*, and some *b*-successor:

(*b*, *b*') such that *f*(*b*) and *f*(*b*') and *g*(*b*,*b*') and B(*b*) is such that if there is no successor of *b*', i.e. *b*'' and *f*(*b*'') and *g*(*b*,*b*'') and *g*(*b*'',*b*') then B(*b*'')

Which fits in with our model of individual but not mutually exclusive signifying practices as:

(*x*,*y*) such that *f*(*x*), *f*(*y*), and *g*(*x*,*y*) then B such that if there is a relation R such that R(B,*f*,*g*) and B(*x*) then B(*y*).

A quick example would be that a for a descending series of numbers between 1 and 0, where a property belongs to 1, e.g. it's being a positive number, must belong to every term in that series except 0. That zero being the function of that series' construction for *f*(*x*)=*x* at 0, thus *f*(*f*)=*f* so *f*(*f*(*x*))=*x*'. Thus, if *x,y* are members of that series, i.e. endowment or strategy implicating the player making identifiable moves on the board, then it is the operation of making an *x*-assertion that expresses a property, *x*' being a successor of *x*, which can be identified with a token on the board *y* such that *x is* understood as *y* in the game, i.e. *x,y* are *g*-related.

[11] "Exists" may get us into trouble, for our method is to eliminate that which is extra-systemic that cannot be justified within the system. However, a parameter that is not clearly defined in the rule book may emerge on the board as the game progresses. Having abstracted the function whereby a strategy was employed from how moves appear on the board, to say "exists" means that if there is a function mapping that move from a strategy domain to a set of conditions on the board, then that move has the property of exhibiting a particular strategy. We see above that if an option is present but left open, it remains an option, a non-move move, composing the state represented on the board. That strategy is indicative of the subject animating what has come to be identified on the board. So now, "there is. . ." or "there exists. . ." is exhibited by an operation: (if (if exist then valid) then valid) Where "valid" means that the function of its expression is not inconsistent and representable within the current domain. So "there is an expression such that that expression exhibits Black-ness" given (if (if there is a Black expression that is valid) then valid) which evaluates to either it's the case that the expression is not valid or it is valid given that expression is valid on board, i.e. translates as a move in some way to others even if not understood, i.e. does not harmonize with or undermines their strategy.

[12] From here, a means of articulating B-ness in that context can be modeled where each articulation can be assigned a sign of the context in which that articulation obtains, representing a B-successor demonstrating the extent to the domain of blackness which is not empty but filled with functions by which it articulates itself. Thereby a substitution function for all free variables in a second or third order formulation can be shown valid for wherever there is a 0, the zero of blackness can be substituted with the least amount of extra-systemic stipulations beginning questions of account. If that substitution does not contradict others in that context, that is a context in which blackness obtains even if posited in negation for if it is false that Black-isomorphic identities obtain access to dominant position, then the negation of blackness in that context posits that it is true that blackness is a member, just not a member that gains recognition within the value structure. As the free positions (variables) in that structure are not constant for an identity has obtained, the truth conditions from which those translated into those affairs hold even if they do not amount to a dominant positioning. Thus, the symbolism of the chain of articulations of one line of citation can be interpreted in another under a sign appropriate into the conditions of the latter, even if proof of its method of articulation, i.e. consistency with those latter conditions, cannot be obtained in the language in which only its sign or identity appears based inductive

principles. In other words, there exists a second-order formula, i.e. how that articulation appears after its undergoing a process of rearticulation i.e. move from one context to another, such that for all 0/open-positions in that second order or successor move into the apparent surface organization of a state of affairs, such that that formula into which that function projects a representation from its priors can be made equivalent to a formula in the language of the second, whereby both players understand the conditions of the newly articulated surface structure of that state of affairs.

Thus the subjectivity animating any one of the identified positions on the boards from move to move is expressed by way of a recursive operation manipulating representations of thoughts, strategy, on the board and in so doing manipulating the very conditions of that board in which certain options emerge or are disallowed. Formally, if R represents the domain of that operation, i.e. endowment wherein a strategy selects and then projects aspects of itself on the board, S the recursive operation that members considered a part of that endowment and M the enumeration of those members, then:

$R(k, X_1 \ldots X_n) = S(X_{n-1})$ and $M(X_{k+1} \ldots X_n)$

or

$M(k, R(X_{k+1} \ldots X_n) \ldots X_n)$

where $k < n$. In sum, this evaluates to $R(x_n+1)=R(x_{m+1}\ (x_{n-1}))$.

[13] What, then, if Black-ness's value is negated? What we see above is that existence is not a predicate, but an operator. To say that Black identity is incommensurable with the system in which that identity is employed, and to negate it would posit a statement about a Black identity that is valid, thereby ensuring by that operation that Black-ness is, in some sense, the case, e.g. if B=false, to say that not-B would not be to say that B does not exist but that "not-B"=true, which inadvertently grants existence to that which is being negated within the framework employed. This shows that Black-ness is possible, for it was expressed in some way. We find this in the connection between quantification and modality. To form an expression is to determine the manner in which the subject of that expression exists in the world in which that expression functions. A possibility operator can be defined such that a position is possible if and only if there does not exist a context such that within a particular set of conditions that asserted position does not produce contradictory identities within that context. As possibility can be determined from not-necessarily-not, we can show that necessarily is equivalent to not-possibility-not. Thus, necessity can be defined from universal quantification: an identity is necessary if and only if for all contexts in which that subject participates, if that position is claimed within those contexts then it is identified in the same way. Formally, necessarily-*q* if and only if for all *p* then *q*. However, one must account for *p* in order for *q* to be necessary. Thus, possibly-*p* if and only if there is no *q* such that if *p* then both *q* and not-*q*. It follows that possibility precedes necessity, a possible domain must be the case in order for what is necessary therein can be determined.

If a move is evidence of a particular predicament in which the subject, who is not on the board but represented by its moves, then the content of that predicament is a function that maps moves/expressions to conditions in which that expression can be evaluated, thus "existence" as being identifiable, quantified, within the parameters of the game or system is an operator whose domain is that class of functions. A repertoire of signifying practice, in this context, is a strategic framework employed in the game. This gets us around the Russellian paradox as the set of non-members is a class of functions indexed to the conditions in which their application is appropriate that come available and as those conditions emerge, not by stipulation alone. It follows that Black-ness is valid for the frameworks in which it can be formalized can be shared across contexts but not all making a particular form of life and yet a form of life with extension.

From this, it follows that a subject must be possible in order for a necessary identity statement to obtain. Just as well, identities may be incompatible within the same framework but without there being a possible domain in which each identity does obtain, then that identity is impossible to make. Even if that subject is the 0-member of that context, if identified as such and that identity is negated, that statement affirms that subject as the 0-member in this context yet a possible member of another whose predicates members of this context do not have access to. A move may be unavailable now, but can become possible

and may be necessary in a subsequent state of affairs. As a result, since subjectivity is affirmed even if its identity is as a 0-member, we contend that subjectivity is a concept expressed by the function of an operation, it is not interchangeable with a thing. Thus the suffix -ness indicates that subjectivity is in excess of any one identity and yet that identity is necessary to the context, not the subject, in which that subject appears. A subject can be known, "expressed," in many ways. For a more simplified example, one need only look to the syntax of English. Negation cannot precede modals, e.g. "…not may…" is ungrammatical; "…may not…" is valid. Thus, in order to negate how an entity is identified, that entity must exist in order for the predicament determined for it to be evaluated.

[14] For example, a cop showing up in response to a public health, school, or non-violent situation because institutionalized structures' only recourse. No program or action that presupposes the cops being there can be devised to fix the situation after it turns into one for which the cop is not trained or equipped. The cop shouldn't have been there in the first place. Assuming that the function of policing is to respond to crime, their being there inadvertently categorizes whatever the situation is as a crime; thus if wrong occurs, this asymmetry absolves one side of blame by definition while the respondee is categorically the only one that perpetuates harm. This shows why intents as ends usually fail, for most racist action was completed under what functions as the good indexed to a context which is structurally inequitable. Confirmation alone will not get us anywhere, as racism is not a thing: it is a system expressed by an operation. A thing that is racist does not exist per deniers, but the impact of its function indicates the existence of that system which posits a relation that is not present but represented by the way individuals are made subordinate. To equate it with one and only one thing per context either leads to an insurmountable aggregate of instances and artifacts, or the possibility to deny racism's existence when it occurs, because we have removed that object and that object no longer exists in the same way or does not fit into the experience of the one benefiting from that operation. Racism is a relation between positions that allows access to or something to or to not emerge. To affirm that the function of a racist image or act is so is to only acknowledge its byproduct.

[15] Consider if it is necessarily the case that NOT-P, then it's the case that NOT-P. Then by contraposition if P then it is NOT-necessarily-NOT the case that P. From this, we see that by the definition of possibility, if P then possibly P. From this, we can conclude that if possibly P then it is necessarily the case that possibly P.

[16] It's not that things happen outside of the game that affect the game but that the player, as a non-member member of the board, by projecting a strategy represented by their moves on it, implicates what's outside, inside. By virtue of the function of their operations on the board, players are implicated in the game. This is what a coalition of signifying practices entails: that emergent affinities reveal the underlying presuppositions utilized and rendered open for movement on the board and can be utilized to construct conditions in which responses by players are rendered innocuous or disallowed. If stipulated, as in an interview, one would set conditions wishing for something to emerge, but that relies on the other to recognize the intent despite what representation was transmitted. One must attend to the way the thought is encoded even in the question, not what expressively came out of their mouth. Otherwise, we rely on predetermined responses to what is apparent, which means we have presupposed an order of operations. If what comes out falls outside of that line, what is apparent has not been affirmed and tactics ensue to subordinate the other back under that "series" of moves, or line(s) of reasoning.

[17] "Overdetermination," then, is a measure of divergence, where disagreement occurs. As affinities are modelled with respect to $pq + (1 - p)(1 - q)$, then overdetermination measures the asymmetry with regards to the value of positions available by $p(1 - q) + q(1 - p)$. Therefore:

1 – divergence = affinity
divergence = 1 – affinity

Thus, possibility of constructing affinities whereby overdetermination can be subverted is pq^{agree} and divergence is $pq^{\text{divergence}}$, i.e. the probability of moves from A,B insofar as they agree and the probability of moves from A,B insofar as they diverge.

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At a 1980 UNESCO conference, the sociologist, cultural theorist and activist Stuart Hall made a call to formalize a theory for Articulation: how relationships of subordination and dominance emerge, evolve, and are reproduced. Focus on the output of this process rather than the process itself led to an increase in centering representation within socio-cultural and political formations. A paradox arises wherein there's a divergence between representation and social change. R|D answers Stuart Hall's appeal and applies it to the study of Race and racialization to attend to this paradox and offer an alternative.

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